Contents

Program ........................................................................................................................................ 3
  Theme ....................................................................................................................................... 3
  Program .................................................................................................................................. 5

Keynote Speech
New Cultural Economy and Changes of Economic Spaces ......................................................... 7
  *Sam Ock Park* (Seoul National University, Korea)

Session I: Urban Culture, History, and Memory in East Asia
Wandering along Urban Phantasmagoria: The Lindenpassage in Berlin and the
  Nanjing Lu in Shanghai .......................................................................................................... 21
  *Jaeho Kang* (New School for Social Research, USA)

City and Town in Chinese History ............................................................................................. 28
  *Ren Fang* (Wuhan University, China)

Session II: Taiwan and Beijing - Culture and Social Space
The Cosmopolitan Imaginary and Flexible Identities of Global City-Regions:
  Articulating new Cultural Identities in Taipei and Shanghai .................................................. 56
  *Tsung-yi Michelle Huang* (National Taiwan University, Taiwan)

Changing Social Space of Beijing ............................................................................................... 82
  *Yanwei Chai* (Peking University, China)

Session III: Tokyo and Seoul - Culture and Spatial Economy
Changing Spatial Economy and Cultural Industries in Tokyo ..................................................... 98
  *Hiroshi Matsubara* (University of Tokyo, Japan)

Making ‘Chic’ Places of Seoul: Art Galleries’ Role in Cultural Economy ................................. 106
  *Hakhee Kim* (Gyeongin National University of Education, Korea)
Transformation of Culture and Spatial Economy of Asian City-Regions

SMF 2008

Transformation of Culture and Spatial Economy of Asian City-Regions

THEME

Much of economic success of the East Asian economies owe to the rapid economic progress in their large cities. In this sense, issue of urban competitiveness is particularly pertinent to East Asian megacities. The large cities in East Asia have enjoyed the explosive growth during the last three or four decades. These growths were mainly brought by real economic opportunity in megacities. Millions of new jobs have been created there. Megacities enjoy the agglomeration economies and also have comparative advantages in dealing with international trade and foreign technology transfer. Furthermore, the "Western" experience is no longer the basis for seeking the understanding of the nature of urban forms and processes in Asian setting, especially for the complex adjustments in social, cultural, and economic relationships.

The Seoul Metropolitan Fora 2008 : 'Transformation of Culture and Spatial Economy of Asian City-Regions' aims of presenting diverse approaches and wide-ranging views on East Asian urban transformations. The symposium will diagnose urban culture, memory, and spatial economy for the 21st century and present our best efforts to the problems from cities. The organizing committee hopes that this event will provide a momentum for researching into urban culture and spatial economy and hopefully establishing new paradigms in urban studies towards the 21st century.

Keynote address of the symposium will raise the issue of the changing culture and spatial economy in the Pacific Rim area. Session I will focus on Urban Culture, History, and Memory in East Asian metropolitan regions. Session II will deal with the culture and spatial economy in Taiwan and Beijing and Session III on Tokyo and Seoul. From the gathering of most prominent scholars and specialists, the Conference will investigate theoretical foundations for the transformations of metropolitan culture and space. Bringing together distinguished scholars and professionals from diverse fields, the Conference will paint a picture of the larger urban civilization in this late modern age, a portrait of bold strokes borne out of rigorous examination, seeking its implications for Seoul and the cities of the East Asian region.
SMF 2008

Transformation of Culture and Spatial Economy of Asian City-Regions

Seoul Metropolitan Fora
The Seoul Metropolitan Fora (SMF) is The University of Seoul's extramural program on urban affairs and studies, created to facilitate exchange of ideas and experiences among scholars, professionals and students both from home and abroad. It will be offered on a continuing basis, and in various forms such as symposium, workshop, distinguished lecture series, roundtable discussion, and exhibition. The Fora represent the University's strong commitment to the enrichment of urbanism that has become one of the focal problematic of the modern world.
SMF 2008 PROGRAMME

□ 11:30 - 12:30 Luncheon

□ 12:30 - 13:00 Registration

□ 13:00-13:10 Opening Ceremony

Welcome Speech: In Sung Lee (Director, IUS, University of Seoul, Korea)
Congratulatory Speech: Sang Bum Lee (President, University of Seoul, Korea)

□ 13:10-13:40 Keynote Address

Sam Ock Park (Seoul National University, Korea)
: New Cultural Economy and Changes of Economic Spaces

□ 13:40-15:00 Session I: Urban Culture, History, and Memory in East Asia

Moderator: Seong-Paik Lee (University of Seoul, Korea)
Papers: Jaeho Kang (New School for Social Research, USA)
: Wandering along Urban Phantasmagoria: The Lindenpassage in Berlin and the Nanjing Lu in Shanghai
Ren Fang (Wuhan University, China)
: City and Town in Chinese History
Discussants: Mi-Sun Park (University of Seoul, Korea)
Seung-Wook Kim (University of Seoul, Korea)

□ 15:00 - 15:20 Tea Break

□ 15:20-16:40 Session II: Taiwan and Beijing- Culture and Social Space

Moderator: Byung-Hyuck Lee (University of Seoul, Korea)
Papers: Tsung-yi Michelle Huang (National Taiwan University, Taiwan)
: The Cosmopolitan Imaginary and Flexible Identities of Global City-Regions:
Articulating New Cultural Identities in Taipei and Shanghai
Yanwei Chai (Peking University, China)
: Changing Social Space of Beijing

Discussants: U-Seok Seo (University of Seoul, Korea)
Wonho Jang (University of Seoul, Korea)

☐ 16:40 - 17:00 Tea Break

☐ 17:00-18:20  Session III: Tokyo and Seoul- Culture and Spatial Economy
Moderator: Jeong Rock Lee (Jeonnam National University, Korea)

Papers: Hiroshi Matsubara (University of Tokyo, Japan)
: Changing Spatial Economy and Cultural Industries in Tokyo
   Hakhee Kim (Gyeongin National University of Education, Korea)
: Making 'Chic' Places of Seoul: Art Galleries’ Role in Cultural Economy

Discussants: Wonho Lee (Sungshin Women’s University, Korea)
   Pil-Sung Byun (Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements, Korea)

☐ 18:40 - Dinner
KEYNOTE ADDRESS

New Cultural Economy and Changes of Economic Spaces

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I. Introduction

Culture is at the root of many urban regeneration schemes throughout the world.

Connection between cultural production and urban industrial concentration.

Global cities --> Homelands of modern cultural industries.
  - Sources of creative and innovative energy.

Cultural economy: diverse from craft industries to modern media industries, such as cinema and music recording.

Evolution of new cultural economy, structural changes, new production systems, changes of economic spaces.
II. New Cultural Economy (1)

Core of cultural economy/creative economy

- Production of cultural outputs, ranging from purely experiential items (film, recorded music, etc) to design-intensive artefacts (clothing, jewellery, etc)

Modern cultural economy

- Extending beyond the central core—to imbue all manner of otherwise utilitarian products (from cars to mobile phone; from eyeglasses to kitchen utensils) with distinctive aesthetic and semiotic contents.

- Shift of the point of view from producer to consumer.
- Vigorous expansion of the cultural economy

II. New Cultural Economy (2)

The rise of new cultural economy

- Poses and reposes many theoretical and empirical questions: location, space and place

Reconsiderations of the geographer’s agenda in the light of recent research on the cultural economy: industrial districts, urbanization, city-regions; regional development, globalization, and others.

- Policy makers: emphasis of the cultural economy as a potential source of local and national economic growth engines.

- Linked to new economy:
  high-tech industry; business services; personal services and so on.

- Starting to emerge new form of capitalism beyond the earlier formulation ('post-fordism' or 'flexible specialization'): 'cognitive capitalism' (Moulier Boutang, 2007); 'cognitive-cultural economy (Scott, 2007).
II. New Cultural Economy (3)

Evolution toward a model of production

- Ever-increasing extent on human cognition, sensibility, social intelligence;

- Enhanced operation by means of digital ICT

- Examples: higher volume of music, film, theatrical performances, symbolic architecture, fashion clothing, festivals, conventions, trade fairs, tourist services, etc.

III. Landscapes of New Cultural Economy (1)

Table 2.1 Asia-Pacific: value and share of total trade in commercial services

<table>
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Notes:
1. No data for Brazil, Russia, India, China, Vietnam.
2. US and Canada.
3. Includes Scandinavian countries.

Source: Daniels et al., 2005, p. 31
III. Landscapes of New Cultural Economy (2)

- Heavy concentrations in major global city-regions in high income countries
  New York; Los Angeles; Paris; London; and Tokyo

- Many small centers of diverse specialized cultural goods and services in high income countries
  from local craft products to display of heritage and periodic festivals.

- New forms of cultural production expands rapidly to periphery of global capitalism
  City regions such as Singapore, Seoul, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Taipei, Mumbai, Mexico City, and Sao Paulo
  Becoming major centers of cultural production, not just for local and national markets, but for global markets as well.

III. Landscapes of New Cultural Economy (3)

- Examples of rapid changes of landscapes:
  Singapore: Re-brand from 'electronics assembly' in the 1990s to 'global city of arts'
  Mumbai: one of the most vibrant entertainment complexes outside Hollywood.

- Both firmly anchored in specific places and a persistent element of the global economic order at large.
  Places constitute the essential hubs or platforms from which cultural producers pursue strategies of wider contestation of global markets

- The landscape of polycentric and polycultural character
  The products of different agglomerations are rarely perfect substitutes for one another
III. Landscapes of New Cultural Economy (4)

Early starting stage of research on the changes of economic spaces with regard to the new cultural economy.

- The logic and dynamics of the cultural economy should be carefully investigated in economic spaces.
- Needs both theoretical and empirical researches with regard to the changing economic spaces.
- Cultural industries and ‘cultural turns’ in economic geography
- Economic processes are shaped by social and cultural forces

New Cultural Economy
- Cultural Turns
- Information Society
- Cultural Industries
- Service World

Major Actors of Economic Spaces

Contrasting Spatial Processes

Mediators:
- Culture
- Institution
- Ethnicity
- Gender

Dynamic Forms of Economic Spaces

Innovation Systems
Knowledge Creation, Spillover, Diffusion

direct impact
feedback
mediating
IV. Contrasting Spatial Forces in Economic Spaces (1)

21st century

- Knowledge-based Economy
- Globalization
- Information Society
- Service Worlds

Contrasting Spatial Forces and Patterns in the Socio-Economic spaces

Focus

New Cultural Economy
- Cultural Turn;
- Cultural Industries
- Information Society;
- Service Worlds

IV. Contrasting Spatial Forces in Economic Spaces (2)

1. Networks: Local vs. Global
   - Formal and informal meetings: Telecommunications are still poor substitute for face-to-face contacts for transferring tacit knowledge
   - Collaborations among different functions and economic activities
   - Local vs. Global Networks;
   - Organizational vs. Personal Networks
   - 3 Types of Personal Networks: Communality; Sociality; Connectivity

2. Spatial Path Dependant; New Spatial Path Creation
   - Path dependent: Culture, local resources, technology and history
   - New path creation: Evolving new spatial centers
   - Major actors of the new creation:
     - State government; Local government; Firm; Innovative entrepreneur, etc.
IV. Contrasting Spatial Forces in Economic Spaces(3)

3. Centripetal vs. Centrifugal Forces

- Knowledge genesis: Cluster of talent, innovation and advanced services is closely related to the process of knowledge creation and transfer
- Dispersion to selected places; dispersed concentration of Europe’s film industry
- Global commodity chains

4. Hierarchy of Control vs. Community Building

- Horizontal interactions and collaborations in a community
- Asymmetric flows of information and knowledge in the economic spaces
- Global centers, national centers, and regional centers
- Dominant role of global centers in supplying knowledge
- Decreasing impact of distance decay on control functions

V. Changes of Economic Spaces(1)

Due to the contrasting spatial forces, Dynamic Patterns are progressing:

1. Cluster/Agglomeration

- Buzz; Localized networks
- Transfer of knowledge and generation of new Knowledge
  - Collective learning
  - Formal and informal networks
  - Lock-in effects
- Untraded interdependencies and the evolution of creative class

2. Global Innovation Networks and Global Commodity Chains

- Global Pipelines: Global flow (network) of Innovation; knowledge; capital; advanced services; products; and power
  - The New Argonauts. Dispatch; business trips; telecommunications
  - B2C, B2B e-commerce
- Global commodity chains and related services
  - Sequence of value adding activities
  - Dispersed concentration
V. Changes of Economic Spaces (2)

3. Continuous Spatial Division of Labor
- Functional division & hierarchical division in the economic space
  - HQ and R&D vs. Production; High tech vs. Low tech;
  - Knowledge-based vs. Technology-based
- Quality difference in addition to the size difference
- New spatial division of labor
  - Knowledge creation vs. transfer over space
  - Emergence of new creative/cultural industry vs. dispersion of routine or standardized services

4. Temporary Cluster
- Spatial proximity: essential for knowledge creation
  - Face-to-face contacts are required only during certain stages of innovation
  - Not always required co-location of innovation and research activities
  - Short-or medium-term visits
  - Temporary co-location through meetings
  - Possible with the increased mobility of qualified manpower and special events such as trade fairs and conventions

V. Changes of Economic Spaces (3)

5. Virtual Innovative Clusters
- Urban virtual networks vs. rural virtual networks
- Buzz without being there
  - Internet network research group
- Buzz without living there
  - Periodic meetings of the advanced researchers in peripheral areas (both on- and off-line networks)
  - Periodic clustering information, knowledge, and technology

6. Industrial Restructuring
- Restructuring for new paths in the core with regard to the new cultural economy
  - Restructuring existing cluster with new technology and innovation
  - Diverse firm strategies: labor, organization, location, R&D
- Emergence of new culture clusters in the periphery
  - Development of new clusters or new industrial structure
VI. Examples in Korea(1)

Brief History of Korean Industrial Policy

- **2000s**
  - Industrial cluster
  - Innovative cluster
  - Regional innovation policy
- **late 1990s financial crisis**
  - Restructuring of Jaebols (conglomerates)
  - New start-ups (venture firms)
- **1990s**
  - Industrial restructuring
    - Labor strategy
    - Subcontracting
    - Foreign direct investment
    - Technological development
- **1980s**
  - High tech industrial development
  - Industrial dispersion
  - Spatial division of labor
- **1960s ~1970s**
  - Industrial complex development
  - Import substitution/Export oriented

Population size and growth rate of cities
VI. Examples in Korea (4)

Findings from the Examples of Korea

- Contrasting spatial forces:
  All related to the dynamic socio-economic spaces
- Persistent spatial division of labor:
  Continuous evolving new spatial division of labor
- Restructuring is undergoing in the economic spaces
  * Possibility of development of a Korean model
- Growing innovative potentials in provincial areas
  * Evolving new paths initiated by government
  * Evolving local buzz
- Continuous processes of path dependent and new path creation

Cases of long-live areas suggest

- Importance of contrasting spatial forces: networks, path dependent, new path creation, and hierarchy of control
- Virtual innovation cluster and community building
  * Evolving Buzz without living there
VII. Policy Implications for East Asia(1)

Implications for East Asia

Developing New Global Pipelines in East Asia
- Global networks of engineers and entrepreneurs
- Networks of global cities and innovation centers in East Asia
- Flow of information, knowledge, technology and brains
  - Networks among cities in Asia
  - Networks among major universities and R&D centers in Asia

Generating New Competitive Advantages in Asia
- Developing strategic cultural products
- Promotion of new cultural industrial development considering new demands in Asia and Western worlds

VII. Policy Implications for East Asia(2)

Implications for East Asia

Developing Virtual Innovation Networks and Temporary Clusters
- Temporary clusters through trade fairs and diverse conventions
  - Continuous networks based on temporary clusters
- Virtual innovation networks in the city-regions and peripheral areas
- Virtual networks through Internet and periodical meetings
  - Collective learning through both on- and off-line meetings

Developing Diverse Innovation Systems and Culture Clusters
- Clusters of financial firms and venture capitals
- Diverse regional innovation systems
- Knowledge and culture clusters (advanced services and new industries)
- New logics of cluster: i.e. dispersed clusters of Europe's film industry

Developing Cross-border Learning Regions
- Collective learning in cross-border region
- Developing new cultural products
VIII. References

**Key References (1)**


**Key References (2)**


SESSION I

Urban Culture, History, and Memory in East Asia

- Wandering along Urban Phantasmagoria: The Lindenpassage in Berlin and the Nanjing Lu in Shanghai
  Jae-Ho Kang
  (New School for Social Research, USA)

- City and Town in Chinese History
  Ren Fang
  (Wuhan University, China)
Wandering Along Urban Phantasmagoria: 
*Lindenpassage* in Berlin and *Nanjing Lu* in Shanghai

JaeHo Kang
(The New School)

A commercial building, which embraces the various forms of public space, has attracted critical attention as a distinct condition of urban culture. It has proved to be a prototypical space of everyday practice where technology, image and the corporeal body are intertwined. Being a part of the urban spectacle, the media play a decisive role to reaffirm the key characteristics of modern public space. It is noteworthy that some questions on the intersection between media and urban spaces have continued to preoccupy us since the commercial spaces predominated urban experiences. Perhaps these questions would be the most vital ones answered in a digital age in which the ubiquitous media penetrate every dimension of urban experience. For example, what is the relationship between the public space of the multi-functional building and the new media? What is the relationship between the media spectacle and the body of subject, as a consumer, cinema-goer, and game-player? What is the relationship between optic contemplation, tactile distraction, and critical expertise in these multi-dimensional urban experiences? What are, then, the distinctive characteristics of the new mode of urban experience within the media culture of the spectacle? More importantly, what are the distinctive characteristics within diverse forms of globalized capitalist modernity. Recently, I have been working to respond to these questions. In the field of cultural studies and urban sociology, the emergence of a distinct form of commercial space in East Asia has attracted critical attention, in conjunction with the rise of the consumer culture and the entertainment industry. Yet, despite globality and coloniality of East Asian cities, unclear are its affinities with and differences from other forms, particularly developed in European and other Asian cities. The paper primarily aims to explore the phantasmagoric character of urban experience in the Nanjing Lu, the busiest shopping street in Shanghai, while comparatively analyzing it with certain forms of urban experience in Berlin. For this purpose, I draw critical attention to Walter Benjamin’s unique insight into the urban spectacle with reference to phantasmagoria and Siegfried Kracauer’s critical analysis of the Lindenpassage in Berlin.
I. The Phantasmagoria of the Urban Spectacle

Benjamin illustrates the important aspects of urban spectacle in terms of what I regard as his key category, ‘phantasmagoria’. He argues that modernity is dominated by phantasmagoria.1) It is worth emphasizing that by means of the notion of phantasmagoria, Benjamin seeks to keep a substantial distance from the Marxist theory of art and culture, and from the crucial limitations embodied in two conventional concepts: ideology and commodity fetishism.2) Marx famously used the metaphor of camera obscura in his discussion of ideology. Benjamin, by contrast, employed the notion of phantasmagoria in relation to a magic lantern. The term phantasmagoria was originally coined to name the ghost show that was performed for the first time in Paris in 1797. These shows were illusionist exhibitions, a type of public entertainment in which ghosts were produced with the use of magic lanterns. The success of the show fundamentally hinged upon the fact that the ghost was conceived to be very real and consequently to have a powerful effect to shock the unawary. This spectacle rapidly became a staple of popular entertainment in most large European cities.

The term ‘phantasmagoria’ was also frequently used by later Romanticism and symbolist writers to refer to ‘delirium, loss of control, the terrifying yet sublime overthrow of ordinary experience’.3) The term literally means to ‘speak to the image of ghost in the marketplace’. For Benjamin the term seems to indicate the key aspects of modernity, that is, a decline in the ability to communicate experience. It shows a transformation from communication involving co-presence to communication with an absent other. Here phantasmagoria illustrates particular forms of urban experience that raised doubts about the supposedly rational nation of the human subject. The phantasmagoria of urban experience implies that the configuration of images, time and space is reshaped with the new modes of communication and that the boundary between the cognitive subject and its object is dissolved. If our urban experiences are deeply saturated by the phantasmagoria of the spectacle, attentive perception and rational thinking would be disturbed. In his discussion of phantasmagoria, this is what I want to emphasize, Benjamin identified a substantial breakdown of our experience and an undercutting of the boundaries between subject subject/object, rational/irrational, and private/public.

2) For more details about the debates on Benjamin’s concept of phantasmagoria, see Jaeho Kang, “The Phantasmagoria of the Spectacle—Walter Benjamin and a Critique of Media Culture”, in Erik Steinskog and Dag Peterson (eds.), Walter Benjamin and Actualities of Aura (Copenhagen: NSU Press, 2005), pp. 252-278
In Benjamin’s view, the phantasmagoria of Paris’s shopping arcades unfolds key attributes of the transformation of social identities. The transformation of the arcade identifies the changing nature of the quintessential public space which is bound up with the decline of the homo des letters. The flâneur, a famous allegory for bourgeois individuality, is first and foremost the nineteenth-century stroller of the city street.\(^4\) Benjamin draws attention to flânerie as the emblem of a new form of behavior and perception that is inextricably linked with the rise of urban space in the early nineteenth century in European metropolises. Although it has various nuanced meanings and applications, a core feature of flânerie is a behavior involving observation of the spectacle dawdling in shops. In a word, for Benjamin, the arcade is ‘a city, world, in miniature,’ providing the flâneur with a panorama of commodities. It should be emphasized that for Benjamin, the emergence of the department store, which gradually replaced the arcades in Paris, tended to induce the end of flânerie. It is no less than the end of bourgeois literary culture and the beginning of a new mass consumer culture.

**II. Goodbye Arcade! Welcome to the New World!**

Siegfried Kracauer continued to stroll the streets of Berlin from the point where Benjamin stopped his flânerie. He continued to track down the transformation of the urban consumer space, focusing on the Lindenpassage, which existed between Friedrichstrasse and Linden Avenue in the heart of Berlin and comprised the famous commercial space, Kaisergalerie. In his essay, "Abschied von der Lindenpassage," published in Frankfurter Zeitung in 1930, Kracauer proclaimed that the Kaisergalerie is no longer an arcade, but remains ‘a means of passage’.\(^5\) He noticed that the transformation of the Lindenpassage represents ‘the critique of the bourgeois world through the bourgeois world,’ that is, a melting-down process of the bourgeois modernity. The life of Kaisergalerie epitomizes the transition from the arcade to the department store to its ruin in conjunction with the changing nature of the urban spectacle and to its ruin. According to Tom Levin’s investigation, the life of the Kaisergalerie can be outlined in three periods.\(^6\)

**The first period: an arcade.**

It is noteworthy that it was the first independent, purely commercial building in Berlin, opened in 1873. Initially appointed with elegant shops, cafés, and a concert hall, it was frequented by the urban aristocracy during its first fashionable period. The Wiener Café, for instance, the first Viennese coffeehouse


in Berlin, was located in the center of the arcade under the octagonal cupola and became a famous meeting place for the urban aristocrat patrons.

**The second period: the rise of the mass culture.**

Its transition to the entertainment space was conspicuous during the second period. In 1888, with many of its shops already vacant, the famous Passage-Optikon took over the building and immediately changed the character of the space, with a miscellaneous collection of dioramas, panoramas, and ‘all kinds of cinematographic attractions and apparatus’. At the turn of the century, Friedrichstrassehad become one of the most eventful entertainment districts, with its concomitant tourism and prostitution.

**Third period: modernization.**

Following World War I, the Kaisergalerie began to be modernized in 1928, reducing the three-storey interior to one storey by means of a vaulted glass roof. It lasted until 1944 when it was destroyed by Allied bombing. Karl Krauss, an Austrian media critic, once described it as ‘the casting of a dream to the dreaming collective,’ saying that ‘here God is made by machine’. The Kaiserpanorama, which ran in the Kaisergalerie, showed the complex intersections of the enlightenment project, entertainment industry and consumption in this multi-functional space. The Kaiserpanoramawas a hybrid of various visual entertainment technologies like the peep show, panorama, diorama and photography. It comprises an individual viewing station located in a public space. The Kaiserpanorama was praised by the government as an educational tool for schoolchildren and the working class. It drew critical attention that the silent and invisible power of the Kaiserpanorama direct the gaze through the spectacle.

Why did many German mandarins like Kracauer, Kraus and Benjamin empathetically address the end of flânerie in the department store? The transformation of the Kaisergalerie delineates not only the disintegration of European bourgeois culture but also the emergence of the new mass culture. The visual pleasure of flâneur acquired through dawdling along the arcade highlights a perceptual mode of bourgeois experience of the commodity spectacle, but the department store is no less than the end of this bourgeois urban culture grounded upon flânerie. The emergence of the department store in European big cities marked the end of the era of bourgeois hegemony in three folds: physically the end of bourgeois urban space, symbolically the end of the culture of the letter, and epistemologically the end of imagined rationality. It is still one of the most widely shared – yet, controversial – misrecognitions to approach the complex dimensions of the urban experience of the commercial space via a theory of flâneur developed by the nineteenth century modernists. Uncritically drawing upon flânerie, many cultural and urban studies have failed to grasp the multi-dimension of urban experiences by separating visual attentiveness from tactile distraction and thereby overly emphasizing the isolated contemplation. In the field of urban and cultural studies of East Asia, Shanghai Modern by Leo
Ou-Fan Lee, which is one of the most insightful works in the study of urbandy of Shanghai, is a case in point.\textsuperscript{7)}

It is not certain to what extent Kracauer’s eyes are downcast or bourgeois melancholic, as exemplified in his ethnographic work on the spiritual homelessness of urban dwellers, \textit{The Salaried Masses (Die Angestellten. Aus dem neuesten Deutschland,} 1929) However, what is fascinating about Kracauer is that he was envisaging the emergence of the urban masses, that is, the amorphous mass consumers, spectators, and the political public, in a more subtle sense than other critical theorists. Kracauer’s envision of the new collective subject did not seem quite optimistic. He finished his essay, "Farewell to the Linden Arcade," by questioning the prospect of this new collective space: the rise of ‘a society that is itself only a passageway’. For him, this society would be ‘fascism or nothing at all’. At this point, I cannot but ask: Could there not be any spaces between ‘fascism and nothing’? Is there not a space which could exist between the total destruction of rationality and the void experience of ubiquitous commodities? What are the distinctive characteristics of the urban experiences with little history or memory of the meltdown process of urban bourgeois culture before their engagement with the rise of the mass culture? To answer these questions, I have tried to investigate the particular form of experience of East Asia, focusing on the urban experiences of the department store in Tokyo, Seoul and Shanghai. Here, I would like to briefly discuss the collective experience of the spectacle on a shopping street in Shanghai.

\section*{III. Nanjing Lu 南京路: People’s Spectacle of China}

Nanjing Lu in Shanghai represents a collective form of urban passageway grounded upon no-history of the bourgeois culture, but its establishment was associated with the intersection of imperialism, coloniality and red-capitalism of urban spaces. The Nanjing Donglu Pedestrian Mall currently surpasses all other commercial spots in Shanghai.\textsuperscript{8)} It is the world’s longest shopping street, around six km long, attracting more than one million visitors every day. Nanjing Donglu stretches westward from the Waitan to now People’s Park, which used be the British Horse Racing Club, opened in 1848. As a result of the treaty signed with the British Empire, the road officially gained the name Nanjing Lu, stretching for a total length of 1,600 meters from the Bund to the middle of Xizang Lu. Consequently, a number of English tearooms and cafés came to fill the streets. If Waitan was the seat of colonial power and finance, Nanjing Lu, was its commercial extension. Nanjing Lu came to gain its reputation as the most dynamic commercial street in Shanghai and China when two new


\textsuperscript{8)} For more details about commercial features of Nanjing Lu, see Sherman Cochran ed., \textit{Inventing Nanjing Road: Commercial Culture in Shanghai 1900-1945} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).
Cantonese-owned Western-style department stores were built in 1917 and 1918: Xianshi gongsi (Sincere Co Ltd) and Wing On (Yong’an gongsi). With a building boom on Nanjing Lu from 1914 to 1930, including two other big department stores (Xinxin (Sun Sun) and Daxin (Sun Company), Shanghai had become a bustling metropolis, the fifth largest city in the world. The old Nanjing Lu changed its name to Nanjing Donglu in 1945 and the local government started to adjust the commercial structure of the road after the foundation of the People’s Republic of China. Since the late 1980s, the Beijing government has immensely transformed the street into a commercial district combined with shopping and entertainment spaces. I would like to emphasize three distinct – long-lasting – characteristics embedded in Nanjing Lu.

First, the interplay between enlightenment and propaganda. On Nanjing Lu, the enlightenment project is being undertaken by the Chinese Communist Party through ubiquitous advertisement. Passersby learn the way to construct a modern life style revealed through omnipresent commodity ads. While strolling along Nanjing Lu, and looking at commodities, no less than the naked commodities on display, passersby acquire how to display themselves as a part of the urban spectacle, and how to sell themselves as a commodity and to buy other people as a commodity.

Second, Panopticon Inside-Out. The experience of bare commodity in the department store also unfolds key attributes of the urban spectacle as a counterpart to Foucault’s famous account of panopticon. This is another point I want to make. Foucault’s panoptic model emphasizes the subjective effects of imagined scrutiny and permanent visibility on the observed, but does not properly explore the subjectivity of the observer. Here on Nanjing Lu, the department store is nothing but the Panopticon inside-out. A modern subject as a consumer occupies the status of the observer. They are the public with their own sovereignty, standing in the center of the panopticon surrounded by the myriad of shops. In contrast to panoptic visuality, the department store as a multi-functional complex is a building machine, designed to transport the spectator-subjects, rather than confine them. While visual perception in the panoptic model primarily hinges upon capturing attention, the experience of commodities on display in the shops and department stores is primarily concerned with distraction, which facilitates entertainment and pleasure.

Third, distraction of the corporeal body. Nanjing Lu is a passageway of entertainment, which embraces all kinds of cinematic attractions, cutting-edge video game spaces, and a family amusement park. The New World Department Store reveals these characteristics in an illustrative way. The New World Department Store, located on Nanjing Xi Lu,

9) For more about colonial and global characteristics of Nanjing Lu and Shanghai, see Arif Dirlik, "Architecture of Global Modernity, Colonialism and Places", Modern Chinese Literature and Culture 17 no. 1 (Spring 2005): 33-61
cross of Nanjin Dong Lu and Xizang Lu, used to be the Shanghai New World Playground founded in 1914. Reestablished on 1st January 1995, the New World Department Store, like its predecessors and contemporaries, embraces a multitude of spaces for leisure and consumption. Its eleven storey building houses a multiplex cinema on the top floor, and more interestingly, a Madame Tussaud Museum on the 10th floor. The New World Department Store is a multi-functional techno-space where multi-layered dimensions of perceptions are constituted, reconstructed, and shattered, not only through visual experience, but more decisively through distraction associated with varieties of the entertainment industry. In the department store, a new form of collectivity is articulated as a spectator, a consumer, and a pleasure-seeker. Likewise, the spectacle of the Nanjing Lu produces a delirium of the urban space that erases the differences between old and new, East and West, private and public, individual and collective, observer and the observed, and enlightenment and propaganda. Perhaps we are witnessing the emergence of a new form of the masses predicated upon a trans-national corporate socialism.

I am not yet terribly sure whether Nanjing Lu can be perfectly characterized as a passageway of ‘fascism’ (or of corporate socialism in a detailed context) as Kracauer envisioned from the melting down process of the Kaisergalerie. We still need to look into the inner dimensions of the complex intersection between the media, urban space, and the corporeal experience on a consumer street like Nanjing Lu. However, it seems to me that people in Shanghai are going back to the future, the future they have been experiencing for a century, while wandering along Nanjing Lu.
City and Town in Chinese History

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中國歷史上的城與鎮

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摘要：在中國歷史上，先有城，後有鎮。隨著歲月更迭，有的城變成了鎮，有的
鎮變成了城，兩者之間相互通轉。但是，城不同於鎮，這是兩個不同的概念。當
然，兩者之間有相似之處，但差異更大。學術界習慣於用西方的城市概念去囊括
中國歷史上的城與鎮，將“城市”與“城鎮”視為同義語，將它們與中國的農村相對
立。這種做法割裂了歷史，也遮蔽了真實。本文的寫作目的，旨在討論中國歷史
上城和鎮的類型與功能，考察城與鎮的異同，探究中國城市化的路徑，澄清學術
界的概念混淆，推進相關的研究工作，並為當代城市規劃與建設提供歷史借鑑。
關鍵字：中國 历史 城 鎮 市場

一 概念與方法

中國的城市史源遠流長，其發展路徑與西方殊不相同，以致有學者（韋伯）駁
斷中國沒有西方意義上的城市。當然，這種缺乏歷史研究基礎的草率結論是站不
住腳的，遭到批評（羅威廉）是必然的。問題是，羅威廉反駁韋伯的舉證是一個
市鎮（漢口鎮），而非一個城市。這種誤位的產生源於概念的混淆和方法論。羅
威廉超過韋伯的地方在於，他提供了一個歷史研究的個案，一個可以深入討論的
文本。相比之下，韋伯的論述僅僅是在知識準備不充分的狀態下的玄想。但是，
羅威廉對中國歷史的誤論與韋伯一樣可怕。他混淆了中國歷史上城與鎮的差異，
無論是有意還是無意。再者，在方法論上，羅威廉仍然是是一個西方中心論者。因
為，羅威廉仍然是運用西方的視角觀察中國，用哈貝馬斯“公共空間”“市民社會”
的分析工具，試圖在中國發掘一個西方式的城市。這一學術立場必然導致他無法
辨識中國歷史的真相。羅威廉的悖論在於：面對中國歷史，他企圖復原真相，卻
逃不出西方中心主義的掌心。他的選擇只能是——摒棄韋伯式的西方中心主義，
選擇哈貝馬斯式的西方中心主義。在此，不能不提及一位在反西方中心主義方面
走得更遠的學者——柯文及其中國中心觀。具有反諷意義的是，柯文強調中國中
心觀，實際上默認了存在一個西方中心觀，否則中國中心觀就失去了參照系，
失去了意義。也就是說，中國中心觀是西方中心主義孕育的怪胎。

當研究者在方法論上陷入困頓和茫然而自我解脫的途徑只有一條，就是回歸歷
史，讓歷史說服。不必在方法論上掙纏，這只能空耗精力，浪費時間。因此，在
這裏最重要的事情不是批判西方中心論的話語霸權，而是討論基本的歷史概念，
弄清楚什麼是中國歷史上的城和鎮。

在中國歷史上，先有城，後有鎮。隨著歲月更迭，有的城變成了鎮，有的鎮變
成了城，兩者之間相互轉換。但是，城不同於鎮，這是兩個不同的概念。當然，
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這種做法割裂了歷史，也遮蔽了真實。本文的寫作目的，旨在討論中國歷史上城
和鎮的類型與功能，考察城與鎮的異同，探究中國城市化的過程，澄清學術界的
概念混淆，推進相關的研究工作，並為當代城市規劃與建設提供歷史借鑑。

二 城與鎮：類型與功能

中國的城起源很早。據考古報告，屬於新石器時代的龍山文化城址已有多處被
發掘出來，距今4000多年。從歷史上看，中國城可謂功能齊全，是不同等級的政治
中心、軍事中心、經濟中心和文化中心。

從語義學的角度看，“城”的本義系指城牆（City Wall）。修築城牆是為了軍事
防禦，保國安民。由於軍事防禦是城的首要功能，因此城的修築必須是堅不可摧
的，其規模、形制、堅固程度和軍事力量均視城的等級而有別。在遠古，城大體
分為兩類：天子及諸侯的都城，卿大夫及邊疆城邑。這時所謂的“城”，是指在都
邑四周用作防禦的牆垣，一般有兩重：裏面的稱城，外面的稱郭。都邑四周不僅
有城垣，而且有護城河。古代中國有“城池”之謂，城指城垣，池指護城河。城門
兩邊建有樓觀，叫城闕。當時，標準的城市建置是：長窄各九里的正方形，有12
座城門，城內有寬闊且縱橫交錯的大道，左邊建有祭祀列祖列宗的祖廟，右邊建
有祭祀土地神的社廟，朝廷在前面，市場在後面，居民按職業劃分居住區。誠如
古人云：“城，所以盛民也”（《說文》）；“城郭溝池以為固”（《禮記》）；“城
者，可以自守也”（《墨子》）。城的修建關乎一國之興亡。所謂“凡欲安君治
民，興霸成王，從近制遠者，必先立城郭，設守備，實倉廬，治兵庫”（《吳越春秋
》）。顯然，遠古中國的城首先是大大小小的軍事堡壘（castle），其次是政治
、經濟和文化的重心所在（City）。

SMF 2008 organized by The Institute of Urban Sciences, The University of Seoul 29
作為軍事堡壘的城，它所要保衛的是政府和人民。確切地說，在古代，中國的城首先要保衛國家權力的擁有者（從帝王到官員），其次才是普通民眾。這表明，城的修築是為了保障政府對人民的統治，以及這種統治不被外敵入侵所干擾。因此，屏護政治權威是城的最重要功能之一。政府駐地往往位於城的中央，築有高大而堅固的城牆，成為城中之城，成為軍隊重點保護的最安全區域。例如，在商代，河南偃師之都城，有宮城、內城、外城三重，宮城位於最核心地帶。又如，明期時期，北京城之中央建有紫禁城，它是皇權的象徵。除了高大的皇城（都城），各級地方政府所在地也必須修築牆樓高度，護城河環繞的城，各種衙門在城中履行職責。由此觀之，城是國家權力的象徵性符號。

除了軍事防禦和政治統馭，中國城還具有經濟功能和文化功能。例如各色人等（軍人、官員、商人、手藝人、士子、戲子、衛士、乞丐等）彙集城中，人口密度大，消費水準高，商品流通發達，必然導致各級權力中心的城扮演經濟中心的角色，它的市場往往是區域市場體系的中心市場。出於軍事和政治目的修建的交通線，皆以城為起點和終點。這些縱橫交錯的陸路交通線和水路交通線構成了國家市場體系或區域市場體系的主幹道，也就是說，國家交通網絡與市場網路大體上是重合的。例如，在商代，從中原到南方有一條重要的道路：殷墟→鄭州→信陽→武漢→長沙，這一條軍事、政治、商業的要道。先秦時期，中國傳統的交通制度——驛傳制度已經形成。甲骨文中的“驛”字，就是商代設置的驛站。周朝非常重視交通道路的修築，專設“司道”一職以掌其事。彼時，有所謂“周道”，實指自岐山至豐、鎬，東行至成周，然後以成周為中心修築的四通八達的交通網。秦漢王朝十分重視交通網的建設，例如三川東海道——由關中東抵海濱，就是秦漢時期運輸量最大的交通幹線。隋唐時期，以長安和洛陽為中心，形成多條10餘條的陸路交通要道，水路交通則是聞名天下的京杭大運河。宋代，形成以汴京為中心的水路交通網，其主要功能是漕運。元代疆域廣大，交通運輸體系達到空前的完備。忽必烈統一中國後，形成了以大都為中心、水陸交匯的交通網。明清時期，以都城、州城、府城、縣城為中心，形成了四通八達的驛路與鋪路相交織的交通網。

與此同時，由於各種教育機構大多設在城中，科舉考試也在城中舉行，因此中國的城又是教育中心。加上刻書、印刷、文人聚會、文藝創作及表演、形形色色的娛樂場所等多集中在城中，因此，中國的城堪稱文化中心。

作為國家或區域的中心，城是各種功能的集合體。具體到每一個城，這些功能當然有主次之分。據此，亦可粗略地將一個城定義為政治的城，或軍事的城，或經濟的城，等等。例如，有學者將明代的城市可分為政治型的城市，最典型者有南京、北京、開封；工商業型的城市，如杭州、蘇州、揚州、淮安、臨清、濟寧、通州、武昌、燕樑等；對外貿易城市，如廣州、海澄；邊塞城市，如大同、遼東、宣府、肅州、甘州、蘭州、寧夏。必須指出，這種類型的劃分是出於研究的便利，僅具有相對的意義，不可泛化，不可誇大，否則就有歪曲歷史之嫌。因為，軍事防禦和政權運作是中國城的最重要的兩大功能。從總體上看，史上的中國城，其經濟功能和文化功能始終從屬於軍事功能和政治功能，不是也不可能是最重要的，無論它的市場多麼繁榮，它的文化多麼燦爛（如唐代的長安、宋代的杭州、清代的蘇州）。換言之，如果長安、杭州、蘇州不是都城或府城所在
地，那他們的經濟繁榮和文化鼎盛將隨風而逝。說得直白一些，長安的政治孕育了長安的經濟和文化，杭州、蘇州也不例外。

附帶說明，古代中國的城一般是正方形或長方形，這是中國人的宇宙觀（天圓地方）在建築美學上的體現。

除了城，中國歷史上還有另一種扮演中心地角色的聚落形式——鎮。鎮，原指邊關或要塞駐軍之地（garrison post），鎮將管理軍事，兼理民政。這種類型的鎮，顯然是軍事意義上的單位。《新唐書·兵志》載：“夫所謂方鎮者，節度使之兵也。原其始，起於邊將之屯防者。唐初，兵之戍邊者，大曰軍，小曰守捉，曰城，曰鎮，而總之曰道。”宋初，廢除軍鎮之建制，原有之軍鎮演變為商鎮，或曰市鎮，成為介於農村與各類城之間的具有相對獨立性的商業實體。宋代的《事物紀原》一書中寫道：“民聚不成縣而有稅課者，則為鎮，或以官監之。”商業意義上的鎮在宋代的出現，是中國市場發育的重要結果。從經濟史的角度看，這種類型的鎮可以上溯至遠古的定期市，再到魏晉隋唐的草市、宋元的草市、鎮，其完整形態是明清市鎮。應該說，宋代以後，鎮的市場功能不斷完善，在社會經濟生活中所發揮的作用日益凸顯。尤其是到了明清時期，市鎮成為中國最有活力的經濟增長點，成為商品經濟的中心舞臺。

市鎮的歷史地位可從縱、橫兩個方面來考察——

首先，從縱向的國家權力系統看：由於傳統中國政經合一的體制，由於傳統市鎮的非行政建制特徵，所以在中國傳統的區域經濟網路中，市鎮居於市場層級的第二級。居於市鎮之上的區域中心市場是府州縣城，市鎮宛如衛星環繞，並通過府州縣城將經濟觸角向外伸展。居於市鎮之下的則是墟、集、場、店等廣大的農村初級市場，它們為市鎮提供了充足的經濟養分和寬闊的市場空間。反過來，市鎮扮演著溝通城鄉關係的重要角色。這種溝通上下級市場的角色定位，毫無疑問刺激了市鎮自身的經濟發展，使原本開放的市鎮更加開放，亦使得市鎮作為區域經濟第二級中心市場的地位不可取代。在區域經濟網路中，市鎮的存在價值正在於它是第二級中央市場，市鎮的發展機遇維繫於此，市鎮的經濟地位取決於此。

傳統市鎮的歷史定位，必然使其充當商品流通的中轉站，成為區域市場乃至全國大市場商品週圈的樞紐。在區域經濟中，市鎮屬於第二級中心市場，發揮著聯通上一級中心市場（府州縣城）和下一級農村初級市場（墟集場店）的巨大功能。在全國經濟體系中，市鎮作為商品流通中轉站的角色尤為醒目，是長距離貿易的重要支點。具體情形是，市鎮將農村初級市場上的各類農副產品和手工業產品收集起來，然後經客商之手進入長距離貿易的管道，這些商品最終銷新全各地市場。在這個過程中，區域內及區域間的市鎮彼此互動性很強，商品的流轉量巨大，與上一級中心市場的商品流通相輔相成，共同推動著全國範圍內各類區域經濟的發展。傳統市鎮之所以能夠發揮商品流通中轉站的獨特作用，是因為傳統市鎮具有開放性，套用經濟學的術語，傳統市鎮的自由貿易程度很高。

其次，從橫向的市場體系看：中國傳統的城鄉市場分屬不同的體系，各自構成相對獨立的市場網路，兩大市場體系之間是平行的互補性關係，其市場結構的相似性大於差異性。
Transformation of Culture and Spatial Economy of Asian City-Regions

圖1 宋代之前的市場體系

確切地說，在宋代之前（在商業性的鎮出現之前），中國的市場體系是城鄉垂直型的，如圖1所示。宋之後，隨著商業性的鎮的出現，中國的市場體系開始發生變化，鎮成為日益重要的一種市場類型。迨至明清時期，市鎮達到繁盛，中國的市場體系變成一個“品”字結構，以鎮為中心的農村市場成為一個相對完備的商品流通體系，如圖2所示。

圖2 明清時期的市場體系

圖2既可表示區域市場體系，也可表示全體市場體系。詳言之，全體各經濟區均存在城鄉兩大自成體系的市場結構：區域性的農村市場體系、區域性的城市市場體系。從商品交易的場所、時間及種類看，城鄉市場大體上可分為兩大類別：一是集市，包括城鄉各類定期市、常設市、不定期市、廟會等；二是專業市場，包括城鄉各類以專項商品為交易物件的市場。需要強調的是，城市與農村均有集市和專業市場，在市場結構與功能上形成對應的關係，各有其相對獨立的商品流通範圍（市場圈）。與此同時，城鄉之間存在商品流通關係，但絕非城市高於農村的垂直性隸屬關係（鎮的商業地位不亞於縣城），而是互補性的平行市場關係。也就是說，在市場結構方面，城鄉之間既有獨立性（但不封閉），又有互補性（但不統屬），是對應而非對立的商品流通關係。在城鄉市場之上，另有商業
輻射力更強的區域中心市場——若干超級都市和超級市鎮。個別區域中心市場發
展為全國性市場。例如江南、華北，各自擁有一個既是區域中心市場、又是全國
性市場的超級都市（蘇州、北京），完整體現了區域與全國市場體系的合二為
一，表明其市場發展狀況良好。

關於鎮的類型，可以從不同的角度予以區分。就發展階段而言，可分為宋代之前的
軍鎮、宋代以降的商鎮、民國以降的建制鎮3種類型。就歷史沿革而言，可分為
漢唐型、新生型、新舊交替型3種類型。就地理環境而言，可分為流域型市鎮、內
陸型市鎮、山區型市鎮、邊際型市鎮4種類型。就人口規模而言，可分為小型市
鎮、中型市鎮、大型市鎮、超級市鎮4種類型。就經濟功能而言，可分為手工業專
業市鎮、商品流通型市鎮、交通樞紐型市鎮3種類型。從一個市鎮的經濟功能常常
能運出其所擁有的商業地位。就商業地位而言，主體上又可分為一般市鎮、區
域市鎮和超級市鎮。另可從市鎮名稱分析其商業地位。一般說來，稱“市”或“鎮”
者，其商業地位高於稱“集”、“店”、“場”、“墟”的鄉村基層市場。就專業化程度
而言，市鎮類型可謂五花多樣，如棉花及棉紡織業市鎮、蠶桑及絲織業市鎮、糧
食貿易市鎮、陶瓷業市鎮、茶業市鎮、造紙業市鎮、木材貿易市鎮、藥材貿易市
鎮等。這些專業市鎮的出現，表明中國農村經濟已經形成各具特色的產業結構，
同時也象徵著區域經濟的商品化達到了較高水平。

為之，城與鎮的區別主要體現在四個方面：其一，城是國家權力的象徵，
是行政建制單位，是政府機構所在地。所有的城都設有城牆。相比之下，鎮
是行政建制單位，處在國家權力中心的週邊。絕大多數的鎮沒有城牆。其二，城
的主要功能是軍事中心和政治中心，鎮的主要功能是經濟中心。雖然城也扮演經濟
中心和文化中心的角色，但卻是次要的。因為城有數千年的歷史，中的城，
已經脫離了軍事、政治中心的角色。在這種情形下，鎮才真正成為經濟中心。其三，
從人口規模看，城以常駐人口為主，以非農業人口為主，鎮以流動人口為
主，以農業人口為主。其四，從商業與市鎮的經濟關聯性看，城的商業與市鎮
的經濟關聯性，鎮的商業與市鎮的經濟關聯性。因此，從上述四
個方面推斷出的結論必然是：城與鎮是兩個不同的概念。鎮不能劃歸城市的範
疇，它屬於農村，是農村地區的經濟中心和文化中心。當然，城與鎮也有相同或
類似之處，最顯著的一點就是城與鎮都是經濟中心，雖然實際的內涵和功能存在
差異。此外，鎮也有國家權力的染指（尤其是，有的鎮就是縣署所在地，有的鎮
被升格為縣），並且依然保留了商鎮蛻變之前的軍事色彩，儘管較為淡薄。

三 城與鄉

為了進一步明確中國歷史上城與鎮的關係，必須重新審視中國歷史上城與鎮的
關係。城鄉畛域有別，兩者的關係錯綜複雜。就中華帝國晚期（明清）而
言，從行政、賦稅關係看，大體上是城鄉垂直的統屬關係；從市場結構看，大體上各成一體，形成平行的互補性關係。

關於城市、農村的定義，國外學術界莫衷一是。儘管如此，借用城市、農村的概念展開科學研究，卻成為不爭的事實，成為學術界默認的範式。迄今為止，似乎沒有哪一位學者用別的概念取代城市或農村這兩個關鍵字。且不論西方學界關於城市和農村的理念是否適用於中國歷史，起碼應該意識到的一個基本常識，就是以城鄉二元視角考察事，自古而然。翻閱眾多明清方志，在表達市場體系時，多採取在城集、在鄉集之敘事結構，表明時人已明確區分城市與鄉市。需要說明的是，在中國文獻中，“城市”的概念古已有之，但與西方的城市（city）不盡一致，僅表示“城中之市場”（market of city）。

城鄉市場體系研究需要思考的一個問題，是關於行政中心等級和經濟中心等級之間重合或一致的問題。施堅雅指出，中國的城鄉經濟中心地分屬不同系統，同時集鎮與城市互有重疊。經濟中心地與行政中心地的交叉情形主要體現在府縣城與鄉鎮集、中心集鎮之間，也就是說，府縣級市場與鄉鎮市場大體處於同一層級。

在部分學者眼中，市鎮屬於城市範疇。他們認為，明清江南地區城鎮化的基本性質，是市鎮的廣泛性成長（extensive growth）更具其集約性成長（intensive growth）。這意味着當時的市鎮固然在量上有持續的增長，但其本身的結構與功能並未在質上有所突破。江南許多市鎮都有城鎮隔開，說明市鎮的規模與功能已與縣城不相上下，顯示了市鎮在鄉村城市化進程中的獨特作用。明清時期蘇州的城市化進程，是以一個大城市（府城）為中心、以郊區市鎮為“衛星城市”為城市擴張。明清都市化發展的最顯著現象，就是專業市鎮的出現，反映出區域經濟的高度分工和商業化。景德鎮、佛山鎮等實際上已成為都市，不能再算作市鎮。要研究中國歷史上的都市化（Urbanization）過程，應該把城（Cities）與市鎮（Market towns）分開來討論。中國歷史上都市化的另一條途徑，是縣治以下的市鎮之興起。市鎮視為城市化的標誌，從一個側面說明市鎮與府縣城屬於同一層級。

關於市鎮的非層級性，有人指出：江南地區宋代以後興起的非傳統性的市鎮，其特點在於它們是超層級的。江南所產的絲綢、棉花、棉布，並不通過各層級來集散，而是由各市鎮直接通過全國性市場。這種超層級的特性，可以從兩方面看出：一是市場規模。在層級性的市場結構中，最低層級的單位規模最小，高層級的單位規模遞增。但是江南市鎮往往大於府縣城，如南潯鎮之於湖州，紡錦鎮之於海寧，盛澤鎮之於吳江，羅店鎮之於嘉定等，不勝枚舉。證明這些市鎮之地位與府縣治沒有層級關係，是由其本身市場活動範圍及經濟實力所決定的。二是商路。從這些市鎮運送商品的路線，看出它們與府縣治缺乏明顯的集散關係。研究江南市鎮的學者往往以蘇州為例，視其為各市鎮之上的一個商品集散地，而認為江南市鎮也具有層級性的結構。這是一個錯覺。蘇州主要不是發揮傳統的貨物集散功能，而是江南紡織品的加工站。此外，市鎮收購的產品以遠方市場為主。江南的紡織品因為遠方市場才得以興盛，後來又因為失去了遠方市場而衰落。江南市鎮不是層級性的地方商業中心，而是自始至終依賴全國性市場，與之發生直接的運銷關係。尤其是，這些市鎮吸引外地的大量資金，前來收購的是遠
方的客商，而非通过县治的层级管道。江南水网密布，市镇将大量纺织品以低廉的运费从水路运出，亦无须通过层级式的集散管道，便可直达远方市场。将市镇大小按等级划分，依照市镇的规模、商业管道的层次，列出上下从属关系。要这种层级式的关联，只适用于内地的传统市镇，无法适用于明清时期在江南崛起的新型市镇。江南市镇直接与远方市场、甚至国际市场发生联系，没有明显的层级关系。这既是在明清时期的特殊环境中的市镇化之独特型态。此外，广东的佛山镇、江西的景德镇都是外向型经济，从一开始就摆脱了层级市场的框架，它们直接将产品——瓷器与瓷器运销远方市场。这表明，市场经济聚集的方向与行政建制并不完全一致，有它自己的等级层次。江南市镇与市场经济的联繫，并不主要采取向区域中心集聚的方式，而是从独立地、分散地由每个市镇多方向、多管道地向全国扩散。

市镇非层级性的一个重要标志，就是市镇在商品流通方面扮演的角色与行政中心所在地的普通城市旗鼓相当，並不完全依賴城市的流通管道。關於市镇与府县的市比肩而立之现象，文献多有记载。

有学者認為，市镇商品经济与城市商品经济的发展，同样有特色。城市与市镇不同，是全国商品流通网上的结点。通过商品流通的网络，城市和市镇与周围农村建立广泛的经济联系，使城市与市镇不仅具有消费意义，也具有生产意義。尤其是，城镇的市場構成具有對称性。例如，明代城市除了店舖貿易，还存在具有定期的集貿市場。明清时期的山東臨清市兼具3地不同级别的市场功能：既有零售商业构成的消費市场，又有農产品集散市场和多种商品的中轉批發市场。廣东某些發達的墟市，具備市集貿易、鋪戶（市貿易）、行商販運貿易3种商業形态。城镇这种複合型市場結构，表明城镇市場存在結構上的對應性，即每种市場形式都在城市或农村裏存在，儘管其發育程度並不相同。

關於农村定期市構成市场體系最低一級，學界基本上沒有歧見。但是，關於市镇的性质，即市镇屬於城市、還是屬於农村？學界對此存在分歧。那些強調市镇属于農村範疇的认为，應該市镇研究方法，首先應該明確城市的定義及其與鄉村市鎮的區別。明清時期，市镇贸易和墟集贸易已成为農村市场的主要。農村市鎮的増加及其经济功能的強化，反映出當時城鄉分離運動的發展。當時，珠江南三角洲的農村市場，包括原始墟市、基本墟市、專業墟市、市鎮4種類型。有人編選明清時期蘇州農村經濟資料時，專門將“農村市鎮與物資交流”列為一章，较將市鎮及縣市歸入村範疇，称“農村市鎮”是所統城市、下壓廣大農村的紐帶，是農村社會經濟的中心。如果從市镇与農村關係的角度思考市镇變遷，那么可以看到明初江南地区的市镇附屬於鄉、都、團等基層組織。自明中葉以降，市镇的獨立性逐漸凸顯，以“市鎮”為單位的區劃觀念逐漸流行，其邊界大致與巡檢司等縣級以下行政組織的管轄區域相吻合。清中葉後，以市鎮公共事業為中心的地方行政運作，取得與以往凌駕其上的賦稅徵派機構相同的地位。清末民初，實行鄉鎮自治，市鎮作為區劃單位開始真正管轄城鄉農村，現代意義上的“鎮管村”機制於焉形成。

筆者認為，市镇是指明清時期介於縣城與村落之間的具有相對獨立性的商業實體，屬於農村經濟範疇。征之于史：嘉慶《余杭縣誌》載，“六朝唐宋之制，縣與鎮相為表裏；鎮大則升為縣，縣小則降為鎮”。正德《姑蘇志》載，“縣民有鄉、
里、都、國、區、保之名，雖與古異，亦先王所取同井，使百姓親睦之意也。若郊外，民居多聚為之村。商賈所集謂之鎮，雖不列於官，亦以類附書焉”。弘治《湖州府志》載，“商賈聚集之處，今皆稱為市鎮”。史家有言，市鎮的價值在於“必由所聚，通商惠工於茲”（隆慶《蘇州府志》）。又稱：“坊以表裏，市以交易，而街則坊市之通衢，鎮又鄉村之街市也，蓋寓表裏宅裏之意雲”（嘉靖《苏州府志》）。可見，在時人眼裏，市鎮屬於鄉村社會的商業範疇。有學者指出，明清市鎮的實際生活史固然與城市有某種物流的中轉關係，但絕非是城市主動擴張的結果，相反卻是由鄉村經濟生活的擴展，自然應運而生的中心地；遠離城市，即使是窮鄉僻壤，山間邊道，也會滋生出類似集鎮或鄉市。市鎮緊緊依附著周圍的鄉村而生存，盛衰相連，休戚與共，此政治與消費性的府縣城更有自在的根柢，鄉音也淳淳得多，幾不離“官話”。流覽各代方志，府縣誌往往缺乏對鄉市集鎮的嚴格界定，除縣份較大集鎮外，市與鎮的稱法比較隨意，相當數量的“鎮”實與鄉市相差無幾。雍正朝起，江南一鎮之地，為二至三縣所共管，上（塘）屬某縣集鎮，下（塘）則劃歸某縣農村，更是把這種景象凸顯得十分清晰。這些都説明是時江南市鎮，仍然植根於農村，鄉村包圍市鎮，兩者的界線多是模糊的，例外的事例有，但極少。再如，嘉慶市鎮景德鎮的發展依賴周邊農村的農林產品和瓷土的商品流通，與此同時，景德鎮瓷業正是浮葉農林商品量增長的關鍵因素。景德鎮與其賴以生存的“鄉腳”有一種互補性的市場關係。

按照施堅雅的中國農村市場體系的模式，屬於市鎮（town）範疇的其相連的經濟中心地包括（自上而下）：標準市場（standard market，又叫基層市場）、中間市場（intermediate market）、中心市場（central market）。這3種經濟中心地所在的居民點，分別稱之為“標準集鎮”、“中間集鎮”、“中心集鎮”。在理想狀態下，基層集市的空間分佈意味著18個自然村以六角形圍繞著一個集市。實際上，每個市鎮都有自己的市場圈。

在討論市鎮的城鄉屬性時，需要指出：在鎮級市場中，包括極少數的超級市鎮（如漢口鎮、佛山鎮），它們橈是傳統市鎮發展的極致，是市鎮商業水準的最高代表，又是頗具城市風格的商業聚落，與城市市場體系中的超級都市相比毫不遜色，都是區域資源配置的中心市場。

筆者提出城鄉市場平行說，旨在凸顯城鄉各有相對完整、自成一體的市場網絡，城鄉之間並不因此而隔絕。相反地，兩大網路之間歷史地形成某種結構對應：功能互補的關係。城鄉市場平行說也並不否認存在垂直性的經濟關係。實際上，城鄉具體的市場之間，既有橫向的平行關係，又有縱向的垂直關係；既有上下層級之間的商品流通，又有跨層級甚至跨體系的經濟互動。例如，以農村為基軸，存在著農村與農村、農村與鄉鎮、農村與縣城、農村與區域市場，農村與中心城市之間縱向及橫向的多層次經濟聯繫。鄉鎮、縣城、區域市場、中心城市各自與外界的經濟聯繫皆如此。

傳統市鎮的地理概念及行政地位一直比較模糊，導致管理許可權多頭並存，互相牽扯，使管理效率大為降低。管理體制的紊亂，使得在市鎮從事商業活動的人們的經濟利益得不到切實保障，市鎮的市場秩序時時常受到許多非經濟因素的干擾，尤其是市鎮的發展缺乏明確的引導，市鎮的市場機制遠未完善。管理體制上的弊端，給市鎮的商品經濟帶來了負面影響，成為束縛市鎮健康發展的重要障

SMF 2008 organized by The Institute of Urban Sciences, The University of Seoul  36
礙。直到民國初年，市鎮的行政地位才最終得以確定：城區（市區）之下，鄉、鎮同級但檔次清晰，成為中國最基層的行政單位，市鎮的規範管理開始提上議事日程。

四 結語

中國歷史上的城市發展，經歷了一個時空轉換的過程。秦始皇統一中國之後，政治中心位於西北，從秦漢到唐代，長安（今西安）是中國城市的最高代表。宋代，政治中心向中原位移，汴京（開封）成為中國城市發展的中心。其後，又向東南轉移至臨安（杭州）。元、明、清三代，定都北京，城市中心北移。進入20世紀，中華民國在南京建都，城市中心南移。1949年後，中華人民共和國定都北京，城市中心又移往北方。鎮的發展軌跡與城不同：宋代商鎮出現之後，重心在黃河流域，其後向東南沿海地區位移。明清時期，江南成為中國市鎮最繁盛之區，這種狀態一直延續至今。應該指出，民國提升鎮為行政單位之後，中國的城與鎮最終歸於城市的範疇，城市化與城鎮化成為同義語。不過，在此之前的漫長歲月裏，中國的城與鎮是不同的兩個概念，前者屬於城市史的研究物件，後者屬於農村史的研究物件。

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（二）西文

本文系2007年中國教育部人文社會科學重點研究基地重大專案“清代以降長江中游農村社會及文化變遷”（批准號：07JJD720043）暨2007年中國教育部“新世紀優秀人才支持計畫”（批准號：NCET-07-0639）的階段性成果。
중국역사상의 城과 鎮10)

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개요　중국역사에서 성이 있고 나서야 진이 있었다. 세월의 흐름에 따라, 어떤 성은 전으로 변하고, 어떤 진은 성으로 변하는 등 양자는 상호 전환해왔다. 그러나 성은 진과 같지 않다. 이들은 서로 다른 개념이다. 물론 이들 사 이에 비슷한 점이 있기는 하지만 차이점이 더욱 많다. 학계에서는 습관적으로 서양의 도시개념을 중국 역사상의 성과 진에 대입하여, '도시'와 '성진'을 동의어로 사용, 중국의 농촌의 반대어로 간주하고 있다. 이런 방식은 역사를 마음대로 편집하는 것이며 진실을 감추는 것이다. 본문을 쓴 목적은 논의 중에 있는 중국역사상의 성과 진 유형과 기능을 살펴보고, 성과 진의 공통점과 차이점을 고찰하여 중국도시화의 과정을 연구하는 것이다. 이로써 학계에서 혼용하고 있는 개념들을 명확히 하여 관련된 작업들의 추진, 당대도시계획과 건설에 역사적 참고가 되려한다.

key words: 중국 역사 성 진 시장

1. 개념과 방법

중국 도시의 기원은 멀고도 길며, 그 발전과정은 서양과 다르다. 그래서 어떤 학자(韋伯)는 서양에서의 도시와 같은 도시가 중국에는 없다고 역설하고 있다. 이런 역사적 연구기초가 부족한 경솔한 결론이 그 위치가 확고하지 못하고 비판(羅威廉)을 받는 것은 당연한 것이라 할 수 있다. 문제는 罗威廉가 韋伯을 반박하는 증거가 도시가 아닌 한구진(汉口镇)이라는 시진이라는 것이다. 이러한 착오가 생긴 것은 개념들의 혼용과 잘못된 방법론이 있다. 罗威廉가 韋伯을 능가한 부분은 그가 역사적 연구의

10) 2007년 중국 교육부 인문사회과학 중점 연구기자 중대 전문 안건 "제대 장강중류농촌사회의 문화 변천" (비준번호: 07JD720043), 2007년 중국교육부 "신세기우수인재지지계획"(비준번호:NCET-07-0639)의 단계성 성과
사례를 제공하여, 본문에서 깊이 토론할 수 있도록 한 것이다. 윤석의 추론은 사전적 조화의 부족 상태에서 빗어낸 현상에 불과하다. 하지만, 윤석의 추론은 한국 역사에 대한 오독 역시 윤석뿐만이 아니 위험하다. 그는 의식적으로는 무의식 적으로는 한국 역사상의 성과 진의 차이를 무시한 채 흐름으로. 게다가 윤석의 추론은 방법론에 있어서 여전히 서양중심론자였다. 왜냐하면 그는 계속하여 서양의 시각으로 한국을 관찰하였는데, 하버마스(Juergen Habermas)의 '공공 공간'과 '시민사회' 분석들을 이용하여 한국에서 서양식 도시를 찾아내려 시도하였기 때문이다. 따라서 이런 방법이 한국의 진상을 판별할 수 없게 한 것은 필연적이다. 중국역사를 최정에 있어 그는 진상의 복원을 의도하였으나 서양중심주의의 손바닥에서 빚어난 것이었다. 하지만, 그는 중국역사를 대함에 있어서도 복원하려고 했다.

본 연구자는 방법론에 있어 곤란함과 막연함에 빠져있는데, 빠져나갈 수 있는 방법은 오직 하나, 바로 역사로 회귀하여 역사로 하여금 말하게 하는 것이었다. 방법론에 있어 곧이 분명할 필요가 없다. 그것은 능력을 소모하고, 시간을 낭비할 뿐이다. 따라서 지금 가장 중요한 것은 서양중심론의 해석 모니터 비판하는 것이 아닌, 기본적인 역사 개념을 토론하고, 무엇이 한국역사상의 성과 진인지 명확히 하는 것이다.

중국역사에서 성이 있고 나서야 진이 있었다. 빛깔의 흐름에 따라, 어떤 성은 진으로 변하고, 어떤 진은 성으로 변하는 등 양자의 상호 전환해왔다. 그러나 성은 진과 격지 않다. 이들은 서로 다른 개념이다. 물론 이 두 사이에 비슷한 점이 있는 하지마지만 차이점이 더욱 많다. 학계에서는 습관적으로 서양의 도시 개념을 중국 역사상의 성과 진에 대입하여, '도시'와 '성진'을 동의어로 사용. 중국의 농촌의 반대어로 인주하고 있다. 이런 방식은 역사학의 마음대로 편집하는 것이며 진실을 감추는 것이다. 본문을 본 목적은 논의 중에 있는 중

2. 성과 진: 유형과 기능

중국의 성은 아주 일찍부터 시작되었다. 고고학적 보고에 근거하면 신석기
시대에 속하는 용산문화성(龍山文化城)터는 이미 많은 곳에서 발굴 되었으며, 지금으로부터 약 4천 년 전의 일이라 한다. 역사적으로 보아 중국의 성은 기능을 완비했다고 말할 수 있으며, 각 다른 등급의 정치·군사·경제·문화의 중심이었다.

의미학적 시각으로 보면, '성'의 본래 뜻은 성벽(城 wall)을 가리키며 성벽 축조는 군사방어와 보국안민을 위한 것이다. 군사방어가 성의 가장 중요한 기능임에 따라 성은 반드시 토تون하게 지어야 하며, 그 규모와 구조, 견고성도, 군사역량은 성의 등급과 차이를 균형적으로 보여준다. 아주 오래된 옛날, 성은 전사·제후의 도성과 향촌대부·변경성읍으로 크게 둘로 나뉘었다. 이 시기의 '성'은 성을 사방에서 방어를 담당하는 담장의 뜻이었고, 일반적으로 그 안쪽을 성이라 칭하고 바깥쪽을 껍이라 칭했다. 성을의 사면은 성벽뿐 아니라 해자로 둘러 쌓여있었다. 고대 중국의 '城池'라는 말에서 성은 성벽을 뜻하고, 지는 해자를 뜻한다. 성 문의 양변에는 멀리 밖을 바라보 수 있도록 누각을 세웠는데, 이를 성궐이라 부른다. 당시 표준적인 도시건축에는 각 길이 가 9리 정방형에 12개의 성문이 있고, 성내에 넓고 중앙에 교차하는 대로가 있으며 좌측에는 각종 제사를 담당하는 중요가 우측에는 토지신에게 제사를 올리는 사당이 있다. 또한 전조는 앞부분에 있고 시장은 뒷부분에 위치하며, 주민들의 작업에 따라 거주 지역을 나누었다. 옛사람이 말하자, "성이기에 백성이 많다."라 하였고, 《礼记》에서는 "성곽의 연못은 건고하게 하기 위함이다."라고도 하였으며 《墨子》에서는 "성은 스스로를 지킬 수 있어야한다."라고도 했다. 성의 축조는 일국의 홍망과 깊은 연연이 있다. 소위 "보통 안군치만, 흉패성왕을 원한다. 가까이에서 멀리 담보기 위해 반드시 먼저 성곽을 세우고, 수비를 세우고, 곡창을 채우고 병기고를 다스려야 한다."라고 했다. 분명 면 옛날의 중국 성은 크고 작건 무엇보다 군사 보루가 우선되었으며, 그 다음이 비로소 정치·경제·문화의 중심소재었다.

군사보루의 성이 지켜야 할 것은 정부와 백성이었다. 명확히 말해서 고대에 있어서 중국 성은 무엇보다 국가권력의 보유자(제왕부터 관위까지)를 보위하는 것이었고, 그 다음이 보호민중이었다. 이것은 성의 축조가 정부의 인민통치와 이러한 흔적과 발을 제외한 제도를 받지 않게끔 보장하기 위한 것임을 표명한다. 즉, 정치권위 보호가 성의 가장 중요한 기능 중 하나인 것이다. 정부는 주로 성의 중앙에 위치하였고, 거대하고 견고한 성벽을 갖고 있는 것이 성중의 성이 되고 군대 중정보호의 최 안전구역이 되었다. 예를 들면, 상제에 تحت 달성 금성과 내성, 외성 삼중으로 되어있었고, 금성은 가장 견고한 지대에 위치하였다. 또 12, 13세기 북경성의 중앙에는 자금성이 있었으며 이는 왕권의 상징이었다. 거대한 황성(도성) 외에도 각 금의 지방정부 소

11) 《説文》, "城, 所以盛民也"  
12) 《城郭滿池以為固》  
13) 《城者, 可以自守也》  
14) 《吳越春秋》, "凡欲安君治民, 興霸成王, 從近制遠者, 必先立城郭, 設守備, 實倉廪, 治兵庫"
재지에는 반드시 높이 숟가락 있는 역이 있었고 해자가 되었을 때까지도 염수째나도 있었으며 각종 관아가 성 곳곳에서 직무를 수행하고 있었다. 이로부터 성이 국가 권력의 상정적인 부호임을 볼 수 있다.

군사병적와 정치통제 외에 중국의 성은 경제적 기능과 문화적 기능을 갖고 있다. 각각각의 사람들은 (군안·관원·상인·예술인·선비·광대·기술자·거지 등)이 성 중심에 모여 있었기 때문에 인구밀도가 많은 수준에 높으며 상품유통이 발달하였다. 따라서 각각 권력의 중심인 성이 경제중심의 역할을 담당하게 된 것은 필연적이라 할 수 있다. 군사적 목적과 정치적 목적으로 건축된 교통노선에서 모든 성은 시작하고 끝난다. 이런 종합기술의 육로교통선과 수로교통선은 국가시장체계 혹은 지역시장체계의 주요 간선도로를 구성하였다. 다시 말해 국가교통망과 시장망은 대체적으로 중복된다는 것이다. 예를 들어, 상대 에 중원에서부터 남쪽까지의 주요 도로(은행·정주·신양·무한·장사)가 있었는데, 이는 또한 군사·정치·상업의 중요 도로였다.

先秦시기, 중국전통의 교통제도인 역전歴傳제도는 이미 형성되어 있었는데, 갑골문 중의 “磐”자가 바로 상대 설치한 역참을 뜻한다. 西周시대에는 교통도로의 건설을 매우 중시하였는데, ‘사공’이라는 전문기관을 설치하여 그 일들 을 담당하게 하였다. 그 당시 ‘周道’라고 불리는 것은 실질적으로 기산(崤山)부터 풍(豊)·고(鎬), 동쪽으로는 성주(成周)까지의 도로를 가리켰으나 그 후 성주를 중심으로 담아진 사통팔달의 교통망을 뜻하게 되었다.

秦漢·양조는 교통망의 건설을 광장히 중시하였는데, 예로 삼천동해도 (三川東海道)-관중 동쪽의 해변으로 인해 불어진·는 진한시기 온반 수송량이 가장 많은 교통도로였다. 隋唐시기에 장안(長安)과 낙양(洛陽)을 중심으로 10여개가 넘는 육로교통 주요도로가 형성되었는데, 이 수로교통이 바로 전하에 유명한 경항(京杭)동운이었다. 宋代 개봉을 중심으로 형성된 수로교통망의 그 주요기능은 조운이었다. 元代 영토 확대로 교통운수체계는 잔재 없는 완벽함에 도달했다. 중국이 통일 한 후 대도시 중심의 수륙이 오가는 교통망을 형성하지 않을 수 없었다. 명정시기, 도성과 주성, 부성, 현성을 중심으로 사통팔달의 역할과 거지처럼 서로 막혀있었던 교통망을 형성하였다.

이와 동시에, 각종교육기관의 대부분이 성 중심에 설치됨에 따라 과거시험 역시 성 중심에서 거행되었다. 이에 중국의 성은 또한 교육의 중심이었다. 뿐만 아니라 책의 간행, 인쇄, 문인모임, 문예창작과 발표, 가지각색의 오락장소 등이 성 중심에 밀집하였고, 중국의 성은 문화중심으로 불리게 되었다.

국가 혹은 지역의 중심으로써 성은 각종 기능의 집합체였다. 각각의 성을 자세히 살펴보면 이러한 기능에도 경중의 차이가 있음을 알 수 있다. 이러한 차이를 근거로 성을 대략 정치의 성 혹은 군사의 성 또는 경제의 성 등등으로 정의 할 수 있다. 예를 들어 어떤 학자는 명대의 도시를 정치형의 도시
만약 군사방어와 정권의 운용이 중국 성의 가장 중요한 양대 기능이기 때문에. 전체적으로 보아, 역사상의 중국의 성, 그의 경제적 기능과 문화적 기능은 시종일관 군사적 기능과 정치적 기능에 속해있었으며, 시장이 얼마나 변화하던 문화가 얼마나 찬란하던 (당대의 징안, 송대의 항주, 명·청대의 소주처럼) 결코 가장 중요한 것이 될 수는 없었다. 바꿔 말하면, 만약 징안·항주·소주가 도성이나 부성의 소재지가 아니었다면 그들의 경제 변화와 문화전성은 바람 따라 사라졌을 것이다. 좀 더 술직히 말하자면, 징안의 정치가 징안의 경제와 문화를 낳았다고도 할 수 있으며 이는 항주와 소주의 경우에도 예외는 아니다.

한편으로, 고대중국의 성은 일률적으로 모두 정방형 혹은 장방형이었고, 이는 중국인의 우주관 (天圓地方: 하늘은 동그고 땅은 평평하다) 이 건축미학으로 표현된 것이다.

성 외에 중국역사에는 중심역할을 담당한 또 다른 취락형식, 鎮이 있다. 진은 원래 국경의 관문 혹은 요새의 주군지 (garrison post)를 거리였다. 진은 군사를 관리하고 민중을 다스리게 되는데, 이런 종류의 진은 분명 군사적 의상의 단위이다. 《新唐書·兵志》에는: “진을 지키는 사람은 그 병사를 절도 있게 다스려야 한다. 원래 그 시기의 병은 순환에서 비롯되었다. 당나라 초기, 변방을 지키는 병사를 크게는 군이라 부르고 작게는 붕잡고 지키는 이, 성, 진이라 불렀으며 이 모든 것을 도라 하였다.”15) 송나라 초기, 군진 제도를 바리고, 군진은 상업적 진 (商鎮) 혹은 진진(市鎮)으로 변화하여 농촌과 각 성 사이에 위치하는 상대적 독립성을 가진 상업적 쟁채가 되었다. 송대의 高承은 《事物紀原》에서 서술하기: “백성들이 모여도 허공은 되지 않았으니 새롭게 건는 이도 있다. 하지만 진에서는 이를 감시하고 관리한다.”16) 상업적 의미의 성진은 송대에 출현하였고, 이는 중국 시장발전의 중요한 결과이다. 경제사의 관점에서 보면, 이러한 유형의 진은 면 옛날의 정기 시장과 魏晉隋唐의 시 (市市), 송·원의 초기 시장(市鎮)으로까지 거슬러 올라가 명·청시기에서 완벽한 형태로 갖추게 된다. 송대 이후 진의 시장기능은 계속 개선되어, 사회-경제 생활에서 발휘되는 작용은 갈수록 뚜렷해졌다. 특히 명·청시기에는 이르러 진은 중국경제의 활력소가 되고 상품경제의 중심무대가 되었다.

다음으로 진의 역사를위를 종적, 횡적 양방면으로 고찰해보겠다.

15) “大所謂方鎮者,節度使之兵也。原其始,起于邊將之屯防者。唐初,兵之戍邊者, 大曰軍,小曰守捉,曰城,曰鎭而總之者曰道也.”
16) “民聚不成縣而有稅課者,則為鎮,或以官監之.”
우선, 중대적인 방향으로 국가권력체계를 보면 중국전통의 정치·경제 합일체제와 전통시장의 영향으로 인해 중국전통의 지역(地域) 경제망 중에서 시진은 시장단계의 두번째 단계를 차지했다. 시진에 의거한 지역중심시장은 府·州·縣·城이며 시진은 위성처럼 맴돌면서 부주현성을 통해 경제 감각을 밖으로 빼어냈다. 시진에 근거한 하위개념이 바로 城·集·場·店등 광대한 농촌 초기시장이며 이들은 시진을 위해 충분한 경제양분과 광활한 시장공간을 제공하였다. 반대로 시진은 城·鄉 교류의 중요한 역할을 담당했다. 이러한 교류에서 하급시장의 역할은 정해져있었고, 시진은 의심할 여지도 없이 시진에 근거한 하위개념이 바로 場·集·場·店등 광대한 농촌 초급시장이며 이들은 시진을 위해 충분한 경제양분과 광활한 시장공간을 제공하고, 이로부터 결정되었다.

전통적 시진의 역사 위치는 그것이 상품유통의 중개를 담당하고 있는 것과 필연적이며 지역시장부터 더 나아가 전국 시장 상품의 중추가 되었다. 지역 경제에서 두 번째 중심시장에 속한 시진은 한 단계 위의 1급 중심시장 (府·州·縣·城)과 한 단계 아래 급의 농촌 초급시장 (허·집·상)을 이어주는 광장한 능력을 발휘하였다. 전국 경제체제에서 시진은 상품 뿐만 아니라 경제 역할에 더욱 눈을 떠게 되어 장거리 무역의 중요기점이 되었다. 구체적 경향을 설명하자면, 시진이 농촌 초급시장의 각종 부산품과 수공업품을 모은 후, 이 상품들은 객상의 손을 통해 장거리 무역 길에 들어서서 최종적으로 전국 각지 시장에서 판매될 것이다. 이 과정에서 지역 내외 지역 간 시진들의 상호작용은 더욱 발휘하고, 상품의 유통량은 어마어마하였으며, 상위 단계 중심시장의 상품 유통과 서로 도우며 함께 전국 범위 내의 각 구역경제 발전을 촉진시켰다. 전통시장이 상품 유통 중개의 특수한 작용을 충분히 발휘하였기 때문에 전통시장은 개방성을 갖게 되었고, 경제학적 용어를 이용하여 설명하자면 전통시장의 자 유무역정도가 매우 높아졌다 할 수 있다.

다음, 횡적인 방향으로 시장체계를 보면 중국전통의 성과 향은 각기 다른 체계에 속해있었고 각자 독립적인 시장 망을 구성하고 있으며 양대 시장체계 간에는 평행적인 상호 보완관계를 맺고 있었는데 이는 시장구조의 유사성 보다 높았다.
분명 송대 이전 (상업적인 진이 출현하기 이전)'의 중국 시장체계는 그림1과 같이 도시와 농촌의 수직적 관계였다. 송 이후 상업적인 진의 출현에 따라 중국의 시장체계는 변하기 시작하여 진은 갈수록 중요한 시장의 한 유형이 되었다. 명·청기기에 이르러 시진은 가장 번성하는데 이때 중국 시장체계는 “품”자형 체제로 변환하였고, 진을 중심으로 한 농촌시장은 그림 2와 같은 비교적 완벽한 상품유통체계가 되었다.

그림2 명·청기의 시장체계

그림2에서 지역시장체계를 볼 수 있으며 전국시장체계도 볼 수 있다. 그것을 살펴보면, 전국 각 경제지역에 균형적으로 자생한 성과 항의 시장기구가 존재했음을 알 수 있다. 상품교역의 장소·시간 종류를 기준으로 성과 항의 시장
온 크게 두 분류로 나뉜다. 첫 번째는 집시(集市)이다. 이는 도시와 농촌의 각종 정기시장, 상설시장, 론토기시장 등들을 포함한다. 두 번째는 전문시장으로 이는 성과 뜻의 각종 전문상품을 중심으로 교역하는 시장을 뜻한다. 여기서 독특한 점을 살펴볼 것은 성과 뜻에 골고루 집시와 전문시장이 존재했고, 시장의 구성과 기능에 있어서 상상적 관계를 형성했으며 각기 비교적 독립적인 상품유통위(市場權)를 갖고 있었다는 것이다. 이와 동시에 성과 뜻 사이에는 상품유통관계가 존재했었는데, 이는 결국 도시가 농촌의 우위에 있는 수직적 예속관계(진의 상업적 지위는 현성로 주자리에 뒤지지 않았다)는 아니었으며, 도리어 상호보완적인 수평적 시장관계였다. 다시 말해 시장의 구조에 있어 성과 뜻은 독립성(봉쇄가 아닌)과 상호보완성(통속되지 않는)을 갖고 대립적이면서도 대립되지 않는 상품유통의 관계를 맺은 것이다. 성과 뜻의 사례에서는 또 상업 반사력이 더욱 강력한 지역중심시장이 있는데 이가 바로 몇몇 거대도시와 거대시장이다. 개별 지역중심시장은 전국적 시장으로 발전하였는데, 남부 충북 등지가 그 예이다. 이들은 지역중심시장이윤도 전국적 시장의 거대도시를 가졌는데, 지역과 전국시장체계의 합이일체를 완벽하게 제현해냈으며 이는 이 시장을의 성장조건이 양호했음을 반증한다.

진의 유형에 관해서는 서로 다른 기준으로 구분할 수 있다. 발전단계로 나누자면, 송대 이전의 군진(軍陣)과 송대 이후의 상진(商陣). 민국이후의 재래적 진 세 가지 유형이 있다. 지역화면 하면 유역형 시장과 내륙형 시장, 산간지방형 시장, 변방형 시장, 네 가지로 나눌 수 있으며 인구 규모로 할 경우 소형시장과 중형시장, 대형시장, 거대시장, 네 중으로 분류할 수 있다. 경제적 기준으로는 수공업전문 시장과 상업 유통형 시장, 교통 요지형 시장, 세 종으로 구분가능하다. 시장의 경제기능에서 그의 차지하고 있는 상업상의 지위를 쉽게 찾아 볼 수 있으며, 상업적 지위에 따라 일반시장과 구역시장, 거대시장으로 나눌 수 있다. 또 시장의 명칭으로 그 시장의 상업적 지위를 분석할 수도 있다. 일반적으로 ‘시’ 혹은 ‘진’으로 불리는 것은 ‘집정장·혀’의 항촌 기층의 시장보다 높은 상업적 지위를 갖는다. 전문화 정도로 나누면 시장의 유형은 문화와 면방적 시장, 유제와 비단시장, 양식무역시장, 도자기 시장, 자 시장, 제자 시장, 뜻재무역시장, 악재무역시장 등등들 예우 다채로워진다.

이러한 전문시장의 출현은 중국 농촌경제가 이미 특색 상품을 생산할 수 있는 구조를 형성하였다는 것을 보여주며 동시에 지역경제의 상품화가 비교적 높은 수준에 달했다는 것을 상정한다.

대략적으로 성과 뜻의 주요 차이는 4가지 방면에서 나타난다.

첫 번째로 성은 국가권력의 상징이자 행정제도 단위이며 정부기구의 소재지이다. 또 모든 성은 성벽을 갖고 있다. 이에 비해 진은 행정제도의 단위도 아니며 국가권력중심의 주변에 위치한다. 또 절대단수의 진에는 성벽이 없다.
두 번째, 성의 주요기능이 군사적 중심과 정치적 중심인 것에 반해 진의 주요기능은 경제적 중심이다. 물론 성도 경제적 중심과 문화적 중심의 역할을 담당하지만 그것은 부차적인 기능일 뿐이다. 마찬가지로 진이 명의상 관이 설립한 가구인 순검사(巡檢司) 등의 관할을 받는다 하여도 이 관할들은 제도적으로 규정이 없으며, 다분히 분산적이고 인원도 적다. 뿐만 아니라 소수의 진에만 관원들이 겨우 살 수 있었다. 이런 상황은 성의 완벽한 관료체계와 반대된 군대제도는 완전히 다른 것이다. 따라서 진은 군사적 중심이나 정치적 중심이 아니었다. 문화적 기능으로 봤을 때 진은 비록 농촌지역의 문화중심이었으나 학교와 과거가 주로 성안에 집중되어있기 때문에 교육의 중심은 아니었다.

세 번째로 인구구성면에서 성은 상주인구와 비농업인구를 주로 하는 반면 진은 유동인구와 농업인구를 주로 하였다.

네 번째, 상업내부와 경제의 관련성으로 보면, 성의 상업적 내부는 진이었으나 진의 상업적 내부는 성이 아닌 농촌이었다. 성과 성의 경제 관련성은 성과 황의 경제 관련성보다 높았지만 이것은 성과 진 모두가 경제적 중심 (비록 실질적 내담과 기능에 차이가 존재한다 하더라도) 이었다는 것이다. 그 외에도 진은 국가권력에 손을 대기도 하고, (특히 몇몇 진은 현서(縣署)소재지였고 몇몇 진은 현으로 승격되기도 했다.) 비록 약화되었다고는 해도 여전히 상업적 진으로 탈바꿈하기 이전의 군사적 색채를 남겨두고 있기도 했다.

3. 성과 황

중국역사에서의 성과 진의 관계에 대해 한 점을 나아가기 위해서는 반드시 중국 역사에서의 성과 황의 관계에 대해 다시 한 번 살펴보아야 한다. 성과 황의 관계는 차이가 있으나 장자 간의 관계는 여러 가지가 복잡하게 되어 있다. 중화제국 말(明·淸)의 행정제, 세금관계에서 보면 대체적으로 성과 황은 수직적인 종속관계에 있었고, 시장구조로 보면 대체적으로 각기 하나의 구조가 되어 수평적인 상호(strpos)관계를 형성하였다.

도시와 농촌의 정의에 관해 국내·외 학계의 의견이 분분하다. 아무리 그렇다고 하여도 도시와 농촌의 개념을 이용하여 과학연구를 전개하는 것은 도리어 쟁
론이 없는 사실을 만들고 학계가 묵인하는 범례가 되었다. 오늘날까지 다른 개념으로 도시 혹은 농촌이 단어로 대신하려 한 학자는 단 한명도 없었던 것 같다. 또한 서양학계의 도시와 농촌 이념이 중국역사에 적합하지 고려하지도 않은 채 지성을 최소한으로 마냥히 알아야 할 기본상식이 되어 성향(城鄉) 양원적 시각으로 역사를 기록하는 것을 당연하게 여기게 되었다. 명·청시기의 많은 지방지를 읽어보면 시장체계를 시술할 때 '성집(城集)에서 혹은 항집(乡集)에서' 등의 서구구조를 많이 이용하고 있는데, 이는 당시 사람들이 이미 성과 향에 대해 명확한 구분을 하고 있음을 나타낸다. 반드시 설명해야 할 것은, 중국 문헌 중에 '도시'의 개념이 고대부터 있었으나 서양의 도시(city)와는 일치하지 않으며 그저 '성 중의 시장'(market of city)만을 의미한다는 점이다.

성향 시장체계연구는 사고를 필요로 하는 문제로 행정적 중심도도와 경제적 중심도도의 사이에 겹치거나 일치하는 문제와 관련 있다. 설전적가 지적하듯이 중국의 성향경제중심은 다른 계통에 속해있는 동시에 집진(集鎮)과 도시는 서로 중첩되는 부분이 있다. 경제중심지와 행정중심지가 교차하는 상황은 부현성(府縣)과 중간집진(集鎮·縣集鎮) 사이에서 주로 나타나며, 부현(府縣)급 시장과 진급(鎮級)시장은 대체적으로 같은 등급에 속했다.

일부 학자는 진이 도시의 범주에 속한다고 본다. 그들은 명·청시기 강남지역이 성집으로 된 기본성질을 시진의 넓은 성장(intensive growth)이 집략적 성장( extensive growth)보다 더 뛰어났기 때문이라 생각한다. 이것은 당시 시진이 양적으로 계속 늘어난 반면 그 본래 구조가 기능은 젤적으로 타파하지 못했음을 의미한다. 강남의 많은 시진은 모두 서남방을 갖고 있었는데 이는 시진의 규모가 기능이 이미 현성(縣城)보다 낮지 않음을 설명해주며, 시진의 항촌도시화과정에서의 독특한 작용을 보여준다. 명·청시기 소주의 도시화과정은 하나의 대도시(府城) 중심으로 교외 시진을 '위성도시' 개념의 도시로 확장한 것이다. 명·청시기의 도시화 발전이 가장 현저하게 나타난 현상은 바로 절단 시진의 출현으로 지역경제의 고도화된 분화화와 상업화를 반영하였다. 경덕현·佛山현등은 실제로 이미 도시가 되었고 다시는 시진으로 취급할 수 없게 되었다.

중국역사상의 도시화(Urbanization) 과정을 연구하고자 할 때 반드시 성군(城郡, Cities)과 시진(Market towns)을 나누어 토론해야 한다. 중국 역사에서 도시화가 나타난 또 다른 경로는 현 이하의 시진들이 함께 일어난 것이 다. 시진은 도시화의 기준으로 삼아 한계 초월에서 시진과 부현성(府·縣)이 같은 계층에 있다는 것을 설명한다.

시진의 범주에 대해 어떤 이는 강남지역의 송대 이후 흔한 비정통적 시진의 특징은 조단계성에 있다고 하였다. 강남에서 생산한 비단면적·면화는 각 단계를 통해 모이거나 흩어지는 것이 아닌 각 시진과 전국적 시진의 직접
거래를 통한 것이었다. 이러한 초단계적 특성은 두 가지 방면에서 볼 수 있다.

우선 시장의 규모이다. 단계적인 시장구조에서 가장 낮은 단계의 규모가 가장 작았고 높은 단계로 갈수록 규모는 점점 컸다. 하지만 강남의 시진은 때때로 부현·성보다 컸으며, 남심진(南潯鎮)·호주(湖州), 협석진(硤石鎮)·해녕(海甯), 성택진(盛澤鎮)·오강(吳江), 나정현(羅店鎮)·가정(嘉定) 등 셀 수 없이 많은 예들이 있다. 이는 이러한 시진의 지위와 부현의 통치가 계급적 관계가 아닌 시진 본연의 시장 활동범위와 경제능력으로 결정된 것임을 증명한다.

두 번째는 장사길이다. 이와 같은 시진의 상품 운송의 노선은 부현 치하에서 눈에 띄게 부족한 장산관계를 갖고 있다. 강남지역 시진을 연구하는 학자들은 종종 소주(蘇州)를 예로 삼아 각 시진을 상품집산지로 보고, 이로부터 강남 시진 역시 단계적 구성을 갖고 있다고 주장한다. 이것은 잘못된 생각이다. 소주의 주요기능은 전통적 화물집산이 아니며, 강남 방직품의 가공이었다. 그 밖에도 시진이 사들이는 상품은 먼 시장에서 온 것이 중심이었다. 강남의 방직품은 면 시장에서 흔하였고, 후에 면 시장을 없음으로써 쇠퇴했다. 강남 시진은 단계적 지방 상업을 중심으로 한 것이 아닌 시종일관 전국적 시장에 기대어 직접적인 운송판매관계를 맺었던 것이었다. 특히 이런 시진은 외지의 자금과 상인들을 대량 끌어들였는데, 이는 부현을 통하지 않은 것이었다. 강남의 수로망은 빈틈없이 배치되어 있어 시진은 대량의 방직품을 저렴한 비용으로 수로를 통해 운반할 수 있었고, 이로부터 시진은 면 시장으로의 직접 운송이 가능했다.

시장의 등급을 시진의 규모와 상업연결망의 단계로 나누면 상하증속관계가 나온다. 이러한 계급적인 관계는 오직 내지의 전통시장에 적합하며, 명청시기 강남에서 부흥하고 있던 신형시장에는 결코 적합하지 않았다. 강남의 시진은 면 시장, 심지어는 국제시장에서도 직접 연계를 맺어 활동하였으나, 눈에 띄는 계급관계는 없었다. 이것이 명청시기 특수한 환경 속 도시화의 독특한 형태이다. 이외에도 양주의 복산전과 신주의 영덕전 모두 외향형 경제로 이때부터 단계적 시장의 틀에서 탈피하기 시작하며, 절개와 자기를 중심으로 면 시장과 직접 교역하였다. 이것은 시장경제 적합의 방향과 행정제도가 완전히 일치하지 않았으며, 자기의 등급관계가 있다는 것을 뜻한다. 그렇다고 강남 시진과 시장경제의 관계가 지역 중심 집거 방식을 대체한 것은 아니다. 독립적·분산적인 면 시진이 다 방향으로 여러 통로를 통해 전국으로 확산된 것뿐이다.

시장의 비단계성은 하나의 중요한 기준으로 시진의 상품유통 역할과 행정소 재지인 보통도시는 함께 동등했으며, 운전히 도시 유통통로에 의존한 것은 아니었다. 시진과 부현성이 비견되는 현상에 관해서는 문헌에 많은 기록이 있다.
어떤 학자는 전시상품경제와 도시상품경제의 발전은 그 속도에 차이가 있을 뿐 그 성질에는 차이가 없으며, 양자는 같은 개념으로 전국상품유통망의 귀결점이라 한다. 상품유통망을 통해 도시와 전시 그리고 그 주변농촌과 광범위한 경제적 연계가 이뤄졌고, 도시와 전시로 하여금 소비적 의의 뿐만 아니라 생산적 의의까지도 갖게 됐다는 것이다. 특히 성향의 시장구성은 대칭이라 하였는데, 그 예로 명대 도시에 점포무역을 제외하고도 정기적인 시장이 존재했다는 것을 들었다. 명청시기 상도 임청시장은 소매 상업으로 이루어진 소비시장과 농산품 집산시장, 다양한 종류의 상품의 도매시장과 같은 세 가지 다른 동급의 시장기능을 갖고 있었다. 광동의 일부 발달한 봉식은 시진무역과 점포무역, 행상 반송무역의 3종 상업형태를 갖추기도 했다. 성향의 이런 복합적인 시장 구성을 성향 시장에 구조적으로 대응성이 있음을 밝혀주며, 매 시장의 형식은 도시 혹은 농촌 안에 존재하나 그 발육시기에 따라 발전을 달리할 뿐이리 하였다.

농촌정기시장이 시장체계에서 가장 하층부라는 것에 대해 학계 이견은 없다. 다만 시장의 성질, 즉 시장이 도시에 속했는지 아니면 농촌에 속했는지에 관해 학계 의견이 분분하다. 시진이 농촌범위에 속한다고 주장하는 사람들은 도시의 연구방법을 비난한다. 우선 도시를 정의하여 향촌 시진과의 차이점을 확실히 하여야 한다. 명청시기 시진무역과 향무역은 이미 농촌시장의 주체가 되었다. 농촌시장의 증가와 경제기능의 강화는 당시 성향분리 움직임의 발전을 반영한 것이다. 당시 이재적 상각주의 농촌시장은 원시 터사기본허시 전문허시 시진 4종류를 포함한다. 어떤 이는 명청시기 소주의 농촌경제자료를 선택·편집할 때 '농촌시장과 물자교류'를 한 장으로 취급하여 시진과 현시 를 농촌의 범위에 넣어 '농촌시장'을 상위의 도시와 하위의 광대한 농촌의 연계체이자 농촌사회의 경제중심으로 간주한다. 만약 시진과 농촌관계의 관점에서 시진의 변천을 살펴보면 명 초 강남지역의 시진이 향(鄉)도(都) 도(圖) 등의 기층 조직에 소속되어 있는 것을 볼 수 있다. 하지만 면 중업 이후 시진의 독립성은 급수록 명확해져 시진을 단위로 구체화하는 관념이 점점 유형화되었고, 경계와 손검사 등의 현급 이하 행정조직의 관할구역이 일치하기 시작했다. 정 중엽 후 시진 공공사업을 중심으로 지방행정이 운영되었고 국세징수기관의 지위를 얻었다. 정말 민초 행진의 저지를 실행하면서 시진은 구획의 단위로, 정정한 주변 농촌 관할을 시작하여 현대적 의미의 '진이 층을 관리한다.'는 메커니즘이 형성되었다.

필자는 시진이 명청시기 현생과 촌락 사이에 끼어있는, 상대적 독립성을 가진 상업체계로 농촌경제범위에 속한다고 생각한다. 이행정이의 《余杭縣誌》에 보면 ’육조는 당송의 제도이고 현과 진은 결과 안이다. 진이 커지면 현이 되고, 현이 작아지면 진이 된다.’고 하였고, 이행정이의 《姑苏志》에는 ’백성은 향·리·도·구·보의 이례에 있고, 비록 유래는 다르나 선왕이 백성끼리 사

17) 《六朝後宋之制，縣與鎮相為表裏；鎮大則升為縣，縣小則降為鎮》
이중계 지내라는 의미가 있다. 교외의 경우 백성들이 모여 사는 곳을 촌(村)이라 하고, 상업 활동이 이루어 지는 곳을 진(鎮)이라 하였는데 관에 속해 있지는 않는다. 18) 라 하였다. 弘治《湖州府志》에는 '상업이 이루어지는 곳은 오늘날 모두 시진이라 칭한다.' 19)라 기록하고 있다. 역사가들은 시진의 가치가 "반드시 모여야 하고, 상업을 통해 공업을 키우는 것에 있다." 20) 고 한다. 또 "방은 표리를, 시는 교역을, 긴은 방과 시를 잇는 도로이다. 진은 또 항촌의 상점가이다." 21)라 하였다. 이로써 당시 사람들에게 시진은 항촌 사회의 상업범위에 속하는 것이었음을 볼 수 있다. 어떤 학자는 명·청 시기 시진의 실제생활과 도시가 여전히 갖고 있던 모종의 물류·공업의 관계를 지정하는데, 이는 도시가 주동적으로 확장해 나간 결과가 아니라 도리어 항촌 경제생활의 확산으로 자연스럽게 생겨난 중심이다. 도시에서 멀리 멀어져 있고 심지어 가난하고 궁핍한 산간에서도 진진 혹은 항가에서 생겼다. 시진은 주위의 항촌에 막달라붙어 생존하면서 흥망, 기쁨과 걱정을 함께 하였고, 이로 정치적이고 소비적인 부현성은 더욱 그 뿌리를 다지게 되고, 사투리 역시 많이 확고해지게 되어 표준어 섞이지 않게 되었다.

여행객들은 지방지를 가지고 다닐는데, 부현지(誌)는 항사·집진에 대한 엄격한 제한이 심하지 않았다. 그래서 소수의 비교적 큰 집진을 제외하고는 비교적 자유롭게 시와 진을 청했는데, 수령적인 '진'은 항사와 실질적인 차이가 얼마 없었다. 이 정서에 관계없이 현 주변의 현을 관리하였는데, 독·우 부분은 현집진에 속하고 독 아래 부분은 농촌으로 분할 근거는 현이 더욱 두드러지게 나타났다. 이 모든 것은 감날의 시진이 여전히 농촌에 예속되어 있고, 항촌이 시진을 둘러싸고 있는 것을 설명하며 양자 간의 경계가 모호함을 알려주는데, 예외가 되는 사례가 존재하기는 하나 극소수이다. 도자업 시진인 경덕진의 발전은 주변 농촌의 농림 생산품과 흥의 상품유통에 의존한 것이다. 즉, 부항浮陽의 농림 상품량 증가가 경덕진 도자업의 관건 요소였다. 이렇게 경덕진과 그에 기생하여 살아가는 항촌 사이에는 상호보완적인 시장관계를 맺고 있었다.

施堅雅은 중국농촌시장체제의 모델에 관하여 시진(town) 범위에 속하는 피자가 서로 관계를 맺고 있는 경제중심지는 표준 시장(standard market, 기층시장이라고도 함)·중간시장(intermediate market)·중심시장 (central market)을 포함한다고 했다. 이 세 종류의 경제중심지가 위치하는 거주지는 각 '표준시장'·중간시장'·중심시장'으로 나뉘어 불린다. 이성적인 상태에서 기층 집시의 공간적 분포는 18개 자연촌이 육각형 모양으로 한 개의 집시를 애위싸고 있는 것을 의미한다. 실제로 각 시진은 자기의 시장역할을 갖고 있었다. 시진의 성향 속성에 대해 이야기 할 때 진급의 시진에 있는 극소수의 거대

18) "郡民有鄉、裏、村、街、保之名，雖與古異，亦先王鄉里同名，使百姓親睦之意也。若郊外，民居所聚謂之村，商賈所業謂之鎮，雖不怕於官，亦以附於書焉." 
19) "商賈聚之處，即今皆稱為市鎮" 學者有言，市鎮의 가치가 "必由所聚，通商惠工於茲" 
20) 徐熙《揚州府志》 "商賈聚之處，即今皆稱為市鎮。商賈有言，市鎮之價值在於 "必由所聚，通商惠工於茲" 
21) 徐熙《揚州府志》 "街坊聚之處，市以交易，而街坊聚之通衢，鎮又鄉村之市也，蓋寓表原宅裏之意也"
시진(漢口鎮이나 佛山鎮)을 반드시 짓고 넘어가야 한다. 그들은 전통적 시진 발전의 극치이며, 시진상업 수준의 최고대표이다. 또 현·성시에 치우친 상업 취락이며, 도시 시장체계 중의 거대도시와 비교했을 때 조금도 뒤지지 않는 구역자원이 배치한 중심시장이다.

필자는 성·향 시장은 수평이 되고 시진을 반드시 짓고 넘어가야 한다. 그들은 전통적 시진 발전의 극치이며, 시진상업 수준의 최고대표이다. 또 현·성시에 치우친 상업 취락이며, 도시 시장체계 중의 거대도시와 비교했을 때 조금도 뒤지지 않는 구역자원이 배치한 중심시장이다.

전통시장의 지리개념과 행정지위는 지금까지도 모호하며, 관리허가권의 공유는 관원들을 상호 견제하게끔 하여 관리의 효율성을 크게 저하시켰다. 관리체제의 문란은 시진에서 상업 활동을 하는 사람들의 경제적 욕구를 확실히 보장해주지 못했고, 시진의 시장질서는 수시로 비경제적 요소의 간섭을 받아야 했다. 특히 시진의 발전은 명확한 발전 방향이 부족했기 때문에 시진의 시장 구조는 완성될 수 없었다. 관리체제의 병폐는 시진 상품경제에 부정적인 영향을 주었고, 속박된 시진의 건전한 발전을 방해하는 장애가 되었다. 민국초기에 결국 시진의 행정지위는 확정되어 성구(城區)이하의 항과 진은 동급 이면서도 명확한 구역을 갖게 되어 중국의 가장 기층인 행정단위가 되었으며 시진의 규범관리는 의사일정을 시작하였다.

4. 결론

중국역사상의 도시발전은 시공전환의 과정을 경험했다. 진시황이 중국을 통일한 후 정치중심은 서북부에 위치하였고, 진한시대부터 당대까지 장안(咸 靜)은 중국도시의 최고대표였다. 송대 중국의 중심은 중원으로 이동하여 개봉(開封)이 중국도시발전의 중심이 되었다. 그 후 또 동남쪽 임안(臨安, 현 항주 杭州)으로 이동하였다. 원명·청 삼 대 북경(北京)을 도읍으로 삼자 도시의 중심이 북으로 움직였다. 20세기에 들어서 중화민국이 남경(南京)을 수도로 정하자 도시의 중심은 다시 남쪽으로 이동했다. 1949년 이후 중화인민공화국이 수도를 북경으로 정하자 도시의 중심은 또 다시 북쪽으로 움직였다.

하지만 진의 발전궤도는 성과 다르다. 송대에 산업적 진이 출현한 이후 황하 유역, 그 후에는 동남 해안지역으로 이동하였고, 명청시기 강남은 중국 시진이 가장 번성한 지역이 되었으며 이러한 상황은 오늘날까지 지속되고 있
다. 물론 민국시기 진이 행정단위로 승격한 이후 중국 성과 진의 귀결점은 도시의 범위였고, 도시화와 성진화는 동의어가 되었다. 하지만 그 이전에 걸고 긴 세월 동안 중국의 성과 진은 서로 다른 두개의 개념, 전자는 도시사 연구에 속하고 후자는 농촌사 연구에 속하는 상이한 것이었다.

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2. 영문


SESSION II

Taiwan and Beijing
- Culture and Social Space

- The Cosmopolitan Imaginary and Flexible Identities of Global City-Regions: Articulating new Cultural Identities in Taipei and Shanghai
  Tsung-yi Michelle Huang
  (National Taiwan University, Taiwan)

- Changing Social Space of Beijing
  Yanwei Chai
  (Peking University, China)
The Cosmopolitan Imaginary and Flexible Identities of Global City-Regions: Articulating new Cultural Identities in Taipei and Shanghai

Tsung-yi Michelle Huang
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ABSTRACT Given the broad consensus among academic geographers that a new matrix of global city-regions is on the rise, this paper attempts to show how urban linkage has become not only a social reality that produces various cosmopolitan identities but a discursive framework for the formulation and articulation of these identities so as to reproduce the urban networks. With a particular emphasis on the ‘imaginary of identity’ and its problems, I will explore Taipei-Shanghai as a global city-region first by examining the ideology inherent in the discourse of the so-called ‘New Shanghai People’ (xin shanghai ren), a popular discourse which has recently emerged to represent the identity of transmigrants. The second part of the paper will analyze several representative cultural texts including Wang Wen-hua’s bestsellers in Shanghai, The Protein Girl, its sequel The Protein Girl II, and Chen-pin’s bestsellers in Taipei, a series of non-fiction works on how to survive and succeed in Shanghai. Situating these texts in the context of the Taipei-Shanghai linkage, I will critique the imagination of the cosmopolitan identity, enabled by the material conditions of the urban network, and further lay bare not just the intricate connections between the new geopolitical regionalism and cultural narrative of Chinese transmigrants but the intense contradictions between the flexible accumulation of capital and the production of ‘flexible citizenship’ in Aihwa Ong’s terms.

KEYWORDS: Global city-region, Taipei-Shanghai link, transnational cultural identities, everyday urbanism, Chinese transmigrants

Identity, let us be clear about it, is a ‘hotly contested concept.’ Whenever you hear that word, you can be sure that there is a battle going on. A battlefield is identity’s natural home. Identity comes to life only in the tumult of battle; it falls asleep and silent the moment the noise of the battle dies down. (Bauman 2004: 77)
Transformation of Culture and Spatial Economy of Asian City-Regions

Cultural identity is in itself a fluid concept. Cultural identity is more than just belonging. It also entails strategic use of cultural resources, texts, and messages to construct transportable identities. (Keane 2001)

During recent years urban geographers have identified the emergence of the global city-region as a more inclusive way to address the relationship between globalization and cities. Instead of pursuing the function and morphology of individual first-tier global cities like London, New York or Tokyo, researchers today believe that terms like ‘region,’ ‘network,’ and ‘linkage’ are better geographical scales as well as better analytical concepts by which to map the changing geography of globalization, which more than ever depends on cities and inter-city linkage. For example, John Friedman calls the global city-region ‘a new form of urban landscape’ (Friedmann 2001: 123). Allen J. Scott defines it as ‘a new regionalism’ (Scott 2001: 1). For Sir Peter Hall, this ‘precursor of a new scale of urban organization’ is ‘networked externally on a global scale and internally over thousands of kilometers’ (Hall 2001: 74). Given the broad consensus among academic geographers that a new matrix of global city-regions is on the rise, this paper attempts to show how urban linkage has become not only a social reality that produces various cosmopolitan identities but a discursive framework for the formulation and articulation of these identities so as to reproduce the urban networks.22)

To put my analysis of the global urban network of transnational Chinese in perspective, it is necessary to explain the term ‘flexible identities.’ What I attempt to inquire into is the complexity of articulating the imaginary dimensions of identities in the context of global city-regions and ways to ‘make legible the tension between citizenship as a formal legal status and as a normative project or an aspiration’ (Sassen 2002b: 9, emphasis mine). In this essay, the term ‘flexible identities’ locates the problematic of the rising claims of cultural citizenship in the global city-regions. As Saskia Sassen persistently reminds us, ‘the global city is reconfigured as a partly denationalized space that enables a partial reinvention of citizenship’ (Sassen 2002b: 6). Inspired by Sassen, I propose to see how the flexible accumulation of global urban linkage invites the transnational subjects to identify themselves as the empowered users with the utmost mobility and flexibility, yet in reality the global city-region does not guarantee flexible identities or inclusive cultural recognition. The capitalist logic of the global city-regions that tends to centralize resources and divide the urban space into the glamour zone and the war zone as Sassen describes (Sassen 1998: xxxiii) has also predetermined and polarized the identity construction for migrants of various kinds.

22) See Allen J. Scott (2001) Global City-Regions: Trends, Theory, Policy and Saskia Sassen’s (2002a) Global Networks, Linked Cities. According to Scott, global city-regions generally take one of the three following forms: ‘the basic figure of a central metropolitan area with a hinterland,’ ‘conurbations, spatially overlapping or converging urban areas,’ and ‘alliances of geographically distinct but proximate urban centers’ (Scott 2001: 4).
Aihwa Ong’s ‘flexible citizenship’ is one of the keywords today to grasp the new identities of the transnational subjects and the claims they make. Based on her research on transnational Chinese managers and professionals, Ong coins the term ‘flexible citizenship’ to refer to:

the cultural logics of capitalist accumulation, travel, and displacement that induce subjects to respond fluidly and opportunistically to changing political-economic conditions. In their quest to accumulate capital and social prestige in the global arena, subjects emphasize, and are regulated by, practices favoring flexibility, mobility, and repositioning in relation to markets, governments and cultural regimes. (Ong 1999: 6)

For Ong, flexible citizenship brought about by the international division of labor should be understood as a result of negotiations rather than as a spatial practice engineered by a borderless world: ‘...whereas international managers and professionals may be adept at strategies of economic accumulation, positioning, and maneuver, they do not operate in free-flowing circumstances, but in environments controlled and shaped by nation-states and capital markets’ (Ong 1999:112).

As powerful as Ong’s ‘flexible citizenship’ is in its explanatory capacity, I would hasten to add that we should understand such a term in a broad context of the global regime of flexible accumulation. According to David Harvey, in contrast to Fordism, flexible accumulation rests on flexibility with respect to labour processes, labour markets, products, and patterns of consumption. It is characterized by the emergence of entirely new sectors of production, new ways of providing financial services, new markets, and, above all, greatly intensified rates of commercial, technological, and organizational innovation. It has entrained rapid shifts in the patterning of uneven development... (Harvey 1990: 147)

Harvey argues that flexible accumulation in the capitalist world has also given rise to ‘a new round of time-space compression’: ‘...the time horizons of both private and public decision-making have shrunk, while satellite communication and declining transport costs have made it increasingly possible to spread those decisions immediately over an ever wider and variegated space’ (Harvey 1990: 147).

Drawing on Harvey’s notion of flexible accumulation, I consider it necessary to extend the meanings of flexible citizenship. Flexible accumulation brings about various kinds of imaginary identities, which can be called ‘flexible identities.’ In this sense, Ong’s ‘flexible citizens’ is one among many flexible identities such as ‘cosmopolitan urbanites,’ ‘citizen of the world,’ ‘the global elite,’ and ‘the professional managerial class,’ just to name a few.

Having defined the ‘flexible identities,’ in the first part of the essay, I critique
the discourse of ‘New Shanghainese’ (xin shanghai ren), a dominant flexible identity in the global city-region of Taipei and Shanghai. The ensuing interpretation of Wang Wen-hua’s bestsellers in Shanghai, The Protein Girl and its sequel The Protein Girl II exemplifies how ‘flexibility’ becomes a lifestyle highly eroticized and fetishized in Wang’s novels. Then I seek to tease\textsuperscript{23} out Taiwanese businesspeople’s identity imagination in Shanghai by exploring not only the lingering myth of ‘common language, culture and ethnic origin’ but also those self-articulating labels of taishang in Chen Pin’s non-fiction, the Marching to Shanghai series, to explain the intense contradictions between the flexible accumulation of capital and the production of flexible citizens. It is important to note that in my analysis of taishangs nation-state is not the site or institution to embed citizenship or identities. Although it is undeniable that taishang (Taiwanese business people) identity formation is entangled with national imagination and the political relationships between Taiwan and China, the complexity of transnational subjects’ cultural identities should not be confined by nationalism, particularly when we deal with transnational migrants in global city-regions, where people’s identity imagination hinges more upon cities and intra-urban relationship than nation-states.

The Taipei-Shanghai link and the East Asian global city-regions

One way to contextualize the new identities brought about by the contemporary Taipei-Shanghai link is to see how the geographical scale of ‘global city-region’ is translated into various cultural forms. In other words, if we treat Shanghai and Taipei as merely ‘two East Asian cities’ rather than a global city-region, the significant socio-economic context of East Asian regionalism will be obscured.\textsuperscript{24} To be specific, the contemporary Taipei-Shanghai link in response to globalization may be more precisely articulated if we start with the historical development of East Asian global city-regions. During the past two decades, East Asian countries’ development follows a pattern that tends to replace the ‘space of places’ with a ‘space of flows,’ in Manuel Castells’ words (Castells 1993: 368). For such a ‘space of flows’ to function in the global nexus of capital accumulation, nation-states integrate and cooperate with each other to form economic zones. As Samuel S. Kim argues, ‘In East Asia, the framework of regionalism and regionalization is most salient in the economic realm’ (Kim 2004: 40). For Yue-man Yeung, ‘inner globalization,’ based on intraregional economic cooperation, is what characterizes Asia Pacific in the age of globalization: ‘even more striking [than the cooperation between TNCs and host countries] is the emergence of subregional zones of economic cooperation in Asia over the past two decades, where participating economies possess varied factor

\textsuperscript{23} See Sassen (2002b) and Holston and Appadurai (1996). For research on (Shanghai) taishang’s identity formation in relation to nation-states and Taiwan subjectivity, see Geng (2002) and Wang Horng-luen (2005).

\textsuperscript{24} The author thanks the reviewer for his/her question.
endowments and resource strengths’ (Yeung 2000: 12, emphasis added). Economic ties based on intra-regional networking in East Asia have become increasingly dominant in the present global age, as Yeung observes: ‘For this region, intraregional investment and financial flows represent the fastest-growing share of the region’s exchange.’ In fact, statistics show that ‘intraregional trade now constitutes about 43 percent of the region’s total, compared with 33 percent in the 1980s’ (Yeung 2000: 17).

East Asia’s intensifying networking across national borders is clear from the emergence of global city-regions as part of a new regionalism. Of the various forms of East Asian global city-regions, two stand out as being particularly significant.25) One is the ‘growth triangle,’ a sub-regional economic zone developed since the 1980s. Representative examples include the Southern China Growth Triangle (Hong Kong, Taiwan, Guandong and Fujian), the JSR Growth Triangle (Johor, Singapore, and Indonesia’s Riau Island) and the Yellow Sea Regional Cooperation Zone (China, South Korea and Japan).26) According to Hsiao Hsin-Huang, the late 1980s witnessed rapid expansion of multilateral cooperation in the Asia Pacific area. Compared with the first three developmental stages, this wave of regionalization in the form of growth triangles ‘mostly rests on the inner transnational, trans-regional linkage of capital, skills, human resources and markets’ (Hsiao 1997: 5).

Another distinctive form of East Asian intraregional inter-city networking is the linkage between ethnic Chinese cities. Such linkage typically embraces cities of the ‘Two Coasts and Three Regions’ (Greater China) and sometimes extends to include Singapore. For example, recent years have seen the proliferation of urban and cultural narratives, which, in juxtaposing two or three ethnic Chinese cities, provide the organizational rhetoric for joint ventures of all kinds: Shanghai and Hong Kong, Shanghai and Taipei, Shanghai and Tokyo all suggest a ‘tale of two cities,’ (shuangchengji)27) while Taipei- Hong Kong-Shanghai or Taipei-Hong Kong-Beijing can be a ‘tale of three cities’ (sanchengji).28) Ethnic linkage also serves as the basis for economic regionalism, as we see with the

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25) According to Kim, the most influential East Asian regional organization is likely to be the ASEAN+3, which refers to the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the NEA-3, China, Japan, and South Korea (Kim 2004: 10). Kim argues that ‘the center of gravity for economic regionalism has already shifted away from the US-dominated APEC toward ASEAN+3’ (Kim 2004: 13).

26) The center of the Yellow Sea Regional Cooperation Zone is the Chinese Bohai Sea Rim, which embraces the two municipalities of Beijing and Tianjin, and the three provinces of Hebei, Liaoning, and Shandong (Friedmann 2001: 131).

27) For discussions of contemporary Hong Kong and Shanghai as a tale of two cities, see Ackbar Abbas (2000) ‘Cosmopolitan De-scriptions: Shanghai and Hong Kong,’ and Tsung-yi Michelle Huang (2005) ‘Mutual Gazing and Self-Writing: Revisiting the Tale of Hong Kong and Shanghai as Global City-Regions.’

28) For example, two joint projects on ‘two coasts and three regions’ in the publishing and film industry have been launched since 2001: one is a series of novella collections entitled ‘Tale of Three Cities: Shanghai, Hong Kong and Taipei,’ edited respectively by Wang Anyi, David Der-wei Wang and Xu Zidong. The other is Jiao Hsiung-ping’s six-film project entitled ‘Tales of Three Cities.’ The project recruited directors from Taiwan, Hong Kong and China to tell stories about the urban changes in Taipei, Hong Kong and Beijing.
above-mentioned Southern China Growth Triangle or the newly proposed Golden Triangles (huangjin sanjiao) of Silicon Valley-Taipei-Shanghai and Tokyo-Taipei-Shanghai.29)

Thus, Taipei and Shanghai can be seen as a representative example of East Asian global city-region in two senses. On the one hand, they both belong to the ethnic Chinese urban network (cities of Two Coasts and Three Regions). At the same time, they are the command-and-control nodal points of such Growth Triangles as Tokyo-Taipei-Shanghai, Taipei-Hong Kong-Shanghai, and Yangtze River Delta-Pearl River Delta-Taiwan.

For scholars like S. Gordon Redding and John Gray, the ethnic Chinese linkage accounts for East Asian countries’ miraculous economic growth since the 1970s. The fundamental principle of the East Asian economy, they argue, is to prioritize family ties and interpersonal relationships over individualism, a ‘Chinese capitalism’ deeply rooted in Confucian ethics (Redding 1990; Gray 1998). Redding and Gray are insightful in pointing out the significance of ethnic networks for the East Asian economy, yet their account of ‘Chinese capitalism’ requires rigorous revision to remain theoretically valid and analytically useful. For one thing, in order to examine ethnic Chinese economic networks today, the geographical context of global city-regions should be placed in the foreground, given that contemporary global capitalism relies on urban nodes and city linkage for flexible accumulation. In other words, the intra-urban relationships within ethnic Chinese global city-regions in East Asia designate a strategic site for comprehending ethnic identity in relation to the logic of global zoning. Second, rather than assume a homogeneous Chinese culture and overlook local differences, as Redding and Gray do, I suggest we focus on the tensions between and among ethnic Chinese cities brought about by the constant negotiations between various geographical scales of the local and the demands of regional integration in the service of global capitalism.30)

**The cosmopolitan narrative of ‘New Shanghainese’: an ideology of capitalist reterritorialization**

To tease out the implications of such complicated intraregional negotiations, we could first look at how the cultural identity of ethnic Chinese is re-constructed to meet the needs of capitalist geographical reorganization. As Harvey argues, an effective strategy for coping with time-space compression is to ‘intervene actively in the production of volatility’ by producing imagery and sign systems to shape

29) Chou Yi-heng and Hsu Ming-yi proposed to develop Taiwan-centered Double Golden Triangles, namely, Silicon Valley–Taipei–Shanghai and Tokyo–Taipei–Shanghai.

the market’s volatility for one’s own purposes (Harvey 1990: 287). The widely disseminated image of the ‘New Shanghainese’ exemplifies how the urban discourse of intraregional economic linkage produces a cultural identity that may facilitate the reterritorialization of capitalism. As the latest addition to the various names for the rising elite in China, which include ‘the new rich’ (xinfu), ‘the middle-class’ (zhongchan), ‘the white collar’ (bailing), ‘the successful people’ (chenggong renshi), and ‘the international freeman’ (IF zu), ‘New Shanghainese’ best captures the collective identity of the large number of migrants who settled in Shanghai because of recent global capital flows.31)

Central to the ‘New Shanghainese’ discourse is a cosmopolitan spirit of universal hospitality. That is, ‘New Shanghainese’ is construed, at the present global age, as an inclusive identity for those who were not born or raised in Shanghai but migrated to the city for various reasons. It is not surprising to see such a narrative of cosmopolitanism reiterate Old Shanghai culture as its authoritative roots. The history of Shanghai as a treaty port after the first Opium War at the end of the 19th century made the city a melting-pot culture, and more importantly, the prototype of a contemporary ‘global city.’ As the legitimate heir of Old Shanghai culture, New Shanghai today has revived its cosmopolitan spirit to welcome foreign cultures and people as an ocean embraces all rivers (haina baichuan). Shanghai scholar Wan Zengwei observes that ‘Old Shanghai cosmopolitanism indeed lends new Shanghai a tolerant and open-minded climate’ (Wan 2003: 131). This cosmopolitan culture, the core value of the New Shanghainese discourse, has been invoked from time to time as the common ground between Shanghai’s past, present, and future.

The grandiose and fancy rhetoric of the New Shanghainese, persuasive to many, could be dangerous because its ‘universal’ cosmopolitan ideals too easily create an illusion of consensus, thus causing its ideological uses to go unquestioned. For one thing, a largely ignored fact about New Shanghainese is that this identity was born in the context of the international division of labor brought about by the globalization of capital, that is, it was prescribed by the ideology of global capitalism. The identity of New Shanghainese is an image, a sign system produced for the expanding new class of global city-regions, and particularly for its professional managerial elite.32) The assumption of class hierarchy permeates most discussions of New Shanghainese. For example, in a report entitled ‘New Shanghainese, New Legends,’ Yazhou Zhoukan defines New Shanghainese as ‘China’s new elite generation. Not born or raised in Shanghai, they cannot speak Shanghainese. Yet it is these New Shanghainese that will take charge of the city’s future’ (Jiang 2002: 26). In a special issue on the cross-strait relationship between China and Taiwan, Global Views Monthly makes New Shanghainese an identity for Taiwanese to claim in Shanghai: ‘The economic boom in new Shanghai is transforming Taiwanese entrepreneurs into

31) For the collective identity of the rich in China, see Shi Lei (2004).
32) For discussions of the two expanding classes of global cities, see Sassen (1998).
New Shanghainese. Top investors, middle-class businesspeople, and overseas returnees all find themselves drawn to Shanghai’ (Cheng 2003a: 101). Ethnic Chinese elite from Hong Kong, Macao, and other parts of the world might also be New Shanghainese. Huang Ju, ex-leader of the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government, once said in an interview that the ‘New Shanghainese are ‘Citizens of the World’ (shijie ren) and also Chinese (zhonghua ren)’ (quoted in Xiong 2003: 121). This juxtaposition shows an ambitious attempt to invite Chinese elites from all over the world to identify themselves as New Shanghainese and call Shanghai ‘my city.’ The assumptions underlying the concept of New Shanghainese suggest that this cultural identity has been produced so that global capitalism can form its linkage between the center of capital (Shanghai) and the multiple local points (Hong Kong and Macao, among others). ]

The New Shanghainese discourse actually abstracts the local dimensions and complicated histories of translocal/transnational capital and population flows mobilized by the matrix of global linkages. Migratory workers have to cope with a constellation of concrete issues both at the macro and micro levels: these include the shifting political relations among participants, negotiations of transnational citizenship, variegated modes of labor control, different corporate management styles, and the details of an individual’s everyday life functioning. For example, for those non-locals who live and work in Shanghai, what kind of resident status do they claim and what problems might they encounter without work permits or Lanyin hukou?33) What rights are they entitled to and what obligations must they fulfill? Do they have adequate access to resources and opportunities? In other words, how are their economic rights and general civil rights defined?

As grand as it sounds, the discourse of the New Shanghainese, essentially the cultural representation of global elites, bypasses the fact that the production of cosmopolitan identity involves complex negotiations within and among a nested hierarchy of spatial scales and government regimes.34) For instance, one distinctive characteristic of Shanghai’s global-city campaign is the intervention of the state. The central and local governments not only supervise and monitor the reconstruction of the cityscape but also keep a short leash on the population of Shanghai (Chan 1996). Seen in this light, New Shanghainese, a presumably ideal

33) Based on his findings, Xiong Yuezhi, a researcher at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, translates ‘New Shanghainese’ into ‘Blueprint residents’ (lanpin hukou); in 1994 the Pudong local government developed the Blue-Cover Residence Card (Lanyin Hukou) so that ‘those who came to Shanghai could become Shanghainese... the Lanyin hukou, in other words, is the local version of investor immigrants and skilled immigrants’ (Xiong 2003: 119–120). In the year 2000 only 30,000 of the 3,530,000 non-local permanent residents in Shanghai were granted the status of ‘Blueprint resident.’

34) Although the rural migrant workers in Shanghai is not the case study of this paper, it is instructive to point out that the seemingly open-door-cosmopolitan identity of New Shanghainese is in fact a privilege for the chosen few – mainly the elite migrants such as translocal/transnational investors and the professional managerial class. The fact that those non-locals who are denied this identity of New Shanghainese (e.g. the large number of low-class migrant workers) greatly outnumber those who stay inside the gate of the glorious global city indicates that this cultural construct is a far cry from the democratic spirit it purports to embody.
Transformation of Culture and Spatial Economy of Asian City-Regions

collective identity articulating a seamless network across different scales (urban, national, regional, global), ironically becomes a highly localized and parochial signifier accessible only to the privileged class – provincialism in cosmopolitanism’s clothing.

Now we can better understand why the discourse of the New Shanghainese is often laced with nostalgia.\(^{35}\) Old Shanghai culture as a form of collective symbolic capital is conjured up for a specific ideological purpose – to serve as the cultural-historical foundation for the imagining, by the non-local service class, of a local identity. Given that New Shanghai declares itself as a global city reliving its glamorous past, the dominant city-users of the globalized Shanghai, investors and other members of the professional class, logically become the designated agents for passing on the legacy of Old Shanghai’s cosmopolitan mentality. In other words, the underlying appeal of ‘New Shanghainese’ lies less in the continuity between Old and New Shanghai than in the open and flexible image of global city-users, a portable identity with which those mobile cosmopolitan subjects may readily represent themselves. The need to articulate their ‘position’ in the city thus accounts for a recurring motif of the discourse of the New Shanghainese, that of the ‘citizen of the world’: this is a theme succinctly summarized by Huang Ju, as mentioned earlier, and by Yang Guorong: ‘The new Shanghainese are more than Shanghainese. They are indeed citizens of the world’ (Yang 2003: 127). Shanghai’s cosmopolitan past, evoked as collective memory, actually functions as ‘collective instruction’ for the city, an instruction on how to join the global club.\(^{36}\)

The production of New Shanghainese discourse exemplifies what Harvey means by manipulating sign systems to cope with the ephemeral market of globalization. According to Harvey, ‘corporations, governments, political and intellectual leaders, all value a stable (though dynamic) image as part of their aura of authority and power’ (Harvey 1990: 288). The production of an image of stable power proves to be a challenging task ‘because the continuity and stability of the image have to be retained while stressing the adaptability, flexibility, and dynamism of whoever or whatever is being imaged’ (Harvey 1990: 288). Harvey’s argument further makes clear why the concept of ‘New Shanghainese’ has been so quickly disseminated – the official narratives of global Shanghai require an identity thatforegrounds both stability, and more significantly flexibility, they require a strategy for interpellating migratory workers under the banner of cosmopolitanism, regardless of their many differences.

\(^{35}\) I have argued elsewhere that two common rules can be found in the rhetoric of urban planning as seen in the contemporary East Asian global city campaign. One is an arduous attempt to look for an ideal other, that is, a role-model such as London or New York as a blueprint for redevelopment. The other is to look back and find a historical era of the city that rationalizes the global city formation as a continuation of the old glories. That is, the nostalgic narratives of Old Shanghai are informed by the projected self-image of the global city.

\(^{36}\) I borrow the term ‘collective instruction’ from Susan Sontag (2003: 85).
Taipei’s popular culture and transnational cultural identity in Shanghai

Looking at the ideology of the New Shanghainese discourse, I hope to show that to fully grasp the implications of the formulation of transnational identity in the age of globalization is to come to terms with the powerful connection between capital flows and local cultures, to take into consideration a capitalist geography that entails the linkage of multiple locals orchestrated on various scales. Here we could borrow Caren Kaplan’s discussions of transnational subjects to ground our analyses of the cross-cultural intersections between Taipei and Shanghai in a larger framework of global complexity. Identifying travel as the dominant trope of technologies of mobility and location, Kaplan argues for the need to see travel and transnational subject in a new light: ‘a notion of travel as an expanded field in transnationality produces differently linked subjects. … [A] theorization of travel as a Foucauldian field with diverse points in tension with one another or even as a continuum with an origin and a discrete itinerary of sites rather than as the older binary of this versus that may engender more plural subjects’ (Kaplan 2002: 41, emphasis added).

Like Kaplan, geographer Laurence J.C. Ma brings into focus complicated routes of global traveling: ‘the patterns of spatial interaction today are multidirectional, based on multiple centers of origin and destination’ (Ma 2003: 19). Tracing the changing paths of contemporary Chinese migration, which redraws the map of the transnational flow of capital and people, Ma points out that instead of there being a ‘simple connection between a sending place in Guangdong or Fujian and a paired destination place in Southeast Asia before the 1960s,’ nations in Southeast Asia that once attracted millions of Chinese immigrants have witnessed a significant trend toward ‘re-migration’ since the 1980s, when Taiwan and Hong Kong loomed large as centers of the Chinese diaspora: ‘Globalization of production and the fear of Chinese rule have made Hong Kong and Taiwan major actors in Chinese transmigration, substantially involved in the sending and receiving of transmigrants. The Chinese mainland is no longer the sole homeland of the Chinese abroad …’ (Ma 2003: 19).37)

Reading the influx of Taiwanese into Shanghai during recent years in the context of Kaplan’s and Ma’s observations on transnational ‘people flow,’ I argue that today Taipei/ Taiwan is not only an ‘endpoint’ that exports capital and human resources to Shanghai, but also a center that produces the image and sign system of Chineseness in global city-regions. Today it is estimated that more than 300,000 taishang and 5000 Taiwanese firms are based in Shanghai. The human resources and capital flow to Shanghai from Taipei/Taiwan also bring about a

37) Ma explains that such ‘remigration’ registers ‘a development that has expanded the area extent of the Chinese diaspora, created new paths of transnational circulation of people and capital, and contributed to the diaspora’s social heterogeneity’ (Ma 2003: 19).
proliferation of new cultural forms.

In the following discussion, I will examine Wang Wen-hua’s and Chen Pin’s works as two representative literary expressions of the ‘transnational subject.’ My interpretation seeks to demonstrate that Wang’s urban love stories may be seen as a cultural form that replicates the pedagogy of global city-regions, one which prescribes a professional managerial class as the ideal users of the city and the model for cosmopolitan life. On the other hand, Chen-pin’s guides to the pursuit of one’s Shanghai dream open a window through which to glimpse the tensions, the contradictions brought about by the lower middle class’s yearning for New Shanghainese flexible citizenship.

The Protein Girl: the pedagogy of global city-regions and the erotic writing of New Shanghainese

The Taiwanese writer Wang Wen-hua is now famous in Shanghai. Since its publication in 2000, The Protein Girl has attracted a great number of readers in the cross-strait market. Wang’s popularity in Shanghai inspired the editor of Global Views Monthly, Cheng Changyu, to claim that ‘if Shanghai is a city that belongs to Bajin, Eileen Chang, Pai Hsien-yung, now we have to update the list to include Wang Wen-hua and Jimmy’ (Cheng 2003b: 161). The phenomenal success of Wang Wen-hua’s and Jimmy’s works, then, raises the question as to why novelists and artists from Taipei become adept at telling stories of Shanghai. Many cultural critics believe that Wang’s (as well as Jimmy’s) acclaim has much to do with the rise of the petit bourgeois culture in Shanghai. For example, L.P. Yao, the general editor of Yazhou Zhoukan comments:

The wide consumption of Wang Wen-hua’s writings in mainland China is indicative of the absence of urban novels in this country. In the past decade, unprecedented urban changes in cities like Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen have not been fully reflected in China’s contemporary literature. The subject matter of many novels has not caught up with the changing times; thus, The Protein Girl gets the chance to step into the secret garden and steal the hearts of one hundred million petit bourgeois (Yao 2003: 4).

While it is true that Taipei and Shanghai significantly share a gentrified urban space and middle-class mentality, I nonetheless feel that such a facile focus on class affinities will only deflect our attention away from the larger historical/spatial context in which this Shanghai-Taipei cultural connection is embedded. Rather than reducing the phenomenon of Wang Wen-hua to the

38) See Wang’s official website; http://www.readingtimes.com.tw/authors/tomwang/promote/cn.htm
39) Jimmy Liao is a renowned illustrator from Taipei, ‘whose illustrated books with simple stories about people coping in the modern urban world have become hot sellers in Taipei, Tokyo, Seoul, Hong Kong, Shanghai and Singapore’ (Taipei Times 2003). His picture books, including Sound of Colors and Turn Left, Turn Right, have been adapted into films, TV dramas and plays in Hong Kong and China.
simple fact of shared petit bourgeois values, I propose to situate his works in the historical context of an intensifying process of cultural translation as well as in the more specific spatial context of global city-regions.

Wang’s overnight fame can be partly attributed to the fact that traditional Chinese characters used in Taiwan can be easily converted on the computer to simplified ones, allowing cross-strait publishers to reduce the time and cost of publication. Thus the urban culture represented in Wang’s novels has been highly accessible to Shanghai readers, who can quickly understand, identify with, and appropriate Wang’s images and vocabulary celebrating the bright lights and the big cities. Furthermore, Wang has created a slick Chinese writing style to translate the Western urban language of eroticism, which easily impresses his readers. As David Wang observes, Wang’s chic urban stories, written in a style similar to the ‘scholar and beauty novels’ (caizi jiaren) of the Ching dynasty, pleasantly surprise the reader with their nuanced portrayal of big city life and love-starved modern urbanites with rhymes and beats’ (Wang, D. 2002). Sher-shiueh Li also praises Wang’s ‘original use of diction, particularly his witty conceits and plotting’ (Li 2002). The journalist Chen Yixin loves Wang for his ‘bitingly funny stories and smart, sophisticated rhetoric’ (Chen 2004).

The target readers of the novels, members of the white-collar class in Shanghai are no less enthusiastic. For example, Yao Wei, from the Asian Development International Transportation Corporation in Shanghai, says: ‘We love The Protein Girl because Wang seems to turn people in real life into types and caricatures effortlessly with refreshing, sensual expressions and images – the novel is a funny and witty page-turner’ (Wu 2003: 17). Indeed, besides those punchline-like one-liners, Wang’s writing is filled with Chinese couplets and rhymes deployed in a frivolous tone, translating colloquial English expressions concerned with relationships and dating. For instance, ‘gao weixiu nuzi’ is a jocular translation for ‘high maintenance women.’ Other instances include lady killer (shunu shashou), the L word (L nagezi), feel horny (gan jue youjiao), and sugar daddy (tang baba).

Neither Wang’s smart appropriation of the glib Sex-and-the-City style nor the easy conversion between simplified and traditional Chinese characters, however, can sufficiently explain the cross-strait popularity of The Protein Girl. The crucial reason for Wang’s popularity lies in his successful translation into Chinese of a kind of urban culture upheld as the ideal lifestyle for everyone today – the culture of the professional managerial class, who claim for themselves ‘the urban glamour zone’ of the global city as Sassen puts it (Sassen 1998: xxxiii).40

According to Sassen, a distinguishing characteristic of global cities like New York, London, and Tokyo is the rapid expansion of two groups of city-users – the service class (professional managerial class) on the one hand, and the underprivileged new immigrants and low-skill laborers on the other. The

40) With an MBA degree from Stanford, Wang himself once was a member of the professional managerial class.
coexistence of these two classes of course manifests a great social inequality and ‘spatial apartheid’ – while the underclass is marginalized into the ‘urban war zone,’ the privileged and powerful elite has every right to occupy the ‘urban glamour zone.’ Specifically, for the professional managerial class, an ideal city would satisfy every need of frequent travelers, be it state-of-the-art infrastructure (airports and highway), luxurious places to live and do business (five-star hotels, landmark office buildings), or hip places around town for some R&R (trendy restaurants, bars) (Sassen 1998: xxxiii). As capital-driven globalization has continued to advance at an unprecedented speed and scale since the 1980s, the urban space catering to the needs of the professional managerial class has increasingly become the ‘urban glamour zone’ that every city in the world seeks to copy (‘Manhattanize’), and these highly-mobile ‘flexible citizens,’ tend to represent the dominant and most legitimate ‘users’ of the city, and their fancy lifestyle the model of success.

The identity of the global elite finds exemplary representations of itself in Wang’s novels. The ‘wolf men,’ those most powerful of ‘lady killers,’ for instance, embody the global elite: based in Taipei, these border-crossing financial experts have offices in the landmark buildings of urban glamour zones; they frequent trendy places in the town, freely display their name-brand luxuries, and make themselves at home in global cities all over the world (Wang 2000: 10–11). Wang’s protagonists’ lifestyle also resembles that of the professional managerial class. For example, in the first volume, the male protagonist imagines, in his first-person narrative, his female friend Jia-jia visiting New York for a meeting. The way he pictures her suggests a ‘global romance,’ made up of such signifiers as New York City, stock markets, parachuting in Fiji, and high-tech communication (Wang 2000: 237). Likewise, in The Protein Girl II, Paulina’s suggestion that Jia-jia should fly to New York the very next day to for a date with her boyfriend is a similar global fantasy:

To find a guy for marriage is easy, but to have him travel to New York with you is just the opposite. The sense of beauty is only for those love birds holding hands and walking on the orange-juice-like Upper West Side, having breakfast together at Tiffany’s, and seeing Truffaut’s Jules and Jim in Greenwich Village. (Wang, W. 2002: 161, emphasis original)

41) Addressing himself in the second-person, the narrator describes his romantic longing in detail:
She [Jia-jia] would make an in-flight call on her way to New York while you are talking to your boss about the price-earning ratio of Cisco System’s stocks. She would be telling you that she is flying over Fiji, where you two had a sweet time together. Then you have no choice but to tell your boss that you have to take this call. You think of how you two will be parasailing high in the sky over the small island of Fiji. Blown by the wind, your parachute flies so close to hers that you can give her a quick kiss. Then the parachutes become entangled. So you two just fall into the ocean together to feed the fish. You figure she would fax you a piece of blank paper with tiny words on the lower right corner, ‘me in New York without you’ and you would fax her back from your office a piece of black paper, saying ‘broad daylight in Taipei without you’ (Wang 2000: 237).
In fact, throughout the novel, despite their seemingly endless dating dilemmas, the female protagonists Paulina and Jia-jia are nothing less than mobile hedonists leading a charmed life. They can just pack up and fly to New York any time they want. When in Taipei, sporting the latest Prada or Birkin handbag, they show up in trendy hangouts like Fnac, California Fitness Center, Room 18, Eslite Bookstore, and all the fancy restaurants. At home all they seem to ever do is use ADSL and log on to ICQ for the latest man-hunting tactics.

Representing Taipei urbanites as the subjects and objects of carnal desire à la Sex and the City, Wang proposes for his readers a pedagogy which defines the privileged global elite as a universal model for everyone in the city and their sexual escapades as stories to be passed down. Yet, clearly the popularity of this cultural model in Shanghai has to be embedded in the historical context of Shanghai being a global city in the making. The Protein Girl series was launched in the city at just the right time. Given the great speed of their own city’s urban redevelopment in the 1990s, Shanghai readers could easily identify with the glittering metropolitan life portrayed in Wang’s novels, seeing it as something tangible, just the kind of urban life that could be theirs in the near future. Now that Shanghai is eager to make its entry into the world as the most prominent global city of the 21st century, it seems reasonable for its inhabitants to look for the corresponding new identities. Wang’s novels of the global Chinese elite and their lifestyle are consonant with Shanghai people’s desire for a new class identity, and also with the official promotion of Shanghai’s ‘reglobalization,’ a campaign encouraging Shanghaiese to retrieve the city’s old glory from the 1930s and become reconnected with the world.42)

The process of cultural learning is further facilitated by Taipei as a spatial interface between Shanghai and such generic global cities such as New York or London. This mediation is made possible by the tension between these two cities – Taipei is culturally closer to Shanghai than most of the other cities in the world outside of China. At the same time, Taipei may be the most unfamiliar city to Shanghaiese due to the decades-old severance of political ties between China and Taiwan. This paradox works miracles for Wang’s novels of transnational fantasy. On the one hand, his fictional representation of Taipei’s urban culture allows the reader in Shanghai to imagine occupying a similar position, one where he/she can imagine being ‘at home in the world,’ connecting here-and-now to other world-famous global cities. Or, to put it more precisely, because Taipei and Shanghai are both Chinese cities, their assumed similarity helps Shanghai readers to imagine the Manhattanization of their city’s future by first grasping the image of a ‘twenty-first-century Taipei modern,’ as Sher-shiuheh Li (Li 2002) puts it.

42) In addition, the mass media’s circulation of Shanghai people’s homegrown cultural identities produced in response to globalization, such as ‘the international freeman,’ ‘the white-collar lady’ (bailing liren), and particularly ‘the successful people,’ serve as precursors that help Shanghai readers to identify with Wang’s global urban elite in Taipei.
On the other hand, while the fashionable hangouts in Wang’s novel may be just around the corner for middle-class Taipei residents, for many Shanghai readers who know little about Taipei, Fnac, California Fitness Center or Room 18 might be nothing more than empty signs. This sense of unfamiliarity with the novels’ specific setting could make for an exoticism that adds spice to Wang’s work. More importantly, these empty signs also drive the reader to focus primarily on the main characters’ colorful lifestyles, replacing these place names with those of Shanghai’s own hip places. Such a reading strategy enables Shanghai readers to envision the transnational identity of a cultural ‘cyborg’ – that is, they may imagine themselves to be ‘protein girls’ or ‘wolves’ in Shanghai. In this way, readers in Shanghai can connect themselves with multiple localities (Taipei–Shanghai–New York), and through imagining the various forms of consumption (of places, products, sex), they can reconstruct their own transnational identities with little social/material cost.

With his dazzling skyscrapers, five-star hotels, and stylish leisure spaces of the urban glamour zone, Wang transplants the cultural identity of the global service class in the fertile ground of East Asian metropolises which aspire to be transformed into global cities of the future. What he has composed is an airy ‘deterritorializing fantasy,’ a volatile mixture of flirty banter and sweet nothings metamorphosed into a common cultural sign-system for consumption by urbanites in both Taipei and Shanghai. Wang not only describes but prescribes the professional managerial elite as the privileged and legitimate class of transnational agents, made possible by the linkage of global city-regions for flexible accumulation.43)

**Taiwanese businesspeople versus New Shanghainese: ongoing negotiation of transnational flexible citizenship**

In contrast to ‘the global Chinese elite as New Shanghainese’ portrayed in Wang’s novels, I now intend to examine a different cultural expression of transnational identity. The Taiwanese businesspeople in Shanghai, as represented in a few non-fictional cultural texts published in Taipei roughly between 2000 and 2003, form the subjects of another case study, one which can illustrate the ruptures between transnational subjects and flexible citizenship.

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43) In other words, Wang’s cross-strait popularity resulted from Shanghai readers’ identification with the ideal users of the global city (-regions) and the geographical fantasy of being at home in the world through transnational urban linkage. The underlying contradiction inherent in this new cultural imagination lies in its annihilation of all kinds of differences among the cities, socio-political, material, and cultural. At the same time, when the global elite are projected as the legitimate users of the urban glamour zone, other social classes and urban realities are often hidden from sight. The ‘urban reality’ one sees is nothing more than a phantasmagoria of global brand name products, a space for consumption. The author thanks the reviewer for the question he/she raises here.
As mentioned earlier, more than 300,000 taishang and 5,000 Taiwanese firms are based in Shanghai at present. However, the term taishang has yet to be defined. The indecision arises from the lack of cross-strait consensus as to who could be rightly dubbed as a ‘taishang.’ As waves of Taiwanese pour into Shanghai, a ‘Shanghai fever’ has hit Taipei’s publishing industry in force, as seen in the proliferation of survival guides. The popularity of these ‘how-to’ manuals not only reflects the needs of those who aim to increase their competitiveness in Shanghai, but also paints a rosy prospect for middle-class Taiwanese wishing to emigrate and invest. Analyzing the cultural experience represented in these nonfiction works, I hope to first clarify the problems one may face in venturing to Shanghai to create a ‘Chinese common market’ because of the putative business opportunities and the convenience of ethnic and linguistic ties. I will also attempt to elucidate the ambivalent nature of flexible citizenship in a global city-region such as Taipei-Shanghai.

In Taiwan the term ‘Chinese common market’ is based on the presupposition that Taiwan and mainland China are only a narrow strait apart, and share the same language, culture and ethnic origins. According to some leading capitalists, such proximity on multiple levels should foster cooperation, bringing about a win-win situation. Sayling Wen of Inventec Corporation once expressed his hope that both sides could ‘work together to construct the strongest Chinese common market ever’ (Wen 2003: 166). Jeffrey Koo, chairman of the Chinese National Association of Industry and Commerce, says that ‘[f]or Taiwan businesspeople, China’s competitive edge lies in its language, culture, distance, labor and land cost. The comparative advantage of the similarities of language and culture as well as their flexibility and experience should set Taiwan enterprises on the right track to success in their foreign investment ventures in China’ (Koo 2002). Enthusiastic about a complete opening up of business collaboration across the strait, Wang Yung-ching, one of the most influential businessmen in Taiwan, pushes the rhetoric further by claiming that ‘Taiwan and mainland China speak the same language and share the same ethnic origin. To be frank, China is ours, and Taiwan, theirs’ (Lin 2004: 111).44

The strong predilection for the discourse of one culture and race is displayed not only by these prominent capitalists but also by quite a few voices from academia and the media. Lawrence J. Brahm, a political economist and lawyer, maintains that ‘compared with the Western companies, Taiwan entrepreneurs have a better chance to succeed in China because of their common ethnic origin and culture’ (Chen 2002). Li-hsing Ho and Chen-kuo Lee, scholars of business management, observe that ‘cheap labor, geographical proximity and the common language/ethnic advantage speed up the taishang’s investment in China’ (Ho and

44) Wang Yung-ching has said in public quite a few times that he opposes the government’s ‘go slow’ policy toward investment in China: ‘In the face of the unstoppable mainland heat, Taiwan simply can’t run against the global trend of opening up the mainland market’. … ‘Taiwan’s people should calmly accept the ‘one China’ principle, and from this position of equality, both sides can cooperate and enjoy long-lasting mutual benefits’ (Lin 2004: 111).
Lee 2000). Chou Yi-heng and Hsu Ming-yi, economic geographers, also propose the developmental model of the golden triangle, Tokyo–Taipei–Shanghai, by recourse to the same rhetoric: ‘in the future Japanese business could draw on the taishang’s experience and their competitive edge in sharing the same culture and race to initiate joint ventures with Chinese business or launch into the Chinese market’ (Chou and Hsu 2001). Local newspaper editorials drum up support with no less vigor. For example, in 2002 one editorial in the United Daily News claimed that ‘Taiwan and China, sharing the same language and origin, are separated merely by a strait, and in no way can their economic ties be severed’ (United Daily News 2002). In 2004 another editorial in the China Times pointed out that ‘After its rise as a global economic power, China’s influence has been far and wide. Ties of common language and culture should give Taiwanese enterprises a strategic and competitive advantage in China’s market’ (China Times 2004).

Rapid economic development and a common linguistic and cultural background have become the primary incentives for Taiwanese investors to expand or transfer their production bases to China. I would argue that such a discourse of ‘common language, culture, and ethnic origin’ is very much the product of negotiation between transnational subjects and the institutional mechanism of a regional economic network. Thus it should be noted that while the Taiwanese and Shanghaiese are similar in many ways, they are by no means identical. Without the protection of citizenship, Taiwanese businesspeople in Shanghai have to negotiate with the national/local government on the one hand and the local community/network on the other.

The various forms of tension entailed by this reality then, can be explored via the wide array of Shanghai survival guides mostly published in Taipei between 2000 and 2003. Among these publications, Chen Pin’s Migrating to Shanghai series is exemplary and carries a particular cultural significance. Writing from his personal experiences as a veteran Taiwanese businessman in Shanghai who became ‘New Shanghaiese,’ Chen aimed his books at the middle-class Taiwanese capable of establishing firms and exploiting business opportunities in China.45) His Shanghai know-how series, which features immigrating to Shanghai, living and doing business there, and getting to know the local people, received wide acclaim and quickly became a bestseller when it hit local bookstores.

The following discussion employs Chen’s Shanghai series as a case in point to reveal the fault lines and contradictions inherent in the formative process of transnational cultural identity. I would explain that, unlike leading Taiwanese business tycoons like Wang Yungching or Jeffrey Koo, the transnational identities of middle-class Taiwanese businesspeople in Shanghai are from the outset predetermined by the gap, embedded in global urban linkages, between the

45) According to a special report in Asiaweek in 2001, ‘Chen is in such demand in Taipei that business associations have to wait for weeks to get him to speak’ (Asiaweek 2001).
powerful professional managerial class and the underprivileged migrant population/foreign laborers. That is, these transnational cultural identities are often polarized. By bringing the labor hierarchy into play, then, I hope to show that expressions of transnational cultural identity/identities are class-inflected.

The popularity of Chen’s books first suggests the possibility of rethinking the validity of the postulate of a common cultural heritage. Chen claims the main purpose of his writings is to show Taiwanese readers that the key to success in Shanghai lies in changing their patterns of behavior and modes of thinking (Chen 2001: 9). Interestingly, if those who espouse the same language and race as a reliable guarantee are right, the taishang should have no trouble transferring their bases to Shanghai at a time when the red carpets are rolled out for them. Why would they need to make a great effort to change the way they think and act? If shared language and race can really be their magic wand, then why do so many Taiwanese readers still need know-how guides and find Chen’s Migrating to Shanghai tremendously helpful? Is it possible a reality check quickly shows that the ‘niche’ of similarities neither entitles Taiwanese in Shanghai to well-established cultural identities nor guarantees any easy communication with Shanghai people?

Chen himself has scrutinized at length the popular fallacy of overrating the similarities of language and culture, which tend to veil the differences between Taipei and Shanghai. Contrary to common belief, the same linguistic and cultural background proves to be more of an obstacle than an aid to the Taiwanese who wish to successfully establish a foothold in Shanghai and become assimilated into the local community. This could result from the Taiwanese newcomers’ high hopes for what they have in common with the locals and their tendency to underestimate the differences. Chen argues that many taishang are so overconfident that their common language and culture will assure easy communication and interpersonal relations, which will in turn necessarily lead to successful expansion of their business (Chen 2000b: 93). That is, a common cultural heritage has mistakenly led the Taiwanese to believe that the Taipei–Shanghai relationship is in every way like the Taipei–Kaohsiung one. Yet this ignores the fact that decades of separation following political severance in 1949 have given rise to huge economic, social and value differences between Taiwan and the mainland. Chen thus warns the reader: ‘Mainland China cannot be understood with Taiwanese common sense’ (Chen 2000b: 212). In other words, ‘[d]espite the similarities of language and race, Chinese and Taiwanese have drastically different modes of thinking’ (Chen 2000a: 255, Chen 2000b: 178).46

46) Jin Bi, a Taiwanese sociologist in Shanghai, has also repeatedly reminded her readers to avoid the pitfalls of ‘same language, same ethnic origin’: ‘More often than not Taiwanese businesspeople are deceived by the rhetoric of ‘same language, same ethnic origin,’ assuming that there will be no problem of communicating with Shanghai people. Yet in reality speaking the same language certainly doesn’t mean we share the same sets of values’ (Jin 2001: 220).
While Chen’s observations based on his first-hand experience contribute to debunking the myth of ‘common language, culture and ethnic origin,’ he fails to show the reader the larger-scale problem here. The true danger of banking on ‘same language, same race’ as the taishang’s ticket to ride, I argue, lies in the paradoxical nature of cross-border collaborations in global city-regions – the economic flow caused by urban linkage may be diverse in nature, but it does not guarantee inclusive recognition and equal treatment of diverse cultural identities. In the network of linked cities, the city that wields most economic power usually plays the pivotal role in the formation of cultural identities. Take the ‘how-to’ manuals mentioned above for example. For many people today to be a member of the mobile class now means the ability to stake the claim at a certain core city – in this case, becoming the New Shanghainese. As described in Chen’s books, the key to success is for the investor to leave behind one’s homeland experiences and do as the Shanghainese do. However, while those taishang who make a name in Shanghai may well call themselves New Shanghainese, for local people they are still known as taishang or Taiwanese rather than New Shanghainese.\(^{47}\) In other words, Taiwanese businesspeople in Shanghai have hardly any cultural label or representation besides taishang and Taiwanese.

In addition to the problem of ‘common language, culture and ethnic origin,’ another factor that contributes to the difficulty of constructing a positive identity for taishang is their mentality along with their sometimes indecent or even unlawful management style, as seen in some of those who went to Guangdong and Fujian in the early 1990s. For example, Chen repeatedly warns taishangs of the danger of ‘new rich Taiwanese mentality’ (Chen 2000b: 133–135, Chen 2003: 37–38). Ong’s field trip to Xiamen in 1993 also shows that ‘although people welcome the Taiwanese investments and free-spending ways, they think that these huajiao tend to exploit their women, create corruption, and intensify unequal relations in the province across lines of gender, class, and nationality’ (Ong 1999: 47). Taishang in Shanghai do not necessarily bear the same defamatory image, yet this prevalent idea of Taiwanese easily sabotages any positive identity representation of taishang.\(^{48}\)

At this point, it is reasonable to inquire: as Shanghai becomes ever more globalized, why are taishang still facing the pressure of integrating into local society? Are not New Shanghainese the cosmopolitan ideal of citizens of the world, whose Shanghai-style tradition of extending a welcoming hand to all has been passed down and reached its apotheosis after the global city campaign in the 1990s? Is it possible for the Taiwanese to become New Shanghainese and

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47) In contrast to Global Views Monthly’s special issue, which calls Taiwanese in Shanghai New Shanghainese as mentioned earlier, in New Shanghainese, a collection of essays articulating the new cultural identity of Shanghai people in the age of globalization, no authors define Taiwanese in Shanghai as New Shanghainese (Shanghai Zendai Institute 2003).

48) I thank the reviewer for bringing my attention to Ong’s observation.
keep their Taiwanese origin at the same time? These questions are raised to highlight not so much Taiwan’s subjectivity as the cultural articulation of transnational people flow, which is often associated with such positive terms of globalization as borderlessness, openness, de-centeredness and flexibility, but actually always involves hierarchy and politics of exclusion.

Interestingly, according to Chen, as Taiwanese flock to Shanghai, they themselves create various labels for different identities, classified according to economic and social status. Some examples of the labels include small- and medium-level Taiwanese business owners (xiao taishang), Taiwanese managers or staff posted in China (taigan), Taiwanese who choose to stay in the mainland despite career setbacks (zhongyou yizu or tailiu), Taiwanese laborers working in China (tailao), Taiwanese housewives (taima), female dependents of prominent taishang (xianxian meidaizi), and female dependents of unsuccessful taishang (genben meidaizi), and so on. These labels, seemingly simple colloquial expressions, register the self-description of those Taiwanese living in Shanghai, the self-articulation of their own transnational identities, identities which are multiple as a consequence of the international division of labor.49)

These self-articulating labels, unrecognized by the official account of the Shanghai-Taipei link, indicate how the industrial network of global city-regions shapes transnational cultural identities. As suggested by Sassen’s findings on global cities discussed earlier, the hierarchization of manpower tends to polarize cultural identity. The two ends of the spectrum, top-notch business professionals and new/illegal immigrants and foreign laborers doing 3D jobs (jobs that are dirty, dangerous, and difficult), thus become two most readily recognizable subject-positions for transnational migrants. This split cultural identity of global city-regions helps us understand the zero-sum game implied by these self-affixing labels – Chen describes in his books that the winners in Shanghai are those who have earned a lot of US dollars and managed to acquire a respectable reputation among their fellow Taiwanese, while the losers are those who end up becoming cheap laborers (tailao) or urban drifters (tailiu) (Chen 2003: 182–183). Such duality of winner and loser in fact derives from the polarized logic of identity formation of global-city regions – one is either a member of the global elite or of the underclass. To succeed in Shanghai the taishang must possess substantial financial resources and professional skills, given that they lack civil rights in the mainland, and their legitimate interests are yet to be clearly defined. Failing to establish a foothold, Taiwanese in Shanghai easily slip down the class ladder and thereby become laborers in a foreign land, not so different from the Thais and Filipinos working in Taiwan.

Now the only identity they can cling to is the one that indicates their Taiwanese

origin, where ‘Taiwanese’ now becomes a pejorative term suggesting no upward mobility. Associated with the underclass in the international pool of divided (that is, class-ranked) labor, tai here takes on derogatory, deprecatory implications. The prefix tai is thus Janusfaced. On the one hand, it simply refers to the place of origin (Taiwanese) within the larger framework of an assumed ‘common cultural heritage.’ On the other hand, it also indicates the ‘otherness’ of those who have failed to surmount the obstacles and become transnational elites.

To be more specific, the terms tailao, zhongyou yizu, and tailiu refer to the Taiwanese businesspeople and employees who have decided to stay in the mainland despite business failures and career setbacks. It is noteworthy that taishang have found it quite easy to conjure up these names to describe their circumstances since a translocal network of urban linkages for flexible accumulation of capital is already in existence, as demonstrated by the hybridity of languages. This also points to the fact that Taiwan is both the supplier and receiver of the international personnel flow. Thus the term Taiwanese laborer (tailao) shares a similar linguistic structure with the term tailao (‘tai’ means ‘Thai’) and Filipino servants (feiyong).50 Here Taiwan’s own experience with the international division of labor has contributed to the coinage of terms in such a way that foreign workers from countries like Thailand and the Philippines have become the mirror image of the Taiwanese in Shanghai. Likewise the second term, zhongyou yizu with its two shades of meaning, originates from the social reality of global people flow. On the one hand, zhongyou is a homophone for the abbreviation of the Chinese Petroleum Corporation in Taiwan. According to Chen, many taishang made a mockery of themselves by referring to C.W. Chen, the former president of the company. The label manifests taishang’s identification with C.W. Chen: ‘Taiwan businesspeople felt for Chen’s pain of being a pawn in the corporation, and therefore coined the term in 2002’ (Chen 2003: 35). At the same time, zhongyou is also an abbreviation of ‘drifters in China’ (zhongguo youmin). In this sense, the term echoes tailiu, meaning ‘floating migrants’ (liumin), which points to an acute social problem facing China as a consequence of the uneven development of globalization and thus widening class divisions during recent years.

By the same token, the terms xianxian meidaizi (a rich idle woman) and genben meidaizi (a woman who cannot afford to do anything) fall into the binary class structure predetermined by the international division of labor. The former refers to wives of global urban elites, traveling to and fro across the Taiwan Strait and around the world for their vacation rather than for business or familial responsibilities. The latter designates those who do not have much to do in Shanghai because of their lack of social and financial resources. The two terms are also the products of language hybridity unique to Taiwan. While terms like tailao and zhongyou yizu originate from the corresponding class structure in Taiwan, xianxian meidaizi and genben meidaizi take their shape by mixing

50) The word tailiu was coined by The Business Weekly in 2001.
Taiwanese (Hokan) with Japanese rather than with either Mandarin or Shanghainese. Such coinage accentuates the influence of the Japanese language in Taiwan, ever since the end of the colonial period, it has been borrowed to express novel Taiwanese ideas.\(^{51}\) Again, in a sense this practice calls into question the validity of ‘sharing a common language and culture.’ To the Shanghainese, who are ethnic Chinese, the term meidaizi does not mean anything until it is translated. The hybridity seen in these labels suggests the socio-historical complexity involved in identity formation.

Also significant is the relation between the meidaizi and the diaspora experience of women.\(^{52}\) The complex relationship between the division of labor and the construction of transnational identity rests on gender differences as well as class hierarchy. As James Clifford argues, diaspora has long been regarded as an experience exclusive to men: ‘[d]iasporic experiences are always gendered. But there is a tendency for theoretical accounts of diasporas and diaspora culture to hide this fact, to talk of travel and displacement in unmarked ways, thus normalizing male experiences’ (Clifford 1994: 313). As the division of labor reaches a global scale, the number of women immigrating or working in foreign lands has increased enormously. In Chen’s works, meidaizi has become an exclusive term for Taiwanese women in the mainland. Yet, although its referent nowadays includes de facto not only the female dependants of taishang, but also business women and female staff working in China, the term is still mainly reserved for the wives, whose social standing is determined by their husbands’ achievements. Similarly, the term taima (ma means mother) implies ‘wives of taishang,’ who stay in Shanghai to take care of their children. Confined to the roles of wives and mothers, Taiwanese women in Shanghai currently do not have available identity labels to account for their diverse array of experiences beyond the domestic sphere.\(^{53}\) Seen in this light, the ‘self’ in the ‘self-articulation’ of Taiwanese in Shanghai exemplified by these labels is a mere façade. Under the guise of a homogeneous entity, it conceals a complex multiplicity of both class and gender differences that still require rigorous interpretation.

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51) Two recent examples are ‘tatsu-jin’ (daren) and ‘kuso’ (egao). The former means ‘connoisseur’ and the latter, originally referring to human excrement, now usually designates a subculture that defies mainstream values.

52) The meanings of diaspora here deviate from the word’s traditional association with exile. As Ong explains, ‘diaspora politics describe not an already existing social phenomenon, but rather a social category called into being by newly empowered transnational subjects’ (Ong 2003: 88). To be precise, my use follows those of Khachig Toonian and James Clifford. As Clifford maintains, ‘flexible accumulation requires massive transnational flows of capital and labor-depending on, and producing, diasporic populations’ (Clifford 1994: 311). Taishang in Shanghai could be seen as such diasporic population, one of ‘the exemplary communities of the transnational moment’ in Töölöin’s terms (qtd. in Clifford 1994: 303), communities born at the current transnational moment of flexible accumulation and the rise of global city-regions. I also employ taishang’s case to illustrate the complicated diaspora consciousness produced in response to the variegated experience of migration, including displacement, assimilation, or syncretism, just to name a few. My analysis of the self-articulating labels of taishang helps elucidate how ‘it [diaspora] is about feeling global’ (Clifford 1994: 312).

53) For Taiwanese women in Shanghai, see Ji (2003).
Conclusion

The labor regimes of globalization produce plural transnational subjects that require cultural articulation and recognition. To expose and challenge the assumptions underlying the production and representation of their cultural identities, we have to explore the politics of presence and absence whose manipulations conceal the contradictions between flexible accumulation of global capital and flexible citizenship in the geographical context of global-city regions. The Protein Girl series exemplifies the mobility of capital in a global network, entertaining its readers with vignettes of a sexy professional managerial elite, urban glamour zones and barely existent national borders. On the other hand Chen’s works, written as a pedagogical tool for Taiwanese, open up important questions about the social tensions produced within and across various geographical scales. Situating these texts in the context of the Taipei-Shanghai linkage, I analyze the imagination of the flexible identities, enabled by the material conditions of the urban network, and further lay bare the intricate connections between the new geopolitical regionalism and cultural narrative of transnational Chinese. Juxtaposing Wang’s novels and Chen’s survival guides, I have tried to bring to light the complexity of articulating and constructing transnational identities in the contemporary context of global city-regions.

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Zhoukan


Changing Social Space of Beijing: from Danwei perspective

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Outline

1. Introduction
2. Research framework
3. Spatial changes of Danwei compound
   - Case study of Beijing No.2 textile factory
4. Social changes of Danwei community
   - Case study of Tongrentang medicine factory
5. Discussions and conclusion

1. Introduction: Socio-economic transition and social space changes in Beijing

- Urban land reform and changes of land-use pattern
  - leasing of urban land use rights and the forming of land rent price
  - urban renewal and the relocation of enterprises and residents
- Urban housing reform and the increasing residential mobility
  - marketization and privatization of housing
  - free choice in housing market
  - Spatial outcome: residential differentiation
  - Rapid suburbanization
  - new housing construction in suburb
  - mixed residential landscape
- form homogenous to heterogeneous
- more mixed and complicated residential pattern
Danwei perspective to social space changes

- as one part of socialist system
  - especially, Housing welfare system
- as cells of urban society and space
  - basic unit of social management and organization
  - basic spatial territory of urban space
- as a kind of social network
  - a channel of social interaction and social support in Danwei community

Concept of Danwei

- Danwei (or work units) is the basic unit of the Chinese urban society, which provides not only jobs but also housing, health care, and other welfare for their employees (Chai and Liu, 2003).
- Types of Danwei: factory, institution, government, and public organization (Chai, 1996)
- Foundation of urban China:
  - Organization of economic production
  - Basic unit of social organization

Characteristics of Danwei compound

- Cultural implications of compounds
  - 'compound' & 'home'
  - Wall, enclosed space, a sense of security and privacy
- Inherit some spatial element of Chinese traditional compound
  - Chinese traditional compound
  - Danwei compound
- Residential landscape of Beijing
  - Old Beijing: Siheyuan
  - New Beijing: Danwei compound
**Spatial layouts of Chinese traditional compounds**

四合院 Siheyuan (left)  衙门 Yamen(middle)  国子学和孔庙 Guozixue and kongmiao(right)

Note: 1,gate and corridor  2,main functional space  3,Auxiliary function space  4, residential space  5, courtyard

**Internal spatial pattern of Danwei Compound**

机关事业单位  工业企业单位 
government department and institutions  Industrial enterprises

**Spatial characteristics and spatial order in Danwei compound**

- Spatial characteristic
  - Wall, enclosure space
  - Axis symmetry
  - Zoning: a clearly division between industrial plants and residential area
  - Short distance between work place and residential place
  - A full range of facilities in Danwei compound
• **Spatial order**
  - form primary to nun-important
  - from public to private

**Case 1: Beijing No.2 textile factory**

![Beijing No.2 textile factory map](image)

**Case 2: Beijing Tongrentang medicine factory**

![Beijing Tongrentang medicine factory map](image)
2. Research Framework

- **Research focus: Danwei perspective**
  - Spatial changes in Danwei compound: case study of Beijing No.2 textile factory
  - Social changes in Danwei community: case study of Tongreyuan medicine factory

- **Research city: Beijing**
3. Spatial changes of Danwei Compound

- **Three Aspects:**
  - Changes in land use pattern
  - Privatization of residential area
  - Changes in welfare facilities and service provision

- **Data:**
  - Observation, historical archives

- **Case study:**
  - Beijing No.2 Textile Mill

- **Case: Beijing No.2 Textile Mill:** Blue Print
  - Industrial enterprise Danwei
  - An Example of Typical suburban self-sufficient Danwei compound
  - Built up in 1953
  - Land: 19 ha
Case: Beijing No.2 Textile Mill: 1950s
Case: Beijing No.2 Textile Mill: **Late 1970s**

Case: Beijing No.2 Textile Mill: **Late 1980s**
Transformation of Culture and Spatial Economy of Asian City-Regions

Case: Beijing No.2 Textile Mill: **Late 1990s**

Case: Beijing No.2 Textile Mill: **2000s**
Summary: Spatial Changes

- Three Trends:
  - Hybrid of land use pattern
  - Hybrid of property rights of residential housing
  - Hybrid of types of service providers and consumers

4. Social Changes of Danwei Community

- Focus: Residential mobility and implication for population Hybridization
- Three groups of Danwei residents
  - Non-movers
  - Outward-movers
  - Inward-movers
- Data:
  - 26 in-depth interviews
  - Beijing Tongrentang

Housing constructions in Tongrentang compound

- State owned industrial enterprise
  - Include No.2 medicine factory, storage and transport station and residential area
  - Land: 8.9 ha

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Population changes in *Danwei* community

Tenure changes
Danwei employees’ moving out

“……我们6楼那老太太，是副厂长——自己本来有房，分房的时候就想给小儿子弄一套呢——人家职务在哪呢，后来自己没住半年就给小儿子了。”
—样本C-03

“……楼上那家儿子那等房娶媳妇——她们俩口子一辈子都工人，哪来的钱买房呀？后来寻思着把这个房装装给儿子住，老两口在郊区找个地方也好凑合——年轻人上班得住城里，退休的就无所谓了。”
—样本C-04

Non-Danwei employees’ moving in

“……我们原来住崇文区沙子口——当时赶上拆迁，给了我们每平米9000的补贴——平房，面积小，（补贴）都加一块，一共就40万——只能买二手的。选这也没什么特别的原因，就是这房43万——自己修一点，我们还出得起。”
—样本C-11

“……赶上拆迁，倒腾房子倒腾了好几回——然后儿子给找的这儿，就住这了。”
—样本C-12

“……房产中介找到这里的——就因为离我大姑、二姐近，平时我们几个姐仨凑一起可以打打麻将，要不没意思啊。”
—样本C-13

Non-Movers: Life Course Bounded to Danwei

- Case: privation of housing property

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Born in Beijing

Working in a Danwei

Rent house for wedding

Moved to house allotted by the Danwei

Buy the property
Transformation of Culture and Spatial Economy of Asian City-Regions

- **Case:** Effects of job mobility and housing marketization

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<td>2002</td>
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<td>金融街新楼房3层（商品房）</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Inward-movers:** Non-Danwei Employees Inward Migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>年份</th>
<th>生命周期</th>
<th>职业经历</th>
<th>居住经历</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979年</td>
<td>出生</td>
<td></td>
<td>四川父母单位房</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998年</td>
<td>上大学</td>
<td></td>
<td>四川大学</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003年</td>
<td>大学毕业</td>
<td>新华社下属报社工作</td>
<td>长兴店（单位分配房，二层 56 平米，与哥哥同住)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004年</td>
<td>结婚</td>
<td></td>
<td>方圆居住区的商品房 (二层 68 平米)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006年</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>购买原A单位内的二手房（三层 110 平米)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Summary: Social Changes**

**Hybrid of Danwei Community**
- Implications
  - New social networks
  - Integration of new migrants
  - Weakened sense of place attachment

**Danwei residents' attitude to new migrants**

新搬来的也算是邻居，街里街坊的，相处久了就好了，远亲不如近邻嘛，这点，我倒无所谓，大家礼尚往来

——A单位包装女工（A05）

说心里话，现在我们小区有新的人过来住能够理解，但是吧彼此不了解，铁门就只能关得严一点，比如你说2号那家（举例）。。。很干扰我们。。。但是在这个楼里住着，就要守着这里的规矩对吧，不要干扰别人。这里尽是卖的，没有以前的那种感觉了啊。。。现在全都是外地人，弄得，唉，不好啊

——A单位某职工（AY1）

**Integration of new migrant and Danwei residents**

我2003年搬来的，和对门那家，也是搬来的，到去年停电第一次会话，原来都关上门各干各的，三年了才有来往。

——计算机厂退休职工（AR1）

邻里关系也想啊。我们两都是早出晚归的，大家没有机会碰面，更没有机会认识，如果有啥组织之类的，还好一些。

——某报社记者（AR4）

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**5. Discussion: Filtering Down of Danwei Compound**

![Filtering Down Diagram]

- House quality faster decline
- Higher Maintaining Cost
- Fixed assets accelerative depreciates
- Property Abandon of the Danwei
- Property flow fast
- The Danwei employees moved out
- Providing conversion space
- Key people left
- Debasing the authority of the Danwei
- New people without the Danwei moved in
- Reduction of the maintenance spending by the Danwei
- The decline of physical infrastructure in the community
- The decline of Social cohesion in the community

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6. Conclusion

- Being a kind of spatial territory, *Danwei's* impacts on urban space and community will still exist

- *Danwei* system is still a very important perspective to study urban transition and spatial restructuring of China
SESSION III

Tokyo and Seoul
- Culture and spatial Economy

- Changing Spatial Economy and Cultural Industries in Tokyo
  Hiroshi Matsubara
  (University of Tokyo, Japan)

- Making 'Chic' Places of Seoul: Art Galleries’ Role in Cultural Economy
  Hakhee Kim
  (Gyeongin National University of Education, Korea)
Changing Spatial Economy and Cultural Industries in Tokyo

Hiroshi Matsubara
(The University of Tokyo)

1 Introduction

Japan is currently undergoing a significant socioeconomic transformation. Globalization and structural-reform are regarded as the central motors to this transformation. Japan is also experiencing a rapid demographic change in the form of a declining birthrate and an aging population. Population changes in the late 1990s led to clear contrasts between growing metropolitan regions and declining peripheral regions.

Considering recent topics, such as emerging urban competition in Asia and clustering of various cultural industries, in this paper, I attempt to clarify changing spatial economy and cultural industries in Tokyo. Today, I should like to give my talk in four parts. The first part overviews changing urban systems of Japan. The second part indicates recent transformation of internal structure in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area. The third part deals with geographical agglomeration of cultural industries in Tokyo. In this part, I will talk about some results of my recent study on Japanese movie industry. And then, the last part tries to discuss perspectives on the spatial economy of Tokyo.

2 Changing Urban Systems of Japan

Figure 1 shows the distribution of cities with more than 100,000 and their growth rates of the population from 2000 to 2005. In this figure, the differences of population change among cities are observed. The increase in population is seen in the three largest cities, such as Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya, and regional capital cities, such as Sapporo, Sendai, Hiroshima, and Fukuoka. On the other hand, population decrease is remarkable in many local small cities.

As for the trends in the net-migration toward the three major metropolitan areas, the flow of population from rural to urban areas increased after which the
income disparity steadily widened through the high economic growth period(Figure 2). In the 1970s after the oil crisis, both the flow of population to the major cities and the income disparity among prefectures generally declined. However, in the 1980s, population became intensely concentrated in only Tokyo, causing the income disparity to widen once again. Although the mono-polarization in Tokyo became weak in the depression of the 1990s after the collapse of the "bubble" economy, the Tokyo Metropolitan Area has again experienced a large influx of new residents and the "Toshin Kaiki", a rise in net migration in the core areas, has progressed since the mid-1990s. It seems that recent Tokyo re-centralization phenomena are related to the drop of a land price rather than the income disparity.

The status of each metropolitan area has also changed (Figure 3), as shown by its share of population, manufactured goods shipments, wholesale sales, employees of information service industries, corporate head offices and foreign companies. Osaka’s shares have decreased in some items, such as manufacturing and wholesale, whereas recent important functions of international finance and information services have been concentrated in Tokyo.

As for the recent change after the collapse of the "bubble” economy, three points are remarkable.

1) The tendency of population to concentrate in Tokyo is continuing.
2) Concerning the level of industrial shipments, Nagoya’s share is increasing, reflecting growth of the automobile industry.
3) After the falling tendency in the 1990s for the functions of wholesale and information service, Tokyo’s shares of such functions have been increasing again since 2000.

Table 1 lists industries with a high location quotients in the 23 wards of Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya. In Tokyo, various industries, such as internet based services, wholesale trades, securities, information services, and Printing industries, have appeared in the list and Tokyo is characterized by the diversity of industry. Osaka is also characterized by the numerousness of the industry. However, those industries are dominated by some kinds of wholesale trades. Nagoya is inferior compared with Tokyo or Osaka in respect of both the number and the spread of industries.

3 Transformation of Internal Structure in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the time of the bubble economy, the increase in land prices occurred mainly in Tokyo’s CBD, reflecting the tight office space market, surplus money and active land purchases by real-estate companies. The incremented price-wave then spread from commercial land to residential land, from inner area to outer areas, and from Tokyo to regional
capital cities, such as Fukuoka and Sapporo (Figure 4).

The internal structure of Tokyo has also been drastically changed in this period. Some older residential areas adjoined to the CBD have been destroyed to construct office buildings. The old factories or warehouses in the waterfront areas have been replaced by newly built offices and condominiums. In addition, suburban business centers, such as Makuhari in Chiba and Minato Mirai 21 in Yokohama, have been developed for decentralization of administrative functions from the core area.

However, since the collapse of the bubble, the land prices have shown a decreasing tendency (Figure 5 (a)). Until 2006 for a long time, both residential and commercial land prices continued to decline. The office market has indicated a large excess of supply over demand, and much unoccupied lands and many vacant offices remain. Such a depression of land price has caused the large amount of high-rise apartments provision inside the metropolitan area. This active provision has brought about the population growth in the central area of Tokyo.

The population in the three central wards (Chiyoda-ku, Chuo-ku and Minato-ku), is growing from 244,000 in 1995 to 268,000 in 2000 and 325,000 in 2005 (Figure 6). The "Toshin-Kaiki" phenomenon also appears on the map having shown the municipalities of high growth rate of population (Figure 7). In the period from 1990 to 1995, comparatively remote cities, towns and villages in Chiba, Ibaraki and Saitama Prefecture showed the growth rate as high as 10% more. On the other hand, the central areas of Tokyo Metropolitan Areas indicate the high growth rate in 2000-2005. It is also predicted that population decrease will arise and a large number of elderly people will rapidly increase in distant suburban areas.

Since 2000 the supply of office floor space has again increased in the Central Wards Area in Tokyo following the active redevelopment projects such as Shiodome, Roppongi and Marunouchi. Figure 5 (b) shows the supply trends of office floor space in the three central wards and the other 20 outer wards. Although the supply in the three central wards has been exceeded by that in the other 20 wards from 1988 to 1999, this was reversed in 2000, and this trend is continuing.

In order to revitalize Japan’s economy, the National Government has designated the emergent development area in the center of Tokyo based on the "Law on Emergency Measures for Urban Regeneration" in 2002. Inside the emergency development area, the normal time needed to redevelop is shortened and the increase of floor space ratio is accepted. Such a policy suits developer's interest because production of space is important for developers to increase their profits.
Demand for office space to expand business operations in the center of Tokyo has also been increasing, reflecting the recovery trend of Japanese economy since 2002. The rate of vacant rented offices in the 23 wards has declined from 9.6% in 1994 to 2.6% in 2006 and the annual growth rate of rents in the large-scale office buildings has reached to 10% in recent years.

In addition, as one of the factors behind recent expansion of markets for real estate investment, the newly emergence of "real estate securitization" schemes has been observed.

4 Geographical Agglomeration of Cultural Industries in Tokyo

Regarding to the definition of cultural industry, we find some different ideas and it is difficult to extract precisely from the actual statistics. In this paper, the following industry will be dealt with as a cultural industry: Publishers, printing and allied industries, newspaper publishers, broadcasting, video picture information production and distribution, sound information production, and internet based services, based on the industrial classification used in the 2006 Establishment and Enterprise Census.

Figure 8 shows Tokyo’s number of employees by each cultural industry and its share to national total. Over 70 % of publishers, video picture information production and distribution, sound information production, and internet based services are concentrated in Tokyo prefecture. On the other hand, the share of broadcasting and newspaper publishers is relatively low because of the development of local broadcasting and local press in every prefecture.

In Figure 9, we can find breakdown number of establishments by number of employees. Tokyo has many small establishments, over 50 % of which have three or fewer employees. The ratio of small establishments in printing and allied industries is higher than that of publishers. Compared with broadcasting, video picture information production and distribution indicates higher rate of small establishments.

As for the changes in the number of employees, we can find clear contrast between older cultural industries and newer cultural industries (Figure 10). Between 2001 and 2006, a decline in the outer 16 wards area in printing and allied industries and growth in the urban center in publishing and video picture information production have been marked. In particular, growth in the urban center and sub-center area in internet based industries is conspicuous.

Printing and allied industries show the high exit rate. It has been noted that business successions are not progressing smoothly among SMEs due to various factors. It can be regarded that the influence of urbanization and the increase in land prices is one of the major factors.
Figure 11 shows the geographical distribution of areas with a high location quotients by each cultural industry in the 23 wards of Tokyo. Although Newspaper publishers and publishers are concentrated in the core area, such as Chiyoda-ku, Chuo-ku and Bunkyo-ku, printing and allied industries are dispersed in the surrounding areas of central Tokyo, such as Sumida-ku and Arakawa-ku, and the northern outer areas, such as Kita-ku and Itabashi-ku. We can find the spatial division of labor between publishers and printing in Tokyo Metropolitan Area.

On the other hand, new cultural industries, such as video picture information production and distribution, sound information production, and internet based services, are concentrated in Minato-ku and Shibuya-ku. Broadcasting also indicates higher location quotients in Minato-ku and Shibuya-ku. The strong relationship between the location of broadcasting and the agglomeration of new cultural industries has been observed.

As for the recent situation of the new cultural industries, Hanzawa (2004) contrasted two Japanese cultural industries - animation and home video games - by examining their key characteristics: location patterns, labor markets, and inter-firm relationships. Both industries are concentrated in small firms within Greater Tokyo and both exhibit close inter-firm relationships. Within Tokyo almost all animation firms are located in the western suburbs of Tokyo and the agglomeration of game firms is in the central area (Figure 12). He explained that this locational difference arises from divergences in the development paths of animation and game firms. He also analyzed the location of the production firms of TV programs (Figure 13). Those firms need to be close to key commercial television stations, such as Tokyo Broadcasting System Television in Akasaka and TV Asahi Corporation in Roppongi.

Today, I focus on the movie industry. Japanese movie industry which has the long history from 1920s like Hollywood, has been recognized as a declining industry since the 1960s, because of the power enlargement of TV and rental video shops. However since 2000, the distributor’s income and the number of films released of Japanese films have again increased (Figure 14, 15). In 2006, the market share of Japanese films surpassed that of Western films. The reasons which Japanese movie industry has recovered can be summarized to three points.

1) organizational transformation of production system

In recent years, the ratio of Japanese films which have been produced by the production committees, “Seisaku linkai” in Japanese. Those committees consist of some different kinds of actors, such as movie companies, TV companies, advertising agencies, publishers, and newspaper publishers. It is said that this system has some advantages in respect of financing, secondary use of contents, advertisement and so on. In particular, TV companies have played an important role as very influential actors in the growth of markets.
2) increase of sales by multi-use of contents

The source of revenue has been diversified not only from box office gross receipts but also from various contents, such as TV broadcasting, novelization, character-goods sales, internet distribution, and export.

3) diffusion of new style theater called cinema complex

The number of screens has changed to increase since the 1990s, as the older theaters have been substituted for cinemacomplex (Figure 16). Some older movie theaters adjoined to the CBD in the large metropolitan areas have been reconstructed into cinemacomplex. Another type of cinemacomplex has been newly constructed in the shopping centers in suburban areas. These cinemacomplex has attracted new demand of families with children.

Under these circumstances, Japanese major movie companies, Shochiku, Toho, and Toei, have again increased the ratio of movie and TV division compared with real estate and other divisions (Figure 17). Each company has one or two studios in Tokyo and/or Kyoto and some directly operated theaters in major cities, such as Tokyo, Osaka, and Fukuoka. In order to produce films and TV programs and operate those facilities, it has organized many subsidiaries and affiliated companies. In addition, Toho has rental space for other companies in Kinuta (Setagaya-ku) studio, which was established in 1943, and Toei uses Kyoto studio as a theme park called Toei Uzumasa Eigamura.

The movie industry’s production process is generously divided into four parts: development, preproduction, production and post production. Each process is supported by many actors, in particular very small and specialized companies. Figure 18 shows the locational characteristics of video picture information production companies based on the special directory. We can find functional and spatial divisions of labor and the locational patterns are classified into three types:

1) companies which are mainly located in central Tokyo (Narration, Post production, Music studio etc.)
2) companies which are mainly located in Tokyo subcenter (Free staff office, Costume and Hair makeup, CG and animation etc.)
3) companies which are mainly located in suburbs of Tokyo (Stage properties and setting, Vehicles and Laboratory etc.)

Agglomeration is theoretically explained as an outcome of the minimization of transaction costs in the case of vertical disintegration of production by Allen Scott (1988). He (2005) also analyzed the dynamics of locational agglomeration of the motion-picture industry in Hollywood. In order to explain the location of Japanese movie industry, it is necessary to consider from both viewpoints"Fagglomeration and spatial divisions of labor."
5 Concluding Remarks

It is very difficult to integrate above-mentioned two topics, "transformation of internal structure in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area" and "geographical agglomeration of cultural industries in Tokyo". In this conclusion, I try to examine the perspectives on Japanese cultural industries and spatial structure of Tokyo.

Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry organized "Contents Global Strategy Study Group"and disclosed a final report in 2007. As shown in Figure, "Globalization"," Innovation" and "Changes in financing", intertwined with each other, are forming an "upward spiral of scale". This upward spiral is accelerating globalization of contents business and making the global contents market more competitive. Development of digital contents is also accelerating integration of the different types of contents, such as films, TV programs, music, and comics. Under such circumstances, it is pointed out in this report that as various genres of contents are integrated, Japanese contents may generate larger synergistic effects than those of other countries.

However, this perspective seems to be too optimistic. One of important problems is institutional and/or organizational barrier specific to each cultural industry. It retains the strong culture of subcontractor, who make products for contents for the Japanese market in the existing framework.

Another problem is the lack of geographical viewpoint. As mentioned above, Japanese cultural industries differ markedly in their detailed location patterns. In order to integrate successfully the different types of cultural industries, it is necessary to consider the geographical background and the location factor in each cultural industry.

Although it is recognized that contents industries have two aspects: culture and business, they focused solely on the side of business in this report. However, it is more important to focus on the side of culture. As for the competitiveness of some cultural industries, the creativity is indispensable and often influenced by the cultural peculiarity and the geographical specific environment.

Tokyo metropolitan area is the largest world city-region and has strengthen the centrality of a lot of advanced functions in Japan. Competitive power of new cultural industries, such as animation and game software, has also been demonstrated in recent years. However, considering the viewpoint of the global competition among world cities, Tokyo is suffering numerous problems, including expensive land and commodity prices, some kinds of congestion phenomena and inconvenient infrastructures. As Tokyo is too large and in disorder, it is difficult to get important information on the new business opportunities and develop close interfirm relationships. In order to enhance creativity and strengthen international
competitiveness of cultural industries, it is important to convert internal structure of urban areas, to accelerate the multi-polarization and to construct comfortable space in the metropolitan area.

References


Making *Chic* Places of Seoul
: Art Galleries’ Role in Cultural Economy

Hakhee Kim
(Gyeongin National University of Education)

Attractive Cities...

- What is the common characteristic of the cities and regions thriving in the global economy – places such as New York, London, Paris and Los Angeles?
- They are open, tolerant and attractive places where gays, artists, dreamers, bohemians and yuppies want to live (Florida, 2002).
- They are not only the financial centres of the world economy but also the cultural paradises famous for their music and art-related facilities, various museums and theatres and their creative atmosphere.
Creative Economy in Cities

- Many cities around the world have come to recognise the economic and social benefits that flow from the creative economy, and are implementing aggressive urban policies to nurture and promote creative and cultural activities (Chang, 2000; O’Connor et al., 2006; Peck, 2005).
- Creative and cultural activity enhances a city’s quality as a place, helps to revitalise neighbourhoods and shapes a city’s identity in the face of increasing competition for global talents (Rofe, 2004; Scott, 2006).
- In ‘The Creative Economy’, Howkins (2001) creates a framework around creativity, intellectual property, management, capital and wealth to understand what is going on in the new economy.

Art Galleries in Cultural Economy

- Recent research shows that art galleries and museums well as prominent artists have made significant contributions in boosting the image of the city to attract foreign tourists and global talents (Evans, 2003; Lazzeretti, 2003; Vicario et al., 2003; Plaza, 2006).
- Even though the direct impacts on economic development as a generator of jobs and income may not be significant, the symbolic value of the art-related world is increasing explosively in terms of attracting other cultural industries and tourists or of bolstering the cultural image of a city, region and even nation.
- But the art and art-related economy are rarely examined, possibly due to the fact that they are sometimes not regarded as a distinct subgroup categorized as such for discourse and statistical purposes (Hesmondhalgh et al., 2005; Galloway et al., 2007).
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Global Art Market and its Urban Hierarchy

- Dealing in Western high art is dominated by New York, Paris and London, as well as several second-tier international nodes such as Los Angeles, Tokyo, Zurich, Milan and Dusseldorf in the global art market hierarchy (Watson, 1992; While, 2003).
- Art markets differ substantially from commercial and financial markets. To invest in art, collectors must acquire extensive knowledge of the art world and its history as well as of artwork itself and have massive capital to buy the famous artists' paintings and sculptures.
- Throughout the post-war era various political and economic interests are closely related to strategies to reinforce the city's image and reputation as a global capital of art and culture.

Modern Art Galleries' Role

- The modern art gallery represents the interface between autonomous art and freelance artists and the capitalist market and its buyers – who mostly call themselves collectors. In this respect, to a certain extent it is the mediating agent between the studio and the drawing room. At the same time, the gallery also fills the gap left by the disappearance of prescribed representational tasks.
- London's re-emergence as a centre for contemporary art in the 1990s was closely related to the opening of new galleries and alternative exhibition spaces in the artists' colony in the East End area in London.
- Many art critics and historians agreed that the real innovation of yBa lay in how and where it was presented (Shone, 1997; Artfield, 1999; Stallabrass, 1999; Wedd, 2003). The bohemian atmosphere of the area seemed to facilitate new artistic activities and interactions.
Cultural Clustering Strategies for Urban Regeneration

- Creating or nurturing cultural clusters has emerged as an attractive, alternative vehicle for urban regeneration among urban policy makers. A mixture of cultural functions and activities, from theatre and the visual arts to pop music and the new media, are grouped together in a great variety of spatial forms.
- Cultural clustering strategies seem to use culture as urban regeneration sources, enhancing the interaction between cultural activities embedded in the urban infrastructure and a broader field of urban dynamics and linked in value chains.
- While some clustering strategies are restricted to genuine artistic/cultural activities, most of them also incorporate a great variety of consumption spaces such as restaurants, bars, clubs and health and fitness complexes.

Artists Communities in the City

- Cities can provide artists and their attendant community with a suitable environment in which to generate the networks, relationships, facilities and cultural spill-over effects within and across artistic communities. Various avant-garde movements have been closely related to urban life and so it remains even today in the global cities (Ley, 2003; Grosenick et al., 2005).
- There are growing concerns that these cultural clustering strategies could lead to a destruction or inflation of original artistic value and to commercialization of the spaces. Artists and other creative people seem to be routinely priced out of areas that become prosperous due to the very creative activity that they helped to generate.
Artists’ roles in Urban Cultures

• Ley (2003) mentioned that ‘artists seem to have some aesthetic power to transform a deserted place to cultural commodity; from a junk to an artwork and then into an asset with cultural value’. Even, the dirty items can evoke an ironic critical commentary.

• There seems to be a kind of symbiotic relationship between the art and the artist’s neighbourhood. Artists tend to live in the inner city area because it is cheap, because it is a friendly environment and because of the richness of culture and artistic inspiration.

• Urban decay and physical disrepair can be understood as a creative potential which awaits artistic redefinition. Urban grittiness and ruggedness can be translated into a valuable resource or energy to stimulate artistic creativity.

The objective of this paper...

• This paper aims to identify certain geographical characteristics of art galleries as an agent which plays some significant mediating roles in between artists, collectors, consumers and distributors of cultural knowledge.

• It will reveal the location characteristics of art galleries in Seoul, reflecting urban development processes, historical specificities and characteristics of Korean art communities.

• It will also examine the role of art galleries in the making of chic consumption spaces within urban areas in connection with the human ecology of artists, art business world and its implication in the global market.
The Location of the Art Galleries in Seoul  

1. Gwanghwamoon & Insa-dong Area
2. Sagan & Samcheong-dong Area
3. Cheongdam & Apgujeong-dong Area
4. Shinsa-dong Area
5. Pyongchang-dong Area
6. Hongik-University Area

The Gwanghwamoon and Insa-dong area

- The Gwanghwamoon and Insa-dong area is one of the largest cultural clusters in Seoul. Gwanghwamoon accommodated many public art museums as a historic, cultural, political and economic centre of Korea.
- Insa-dong retains its status as the largest art cluster accommodating interesting traditional art shops and art galleries and a combination of an exhibition space and café.
- According to research about the image of Insa-dong (Cho et al., 2002), antique shops, rare book stores, calligraphy shop, traditional tea house, traditional clothes shops including art galleries can be categorized as positive components to make Insa-dong keep its identity and boost its image.
- But the area has increasingly become commercialised with modern restaurants, karaoke and fusion bar and has lost its distinct identity as a traditional art centre.
Cheongdam & Apgujung-dong Area

- Cheongdam-dong and Apgujung-dong in Gangnam accommodate some art galleries with a good reputation in dealing with foreign art works. Art galleries are more tailored to the wealthy collectors who prefer the artworks of more established artists to those of young artists.
- They don’t seem to maintain the linkage with local artist communities or support young artists but specialize in dealing with western art work with a well developed connection to the global art market. Art is regarded as an alternative means to diversify the investment portfolios and upgrade the social/cultural status of collectors.
- Art galleries are surrounded with conspicuous consumption spaces like luxurious designer shops and chic restaurants serving top-quality world food and drinks.

Sagan & Samcheong-dong Area

- Samcheong-dong and Sagan-dong have accommodated many leading major art galleries since the early 2000s. They attracted growing media interest as an alternative cultural consumption centre of Gangbuk or a ‘Cheongdam-dong of Gangbuk’.
- Many owners of the retail stores with creative minds and cultural capital opening their shops in the Samcheong-dong area was attracted by the unique cultural environment of the neighbourhood. Art galleries upgraded the cultural atmosphere and increased the economic value of the neighbourhood (Lee and Lee, 2006: 28-30).
Pyongchang-dong Area

- Pyongchang-dong emerged as a small art gallery cluster in early 2000s with little public transportation access.
- Major art galleries and auction houses are located there but seem to have some limitation to achieve rapid growth as an art gallery cluster. They have their own list of rich collectors and invisible but secure connections with their business partners.
- They are already surrounded by luxurious residential houses and gated communities with little commercial or open space for further development.

Hongik-University Area

- Meanwhile Hongik University is one of the prestigious art schools in Korea. It has enjoyed special status in the field of paintings, sculpture and design.
- Its neighbourhood has located many cultural facilities such as clubs for independents rock bands or various music groups as well as small decoration shops, cultural planning, publishing or design companies. Several small multi-cultural spaces sprang up during the early 2000s with an intention of providing an alternative exhibition space for young contemporary artists.
- Recently this area is also facing pressure to commercialise. Karaoke, Korean saunas, bars and even motels are colonizing the artistic spaces rapidly.
Shinsa-dong Area: Garosu-gil

- New in Shinsa dong and its vicinity, there is a street that people call garosu-gil (gah-ro-soo-gil).
- It locates many art galleries and urban chic consumption spaces such as terraced cafes, restaurants, bars, and tiny clothing boutiques.

The rise and fall of art galleries in Seoul

- The location of art galleries in Seoul has seen several phases suggesting a possibility of a location cycle theory in the urban and global context.
- The location dynamics of art gallery clusters in Seoul showed how increased rents, changes of consumers’ taste and fluctuating market cycles are related to the rise and fall of art clusters in Seoul.
- Insa-dong era in 1970-1980s, Cheongdam-dong Era in the 1990s, Samcheong-dong Era in the 2000s and Shinsa-dong Era, recently.
Insa-dong Era: 1970-80

• Since the nineteenth century, Insa-dong has been known as a 'centre of traditional Korean culture' at home and abroad. Insa-dong rose as a traditional street with an agglomeration of antique shops and dealers following the end of World War II in 1945 when Korean was liberated from the Japanese occupation.
• In the 1970s, Insa-dong enjoyed its heyday as a gathering place not only for the aging artists specializing in calligraphy or eastern painting but also for antique collectors and dealers. But a number of antique dealers left Insa-dong as government regulations regarding counterfeits and tax evasions became stricter in the mid-1970s.

Insa-dong, a mecca of Korean Art?

• Even though it lost its monopolistic status as a mecca of Korean art, some vestige of tradition can still be found. Insa-dong district accommodates 40% of the national’s antique shops as well as 90% of traditional stationery shops.
• Insa-dong still seem to keep its status as the largest art cluster accommodating interesting traditional art shops and art galleries and a combination of an exhibition space and a café.
• However it seemed to be losing the historic aura as many modern restaurants, art galleries and stores sprung up, replacing traditional structures and cultural landscapes.
Saving Insa-dong...

When 12 traditional shops were at risk of being cleared away, the president of a successful fashion company decided to buy the space to preserve the unique atmosphere and constructed a building complex with 72 shops, including the 12 previous stores, galleries, traditional handicraft shops, furniture and household supplies stores.

An owner of art gallery in Insa-dong complains:

"...Only several galleries were designated as cultural heritage to be preserved... We, contemporary art galleries, can't compete with restaurants or Karaoke in terms of profit structure. We can't afford to the soaring rents in this area."

The fall of Art Galleries in Insa-dong

- As foreign tourists have flown in, it became overrun with homogeneous shops to sell tourists cheap art crafts or mass-produced souvenirs.
- Art galleries are also losing their artistic leadership and just sub-renting the exhibition space for anonymous artists or art school graduates just for their survival.
- Some art galleries moved to the northern neighbourhood such as Sagan-dong or Samcheong-dong seeking lower rents and larger spaces; Some transformed their exhibition space into complex consumption space including art shop, café or bar.
Booming Global Art Markets in 1990

- Demand for Modern and contemporary paintings in the 1980s were so strong that even works by living artists were often asking prices in excess of $US10 million. As a result, the international market for auctioned art grew dramatically during the period, from less than $US150 million in 1970 to more than $US1.8 billion in 1997 (Wortington, A.C. et al, 2004: 258).

- The Korean art market enjoyed its heydays in 1991 under the influence of a booming global art market. Record-breaking sales in global art markets followed the stock market booms after the mid-1980s.

The Korean *nouveau-riche* in Gangnam

- The Korean and middle-class residents of Gangnam, who were hungry for cultural capital, started to show great enthusiasm for art collecting, fuelled by the profits generated from the property and stock market booms after the 1988 Olympic games.

- In this favourable environment for art, art galleries in Cheongdam-dong and its neighbourhood increased massively to meet the rising demands.
Cheongdam-dong Era: early 1990s

- Cheongdam-dong was a quiet place with relatively low rents in comparison with the traditional artistic centre of Insadong in Gangbuk and immediate commercial area like Apgujeong-dong in the 1980s.
- It had neither convenient public transportation networks nor other commercial/cultural facilities except several garment/furniture outlets.
- It had some advantages as an emerging art gallery cluster as it could provide enough spaces for art exhibition and car parking for potential customers at relatively low rents and its location is near the large residential apartment communities for new rich and middle class residents in Gangnam.
Urban *Chic*, Cheongdam-dong...

- Since the late 1990s, the neighbourhood at Cheongdam-dong was flooded with all the luxurious retail chains, restaurants and bars due to an improved transportation network and spread of commercial spaces in Apgujeong-dong and Galleria department.
- The opening of ‘Cheongdam’ subway station around 2000 and construction of residential villas and apartments for wealthy people who could afford to expensive commodities and advanced cultural tastes aggravated commercialisation of the area.
- Cheongdam-dong seems to keep its status as a venue as a conspicuous consumption space with foreign top designer brand wear, luxurious jewellery collection, *haute* fusion cuisine, wine bar and chic café culture.

Art galleries in Cheondam-dong at risk?

- However...a number of galleries at risk were closed or priced out from the Cheongdam-area during this process.
- Only galleries with owners who were originally rich enough to have a building there or invested audaciously in property for exhibition space in its peak period – in addition to showing simultaneously showing excellent ability in positioning and promoting their art work in the rough terrain of the Korean art market - survived in Cheongdam-dong.
- To make it worse, most of the new art galleries faced serious financial difficulties after the collapse of the international art market boom and continuous general economic depression in the late-1990s.
Samcheong-dong era: the 2000s

- The numbers of art galleries in Samcheong-dong and its neighbourhood has increased sharply from 17 to 41 since 2003. The locus of the art world shifted from Insa-dong to Samcheong-dong with opening several galleries a month.
- A case study of creative retail shops in Bukchon (2006) showed many owners of the retail stores with creative minds and cultural capital opening their shops in the Samcheong-dong area was attracted by the unique cultural environment of the neighbourhood.
- They also emphasized the role of art galleries to upgrade the cultural atmosphere and increase the economic value of the neighbourhood (Lee and Lee, 2006: 28-30).

Changes of Art Galleries Distribution in Samcheong-dong Area

**Year 2002**  
(Data Source: Seoul Art Guide, July 2002)  

**Year 2006**  
(Data Source: Seoul Art Guide, July 2006)
Favorable Urban Policy

- In addition to the attractive cultural milieu of Samcheong-dong, political attention and urban policy also seemed to play a crucial role in providing attractive ground base to the gallery owners.
- Especially, the plausible rumour that National Modern Art Museum could be moved on the neighbourhood at Samchong-dong as a means of urban regeneration boosted the speculation of gallery owners.
- The Metropolitan Seoul government has embarked on an ambitious urban regeneration project whose ultimate aim is to turn Seoul into a flourishing international hub of culture, tourism and business activity. These strategies have mainly called for ‘flagship’ development projects focusing on derelict inner-city sites near the Samcheong-dong area.

Samcheong-dong
: an Artists’ colony and collectors’s haunt with many chic cafes, restaurants and trendy shops
Volatile Cultural Consumption Spaces in Samcheong-dong

- Since the early 2000s, commercial retailers, mostly of clothing and accessory shops and restaurants and cafes have cunningly been exploiting the neighbourhood’s reputation for advanced taste.
- Samcheong-dong and its neighbourhood seem to be transformed and extended into highly visible cultural consumption spaces. It creates alternative and post-modern lifestyle through *nouvelle cuisine* restaurants, boutiques, wine bars as well as art shops and book cafes.
- But the factors that make some place attractive to art gallery gazers are also volatile. The owners said that they should pay attention to the minute dynamics of tastes of consumers within the cultural and symbolic economy.

The Location Dynamics of Art Galleries in Seoul

- In a sense, Samcheong-dong may be a more propitious venue because it resembled Insa-dong in the 1980s or Cheongdam-dong in the 1990s as a booming site with many new galleries and art-related cultural spaces.
- The location dynamics of art gallery clusters in Seoul showed how increased rents, changes of consumers’ taste and fluctuating market cycles are related to the rise and fall of art clusters in Seoul.
- Rising rents and expanding commercial spaces could be a sign of doomsday. In reality, Garosugil in Shinsa-dong is rising as an alternative art space to Samcheong-dong recently.
Characteristics of Art Gallery Location in Seoul

- Most of the art galleries of Korea tend to concentrate on their commercial aspects rather than cultural aspects in spite of their cultural significance in Korea.
- Most art galleries in Seoul are not embedded in the local environment and their location seems to be affected mainly by external factors beyond the control of the artist communities like consumers’ convenience, art business trends and global art market changes, rather than the needs of artists.
- The location of art galleries in Seoul has seen several phases suggesting a possibility of a location cycle theory in the urban and global context.

The lesson from the art gallery location in the competitive modern art world

- From all over the world, critics, artists, dealers, museum professionals, and art-interested people converge on the place where art is produced – even though it is a humble factory district- in order to see the most innovative works of the day.
- Unlike SoHo of New York in 1970s or the East End of London in 1990s, art galleries in Seoul seem to have produced few opportunities for artists to congregate and formed a creative community for their mutual support, creative activities and learning.
- It is extremely difficult to locate visible and symbolic artists’ communities in Seoul. Korean art agglomeration seem to lack the major innovators of the art communities scene; Artists themselves.